Ex-Post evaluation report on the effects of actions under the ISF – Borders & Visa national programme

Final report

For the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Lithuania

Vilnius, 2024

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List of Abbreviations

AFPP	Analysis of financial and physical progress (analysis method)
BMVI	Border Management and Visa Instrument
CD	Customs Department (*lt. Muitinės departamentas prie Lietuvos Respublikos finansų ministerijos, MD*)
CPMA	Central Project Management Agency (*lt. Centrinė projektų valdymo agentūra, CPVA*)
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
FCIS	Financial Crime Investigation Service (*lt. Finansinių nusikaltimų tyrimo tarnyba prie Lietuvos Respublikos vidaus reikalų ministerijos, FNTT*)
ILR	Intervention logic reconstruction (analysis method)
ISF	Internal Security Fund
ITCD	Information Technology and Communications Department under the MoI (*lt. Informatikos ir ryšių departamentas prie Lietuvos Respublikos vidaus reikalų ministerijos*)
LR	Lithuanian Railways (*lt. Lietuvos geležinkeliai, LG*)
FSCL	Forensic Science Centre of Lithuania (*lt. Lietuvos teismo ekspertizės centras, LTEC*)
MoI	Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Lithuania (*lt. Lietuvos Respublikos vidaus reikalų ministerija, VRM*)
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania (*lt. LR Užsienio reikalų ministerija, URM*)
NA/SM	Needs assessment/stakeholder mapping (analysis method)
PD	Police Department under the MoI (*lt. Policijos departamentas prie Lietuvos Respublikos vidaus reikalų ministerijos, PD*)
PSS	The Public Security Service (*lt. Viešojo saugumo tarnyba prie VRM, VST*)
PSSA	Primary and secondary source analysis (data collection and analysis method)
SBGS	The Directorate of Border Crossing Infrastructure (*lt. Pasienio kontrolės punktų direkcija prie VRM, PKPD*)
SFMS	State Forensic Medicine Service (*lt. Valstybinė teismo medicinos tarnyba, VTMT*)
SI	Semi-structured interview (data collection method)
SIS	Special Investigation Service (*lt. Specialiųjų tyrimų tarnyba, STT*)
SO	Specific Objective of the Programme
SSD	State Security Department (*lt. Valstybės saugumo departamentas, VSD*)
IS VORAS	Information System of the Programme

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List of Terms

Evaluator	Smart Continent LT, UAB
Beneficiaries	Institutions that are implementing projects under the Programme
Intermediate Body, CPMA	Central Project Management Agency
Managing Authority, MoI	Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Lithuania
Monitoring Committee	A governing body composed of representatives from all relevant stakeholders, including final beneficiaries, managing authorities, and other national institutions involved in the implementation of the Programme. Its primary role is to oversee the progress of the Programme, ensuring that it meets its objectives efficiently and in alignment with national and EU priorities.
Programme	Internal Security Fund 2014–2020 National Programme
Public Security Development Programme for 2015-2025	Public Security Development Programme for 2015-2025, approved by Resolution No. XII-1682 of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania of 13 May 2015
Report	Ex-Post evaluation report on the effects of actions under the ISF – Borders & Visa national programme

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Summary

The ISF Programme 2014-2020 (hereinafter – Programme) was implemented in Lithuania to enhance Union's security, with a particular focus on securing the Union's external borders, preventing and combating crime, and improving crisis response. As a member of the European Union, Lithuania's strategic position as an external EU border state, neighbouring Russia and Belarus, made the Programme particularly important for the Union's overall security framework. The ISF Programme successfully targeted key national security issues through the allocation of financial resources to law enforcement institutions. Over the programming period, 198 projects were implemented by the beneficiaries (for more details see 3 chapters).

KEY ACHIEVEMENTS:

- **Visas and Borders**. The Programme contributed significantly to support a common visa policy and integrated border management by development and improvement of structures, systems and technical equipment in conformity with the Schengen acquis.
- **Special Transit Scheme.** The STS is one of key achievements of the Programme implemented in Lithuania. It was designed to facilitate the transit of Russian citizens through Lithuania to the Kaliningrad region without requiring a standard Schengen visa, using special transit documents (Facilitated Transit Document (FTD) and Facilitated Railway Transit Document (FRTD)). The scheme was part of Lithuania's legal obligations following EU agreements with Russia after Lithuania's accession to the EU.
- **Crime prevention,** combating cross-border, serious and organised crime including terrorism **and crisis response**. Investments in modernizing law enforcement tools and improving inter-agency cooperation have bolstered Lithuania's ability to effectively combat and manage organized crime and respond to crises, including geopolitical tensions and migration surges.
- **Use of technical assistance**. Use of technical assistance for the installation, updating, operation and interconnection of computerised systems for management, monitoring, audit, control and evaluation was a key development in reducing the administrative burden. This allowed for the improvement of more efficient project oversight and transparency.
- **Flexible multiannual programming**. The Programme's multiannual funding mechanism allowed for flexibility in addressing changing security needs. Decisions on project priorities and fund reallocations were made collaboratively through the Monitoring Committee, which included all key stakeholders.
- **Results of implementing each of 6 SOs**.

SO1 – Support a common visa policy. In implementing SO1, the national Visa Information System (VIS) was established, technical and communication tools at visa service workstations were upgraded, consular officers and visa service staff received specialized training, and Schengen visa issuance was expanded through the Consulate-General in Almaty.

SO2 – Borders. SO2 strengthened border security and information sharing by enhancing inter-agency exchange, developing national border surveillance systems and advancing biometric verification. Key investment projects included the strengthening of the exchange of information among all the authorities responsible for external border surveillance by obtaining advanced electronic data processing and transmission techniques, development of national border surveillance system, implementation of the biometric data verification system, development and improvement of structures, systems and technical equipment in order to improve the implementation of the Schengen acquis, implementation of the recommendations made in Schengen evaluations, implementation of the national SIS, development and implementation of the EU Entry-Exist System (EES), investments on the EES, European Travel Information and Authorization System (ETIAS), and the acquisition of technical means for border control. Notably, Lithuania devoted the necessary funding to Eurosur in order to ensure its good functioning – in total EUR 28,56 million.

SO3 – Operating support. SO3 provided operational support to enhance visa processing (operating support for national VIS) and border management capabilities (operating support for national SIS).

SO4 – Special transit scheme (STS). The resources allocated to Lithuania for ensuring the upgrading of FTD/FRTD issuing and delivery systems, ensuring and developing of the control over the persons travelling with FTD/FRTD,

strengthening the response capacity to ensure the smooth transit of Russian citizens, training of the staff implementing the STS. Also, the funds for smooth functioning of the STS were used for the compensation of foregone fees and for additional costs, which result directly from the specific requirements of implementing the operation of the STS. The additional costs included the renewal of depreciated assets, maintenance and support of the existing equipment and IT systems, on training of the staff executing STS and additional operating costs, including salaries of staff specifically implementing STS.

SO5 – Preventing and combating crime. SO5 focused on strengthening law enforcement capacities to tackle cross-border and organized crime through enhanced investigative methods, criminal intelligence, and financial crime investigation. Key actions included building capacities for cross-border data exchange, creating systems like the centralized Information System of Retained Data and the national Passenger Information Unit (PIU), and developing IT solutions for interoperability with EU databases. The initiative also established analytical tools for the Criminal Offences Register, a universal data search system for law enforcement, and provided specialized training to officials on EU policy topics and victim support.

SO6 – Risks and crisis. SO6 focused on building capacity to counter individual terrorism and prevent violence by establishing information-sharing networks for frontline practitioners, preparing for automated data exchange via the INTERPOL Ballistic Information Network, and providing awareness-raising training.

CHALLENGES:

- **Delayed implementation of IT systems**. One of the challenges faced during the implementation of the Programme was the delayed development of EU large scale IT systems, particularly the Entry/Exit System (EES) and the European Travel Information and Authorization System (ETIAS). This delay impacted Lithuania's ability to develop its national EES and ETIAS systems on schedule, creating challenges in aligning national capabilities with EU-wide security frameworks. These setbacks required adjustments in project timelines and resource allocations to ensure that national systems could eventually integrate smoothly with the overarching EU infrastructure.
- **Sustainability and long-term impact**. The investments made through the ISF Programme are expected to have lasting effects. The continued use of the equipment purchased during the period, such as surveillance systems, vehicles and IT tools, ensures that the benefits of the Fund will continue well beyond the 2014-2020 programming period. Additionally, capacity-building initiatives, such as training law enforcement personnel, have left a lasting impact by improving the operational efficiency of these institutions.

LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

- **Expand early implementation of monitoring IT system**: The timely introduction of computerised system for management, monitoring, audit, control and evaluation in future programmes should be a priority to ensure all beneficiaries can fully utilize them from the outset.
- **Strengthen crisis preparedness**: Future programs should further support integrated border management, a common visa policy, reinforce Lithuania's capabilities to respond to crises, especially given its strategic position as an EU border with Russia and Belarus State. Additionally, strengthening the coordination and interoperability of police forces across borders will be crucial, ensuring rapid and effective responses to security threats, cross-border crime, and potential disruptions in times of crisis.
- **Ensure continuous partnership with relevant authorities and bodies**: The partnership composition varied throughout the programme stages, involving relevant state authorities. A monitoring committee was established to support the programme's implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. The Monitoring Committee's success in bringing together stakeholders should be maintained and enhanced to ensure smooth project execution and the continued alignment of national and EU specific objectives.
- **Operating support.** The budget allocated to the national programme referred to in Article 9, to the operating support referred to in Article 10 and to the functioning of the Special Transit Scheme referred to in Article 11 shall be further implemented under shared management.

Introduction

Smart Continent LT, UAB (hereinafter – Evaluator) conducts evaluation as per public procurement contract No. 1S-133, which was signed on 19th of April 2024 regarding the Ex-Post Evaluation of the Internal Security Fund 2014–2020 National Programme (hereinafter – Evaluation).

EVALUATION GOAL: The goal of this evaluation is to assess the effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, coherence, complementary, EU-added value, and sustainability of the actions implemented under the Internal Security Fund (ISF), in line with the common monitoring and evaluation system established by Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No. 207/2017. The evaluation will specifically address the questions outlined in Annex II of Regulation (EU) 2017/207 and will measure the impact by providing the values for the common result and impact indicators as specified in Annex IV of the same regulation.

EVALUATION CRITERIA:[1]

- Effectiveness;
- Efficiency;
- Relevance;
- Coherence;
- Complementary;
- EU added value;
- Sustainability;
- Simplification and reduction of administrative burden.

EVALUATION TASKS:

- Assess the impact made towards achieving the objectives set out in the Programme, considering the actual use of resources, the timing of the Programme's approval, and the full implementation period. The evaluation will focus on the long-term outcomes and the extent to which the Programme has contributed to its intended goals.
- Evaluate compatibility and synergies with other funding sources and programs, identifying how the Programme has complemented or interacted with these sources. The evaluation will explore any overlaps, complementarities, or gaps in funding and their impact on the overall effectiveness of the Programme.
- Identify key factors influencing the achievement of the Programme's objectives, highlighting challenges and success factors. Where necessary, propose new or additional measures to strengthen the Programme's impact. Recommendations will be clear, actionable, and realistic, specifying the responsible entities and the recommended actions for continued or improved implementation.
- Evaluate the Programme's management procedures, particularly about monitoring indicators and measuring outcomes. The evaluation will also consider the impact of national strategic management legislation on the efficiency and effectiveness of the Programme's and projects' management.
- Assess additional aspects relevant to the management and long-term impact of the Programme, including stakeholder collaboration, project sustainability, and the adaptability of the Programme in response to changing national and EU security needs.

THE OBJECT OF THE ANALYSIS: ISF 2014-2020 Programme.

STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT:

- Summary;
- Introduction;
- Methodology;

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[1] Evaluation is conducted according to 8 criteria, specified in procurement's technical specification (hereinafter – TS) and guidelines, prepared by EC.

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- Reconstruction and Description of the Intervention Logic;
- State of Play;
- Evaluation results (results are presented separately according to the Effectiveness, Efficiency, Relevance, Coherence, Complementary, EU added value, Sustainability and Simplification and reduction of administrative burden criteria);
- Conclusions (including lessons learned, recommendations, and examples of good practice).

1. Methodology

This evaluation follows the technical specification (hereinafter – TS) and provides general requirements for this Evaluation. Specific requirements for this Evaluation are provided in Commission delegated regulation (EU) 2017/207 of 3 October 2016 on the common monitoring and evaluation framework provided for in Regulation (EU) No 514/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down general provisions on the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund and on the instrument for financial support for police cooperation, preventing and combating crime, and crisis management (hereinafter – Regulation (EU) 207/2017). It provides the following evaluation aspects for the ISF:

1. **Effectiveness** – primarily to assess whether the program has contributed to achieving the stated objectives;
2. **Efficiency** – primarily to assess whether the results of the were Fund achieved at a reasonable cost;
3. **Relevance** – primarily focused on whether the objectives of the interventions funded by the Fund corresponded to the actual needs;
4. **Coherence** – primarily focused on whether the objectives set in the national program were coherent with the ones set in other programs funded by EU resources and applying to similar areas of work and whether was the coherence ensured also during the implementation of the Fund;
5. **Complementarity** – focused on whether the objectives set in the national program and the corresponding implemented actions were complementary to those set in the framework of other policies — particularly those pursued by the Member State;
6. **EU added value –** focused on whether any projects have brought added value for the EU and constitute a tangible sign of the solidarity and responsibility-sharing which are indispensable in responding to the common challenges;
7. **Sustainability** – focused on whether the positive effects of the projects supported by the Fund are likely to last when its support will be over;
8. **Simplification and reduction of administrative burden** – focused on whether the management procedures of the Fund were simplified and whether the administrative burden was reduced for its beneficiaries.

Regulation (EU) 207/2017 also provides evaluation questions. These were detailed into judgment criteria and indicators, and corresponding methods were selected. This process allows to design evaluation matrix, which helps to manage the evaluation. A schematic visualization of this process is provided below.

Figure 1. Evaluation matrix
Source: composed by Evaluator

The following methods will be applied:

1. **Reconstruction of the Intervention Logic** – at the time of mid-term evaluation, no significant progress is expected to be achieved; this study focuses on checking the relevance of the initial needs assessment in the context of changing needs. Reconstruction of the Intervention logic thus allows for the identification of existing issues and causal links that are expected to solve or reduce said issues. The method relies on the analysis of ISF official documents, initial needs assessment, and other primary and secondary sources;
2. **Needs assessment and stakeholder mapping –** to make sure that all relevant stakeholders' needs are correctly understood and reflected, this method is applied to identify relevant stakeholders and sort them

according to their interests, influence, needs, etc. Since ISF interventions are primarily focused on the enhancement of skills and capabilities in a limited number of public institutions, semi-structured interviews are used to assess their needs and interests;

3. **Semi-structured interviews** – semi-structured interviews are conducted with identified stakeholders. A questionnaire is prepared by judgment criteria and indicators (descriptors) specified in the Evaluation matrix. During 30 to 90-minute remote interviews (the duration of the interview may vary depending on the stakeholder's level of engagement), representatives of identified stakeholders (respondents) answer questions. Interviewer and respondents may deviate from the questionnaire if it does not degrade the quality of answers to the pre-defined questions and produces relevant data for the Evaluation;

4. **Analysis of financial and physical progress** – analysis of monitoring data accumulated by the monitoring systems is focused on comparing actual progress, both financial and physical, to planned progress. It is important to contextualize any kind of analysis based on data from the monitoring system with data from interviews and the Programme's reports and internal documents, as raw quantitative data might lack context;

5. **Analysis of other relevant primary and secondary sources** – a broad range of primary and secondary sources are analysed to answer the broad range of Evaluation questions as specified in the Evaluation matrix.

2. Reconstruction and Description of the Intervention Logic

The means for a part the Programme arise from the National Security Strategy[2] and Public Security Development Programme for 2015–2025[3], by which the tools for implementation of the Strategy are established. Long-term objectives found in the strategy that are reflected in the Programme:

- Strengthening the state's crisis prevention and mitigation capacity;
- Maintaining and strengthening public security;
- Economic and financial security.

Additionally, it should be mentioned, that objectives set in the Strategy are connected to the objectives set in Public Security Development Programme for 2015–2025. The tables below depict the connections between the 3 Strategy's objectives (those related to the Programme), and the objectives set in the Public Security Development Programme for 2015–2025.

Table 1. National Security Strategy's Connection with Public Security Development Programme for 2015-2025 (I)

1. Strengthening the state's crisis prevention and mitigation capacity	Is it connected to the Programme?
Strengthen the readiness of the civil protection system.	No
Strengthen the fire rescue forces and develop the activities of volunteer firefighters.	No
Expand and improve fire prevention by strengthening cooperation between state and municipal institutions and bodies.	No
Strengthen the protection and resilience of potential terrorist targets.	Yes
Strengthen the prevention and control of illegal migration.	Yes

Source: Prepared by Evaluator

Additionally, this first goal resonates with SO5 "Preventing and combating crime". SO5 implements relevant actions, such as 5.1.1 "Strengthening of police capacities to prevent and combat cross-border and organized crime", 5.1.2 "Strengthening of police capacities by developing of investigative and research methods", 5.1.3 "Strengthening the capacities of customs departments in the field of criminal intelligence and pre-trial investigation", 5.2.6 "Development of IT solutions needed for information exchange with other Member States and interoperability between IT systems and databases of the Union and other Member States", 5.2.7 "Creation of a universal data search system (browser) for law enforcement institutions", 5.3.1 "Specialised training to LE officials on topics derived from the EU policies".

The first goal of the Programme also resonates with SO2 „Strengthen the prevention and control of illegal migration". SO2 implements relevant actions such as 2.1.1 "Strengthening of the exchange of information among all the authorities responsible for external border surveillance", 2.1.2 "Development of national border surveillance system", 2.2.1 "Implementation of the biometric data verification system", 2.3.2 "Implementation of the recommendations in the light of the results of the Schengen evaluation and monitoring mechanism", 2.4.1 "Implementation of the national Schengen Information System (SIS)", 2.4.5 "Developing and implementing the EU's entry-exit system", 2.4.6 "Establishment and implementation of the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS)", etc.

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Table 2. National Security Strategy's Connection with Public Security Development Programme for 2015-2025 (II)

2. Maintaining and strengthening public security	Is it connected to the Programme?
Increase the effectiveness of the prevention of criminal acts and other violations of the law.	Yes
To prevent the views of the population from becoming extreme, i.e. would not become so radical that the population becomes recruitable for terrorist activities.	No
To develop public education in firefighting and other civil protection areas, to promote the culture of self-defence and responsible behaviour.	No
Develop an effective fight against human trafficking.	No
Increase the effectiveness of responding to reports of criminal acts and other violations of the law and create suitable conditions for the victims to exercise their rights.	Yes
To strengthen the capacity and abilities of law enforcement institutions and other state institutions entrusted with tasks directly related to the strengthening of public security to ensure public security.	Yes
To reduce the extent of violence, especially in the intimate environment.	No
Develop a high-quality system for identifying, evaluating, and forecasting risk factors and threats to public safety.	Yes
Reduce the risk of reoffending.	No

Source: Prepared by Evaluator

The second goal "Maintaining and strengthening public security" resonates with SO5 "Preventing and combating crime". SO5 implements relevant actions, such as 5.2.1 "Capacity-building for cross-border information exchange and joint actions at borders by the recommendations of the European Information Exchange Model (EIMI)", 5.2.2 "Modernisation of HDR and creation of working places for the collection of HDR data", 5.2.3 "Creation of analytical measures for the Register of Criminal Offences", 5.2.4 "Creation of a centralized Information system of Retained Data from electronic communications", 5.2.5 "Develop a national Passenger Information Unit (PIU) to implement a Passenger Data Record (PNR) IT system", 5.4.1 "Capacity building of police for Witness/Victim Support".

Table 3. National Security Strategy's Connection with Public Security Development Programme for 2015-2025 (III)

3. Economic and financial security	Is it connected to the Programme?
Prevent the legalization of assets obtained through criminal means and investment in illegal activities.	No
To protect the state economy from the infiltration of organized criminal groups.	Yes
Develop an effective fight against illegal international trade.	Yes

Source: Prepared by Evaluator

The third goal "Economic and financial security" resonates with the Programme through SO5 "Preventing and combating crime". SO5 implements relevant action, such as 5.1.4 "Capacity building for effective financial investigations and fight against corruption".

The Programme covers 3 out of the 7 objectives set in the National Security Strategy and addresses 8 out of the 17 objectives in the Public Security Development Programme for 2015–2025, which are directly connected to the same objectives outlined in the National Security Strategy. However, it shows that only SO5 measures are covered by Public Security Development Programme for 2015–2025. SO1 and SO5 are not connected to the goals of the National Security Strategy and objectives of the Public Security Development Programme for 2015–2025. The primary objectives of the National Internal Security Policy are threefold: firstly, to combat criminal activity; secondly, to maintain public order and the personal security of the state; and thirdly, to ensure the reliability of state border control and protection, in accordance with the relevant EU requirements, with particular attention paid to the control and protection of the external border of the EU.

OBJECTIVES OF THE PROGRAMME. By carrying out the Programme, Lithuania seeks 6 specific objectives (SO): SO1 – **Support a common visa policy**; SO2 – **Borders**; SO3 – **Operating support under the national programme;** SO4 – **Operating support for the Special Transit Scheme;** SO5 – **Preventing and combating crime;** SO6 – **Risks and crisis**. Below, strategies implemented under each SO, as defined by the Programme, is outlined.

- SO1 "Support a common visa policy". The MFA's strategy for Lithuania's Common Visa Policy aims to enhance the efficiency, accessibility, and quality of visa services. The strategy focuses on ensuring the smooth implementation of the EU Visa Code and maximizing the network of external service providers for streamlined data collection, including biometric data. Additionally, as set in this strategy, Lithuania is expanding its representation network to improve visa access globally. To improve service quality, the strategy prioritizes staff development through targeted training programs and professional qualifications to ensure efficient applicant handling. It is also targeted to strengthen international cooperation by facilitating visits and consultations with partner countries, integrating shared experiences, and conducting training projects to continuously enhance staff expertise and operational practices.

- SO2 "Borders". SO2 focuses on enhancing border security and information sharing through improved inter-agency collaboration, the development of national border surveillance systems, and the advancement of biometric verification. Key investment projects included upgrading the exchange of information among authorities responsible for border control by adopting advanced data processing and transmission technologies, implementing a biometric data verification system, and improving infrastructure, systems, and technical equipment to better enforce the Schengen acquis. Other efforts included executing recommendations from Schengen evaluations, establishing the national SIS, and advancing the EU Entry-Exit System (EES) and European Travel Information and Authorization System (ETIAS). Lithuania allocated EUR 28,56 million to support the effective operation of Eurosur.

- SO3 "Operational support". Operational support is allocated to the field of visas, as well as borders area.

- SO4 "Operational support for the execution of a special transit scheme". Operational support for the execution of a special transit scheme (SO4) is functioning effectively, and its integration into the Special Transit Scheme (STS) has proven highly beneficial. Established as part of the 2003 EU-Russia agreements following the EU's enlargement, the STS addresses the logistical challenge posed by Lithuania's accession to the EU, facilitating the transit of Russian citizens to Kaliningrad via FTDs and FRTDs while maintaining EU border security. SO4 focuses on upgrading FTD/FRTD systems, improving infrastructure at border points like Kybartai, enhancing communication equipment, modernizing surveillance systems, and strengthening patrol capabilities, all while ensuring continuous staff training. It is essential to recognize that the STS's financial framework extends beyond EUR 16,349 million in investment projects and EUR 1,227 million in training; it encompasses EUR 154 million, including EUR 86,995 million for operational costs like salaries and maintenance costs, EUR 43,287 million in foregone visa fees revenue, and EUR 6,1 million for technical assistance. These comprehensive efforts, from technical upgrades to systemic enhancements, align with broader EU priorities, ensuring efficient transit, robust security, and effective operational integration

- SO5 "Preventing and Combating Crime". As it was established above, SO5 partially implements Public Security Development Programme for 2015–2025. It can also be mentioned, that SO5 aims to reduce and deter crime by addressing areas such as organized crime, drug trafficking, corruption, and cybercrime. A key part of this objective is enhancing cross-border cooperation through platforms like the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT). EMPACT facilitates coordinated actions among EU Member States to tackle major crime threats, providing a framework for intelligence-sharing, joint operations, and strategic interventions against transnational criminal networks. SO5 also emphasizes transparency and corruption prevention in sectors like public procurement and healthcare, along with strengthening cybersecurity through collaboration between law enforcement, the private sector, and EU cybercrime bodies. Specialized training for law enforcement officers further supports cross-border investigations and effective witness protection, fostering a unified and proactive EU approach to combating crime.

- SO6 "Risks and crisis". Lithuania aimed to strengthen its efforts against violent extremism and terrorism by developing a national strategy with an inter-institutional coordination mechanism. Key actions included preventing radicalization, combating terrorism financing, improving criminal intelligence exchange, and enhancing law enforcement cooperation both nationally and with EU and international partners through platforms like the Anti-Radicalisation Network (RAN). The country also worked to reduce internet use for terrorism, improved EU external policy effectiveness in crisis situations, and protecting potential terrorism targets. Additionally, Lithuania acquired and upgraded technical equipment, including ICT systems, to support European cooperation on cybersecurity and cybercrime, alongside raising awareness through training on risks and crisis management

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Specific objectives

SO1: Support a common visa policy	SO2: Borders	SO3: Operational support	SO4: Operational support for the execution of a special transit scheme	SO5: Preventing and combating crime	SO6: Risks and crisis

National objectives

SO1:
- NO1: Strengthening of national capacities
- NO2: Application of the European Union visa acquis
- Specific action 1: Application of the EU visa acquis

SO2:
- NO1: Development of EUROSUR in line with EU law and guidelines
- NO2: Development of common EU standards (interaction of border management systems of EU member states)
- NO3: Application of the EU border control acquis
- NO4: Strengthening of national capacities
- Specific action 2: FRONTEX equipment

SO3:
- NO1: Operational support in the field of visas
- NO2: Operational support for the border area

SO4:
- NO1: Modernization of the issuing and delivery systems of simplified transit documents (STD) and simplified rail transit documents (STGD)
- NO3: Development of electronic control systems for transit trains going from the Russian Federation to the Kaliningrad region and back through the territory of the Republic of Lithuania
- NO2: Screening of passengers traveling on a basis of STD/STGD, determination and identification of violators of simplified transit rules
- NO4: Strengthening response capacity to ensure smooth transit of Russian citizens
- NO5: Training of personnel implementing the special transit scheme
- NO6: additional operating costs

SO5:
- NO1: Crime prevention and the fight against cross-border, serious and organized crime
- NO2: Exchange of information
- NO3: Trainings
- NO4: Protection and support for witnesses and victims of crime

SO6:
- NO1: Crime prevention and the fight against cross-border, serious and organized crime
- NO2: Exchange of information
- NO3: Trainings

Inputs — Measures by theme

SO1:
IT systems	Equipment	Training	Resources
1.1.1	1.1.2	1.2.1	1.3.1

SO2:
IT systems	Training	Equipment	Infrastructure
2.1.1 2.1.2 2.2.1 2.2.2 2.2.3 2.4.1 2.4.2 2.4.4 2.4.5 2.4.6 2.4.7	2.3.1 2.3.2	2.4.3 2.5.1 2.5.2 2.5.3 2.5.4	2.4.8 2.4.9

SO3:
IT systems
3.1.1 3.2.1

SO4:
IT systems	Equipment	Infrastructure	Training	Resources
4.1.1 4.1.2 4.2.4 4.2.6 4.3.2	4.1.3 4.1.5 4.1.6 4.2.2 4.2.3 4.3.1 4.4.1 4.4.2 4.4.3 4.4.4 4.4.5 4.4.7	4.1.4 4.2.5 4.2.8 4.3.3 4.3.4 4.4.8	4.5.1	4.6.1

SO5:
Equipment	Training	Resources	IT systems	Infrastructure
5.1.1 5.1.2	5.1.3 5.1.4 5.3.1	5.2.1	5.2.2 5.2.3 5.2.4 5.2.5 5.2.6 5.2.7	5.4.1

SO6:
Training	IT systems
6.1.1 6.2.2 6.3.1	6.2.1

Outputs

SO1:
C1 Number of consular cooperation activities developed with the help of the Fund (1)
C2.1 Number of staff trained in common visa policy related aspects with the help of the Fund (400)
C2.2 Number of training courses (hours completed) (80 thous.)
C3 Number of specialised posts in third countries supported by the Fund (0)
C4.1 Number of consulates developed or upgraded with the help of the Fund out of the total number of consulates (40)
C4.2 Percentage of consulates developed or upgraded with the help of the Fund out of the total number of consulates (80)

SO2:
C1.2 Number of training courses in borders management related aspects with the help of the Fund (98 thous.)
C2 Number of border control (checks and surveillance) infrastructure and means developed or upgraded with the help of the Fund (280)
C3.1 Number of border crossings of the external borders through ABC gates supported from the Fund (0)
C3.2 Total number of border crossings (11000 thous.)
C4 Number of national border surveillance infrastructure established/further developed in the framework of EUROSUR (14)
C5 Number of incidents reported by the Member State to the European Situational Picture (4 thous.)

SO5:
C1 Number of JITs and EMPACT operational projects supported by the Fund, including the participating Member States and authorities (2)
C2.1 Number of law enforcement officials trained on cross- border-related topics with the help of the Fund (480)
C2.2 Duration of the training (carried out) on cross-border related topics with the help of the fund (1440)
C3.1 Number of projects in an area of crime prevention (30)
C3.2 Financial value of projects in an area of crime prevention (9958 thous.)
C4 Number of projects supported by the Fund, aiming to improve law enforcement information exchanges which are related to Europol data systems, repositories or communication tools (e.g. data loaders, extending access to SIENA, projects aiming to improving input to analysis work files etc.) (7)

SO6:
C1 Number of tools put in place or upgraded with the help of the Fund to facilitate the protection of critical infrastructure by Member States in all sectors of the economy (3)
C2 Number of projects relating to the assessment and management of risks in the field of internal security supported by the Fund (0)
C3 Number of expert meetings, workshops, seminars, conferences, publications, websites and (online) consultations organised with the help of the Fund (15)

Figure 2. Reconstruction of Intervention Logic of the Programme
Source: Prepared by Evaluator

OPERATIONS. It was planned to implement **201 projects** (198 projects were implemented due to changing needs of beneficiaries, 3 projects were removed from the Programme) with a total budget of EUR 249,1 million, of which EU investments are EUR 220,3 million and national funds comprise EUR 29 million. EUR 216,7 million were allocated for project implementation. Most of the projects seek to develop, update, or maintain the government's systems (among those registers, information systems, etc.). A significant part of projects is dedicated to increasing institutions' capacity to react to unlawful activities by investing in human resources (trainings) and systems that can improve coordination between national and international institutions. Other projects are directed at purchasing needed infrastructure and equipment. Institutions responsible for the implementation of those projects (beneficiaries) are as follows:

- Police Department (hereinafter – PD; *lt. Policijos departamentas, PD*);
- Information Technology and Communications Department (hereinafter – ITCD; *lt. Informatikos ir ryšių departamentas prie Lietuvos Respublikos vidaus reikalų ministerijos, IRD*);
- Financial Crime Investigation Service (hereinafter – FCIS; *lt. Finansinių nusikaltimų tyrimų tarnyba, FNTT*);
- State Security Department (hereinafter – SSD; *lt. Valstybės saugumo departamentas, VSD*);
- Special Investigation Service (hereinafter – SIS; *lt. Specialiųjų tyrimų tarnyba, STT*);
- Customs Department (hereinafter – CD; *lt. Muitinės departamentas prie Lietuvos Respublikos finansų ministerijos, MD*);
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania (hereinafter – MFA; lt. *LR Užsienio reikalų ministerija, URM*);
- State Border Guard Service of Lithuania (hereinafter – SBGS; *lt. Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnyba, VSAT*);
- Identity Documents Personalisation Centre (hereinafter – IDPC; *lt. Asmens dokumentų išrašymo centras prie VRM, ADIC*);
- The Directorate of Border Crossing Infrastructure (hereinafter – DBCI; *lt. Pasienio kontrolės punktų direkcija prie VRM, PKPD*);
- Lithuanian Railways (hereinafter – LR; *lt. Lietuvos geležinkeliai, LG*);
- The Public Security Service (hereinafter – PSS; *lt. Viešojo saugumo tarnyba prie VRM, VST*);
- Forensic Science Centre of Lithuania (hereinafter – FSCL; *lt. Lietuvos teismo ekspertizės centres, LTEC*);
- State Forensic Medicine Service (hereinafter – SFMS; *lt. Valstybinė teismo medicinos tarnyba, VTMT*).

EVALUATION OF ALLOCATIONS AS PER REGULATIONS. In the ISF, specific objectives (SO) are achieved through national objectives (NOs), which are structured as financial priorities that each Member State must meet to support EU-wide security. For the ISF Borders component, governed by Regulation (EU) No 515/2014, minimum allocation requirements for national programs are outlined in Article 6(2) as follows:

- 10% of funds should be allocated to actions under Article 9(2)(a), addressing core border management needs.
- 25% should support actions under Article 9(2)(b), which focus on heightened border security measures.
- 5% should target actions related to Article 9(2)(c)–(f), which address various security enhancement needs, such as managing travel and securing infrastructure.

In practical terms, this means that the total budget must allocate:

- 25% to cover SO1.NO1, SO2.NO6, and SO3 priorities,
- 10% for SO2.NO1, and
- 5%for SO1.NO3, SO2.NO2, and SO2.NO3.

For the ISF Police component, under Regulation (EU) No 513/2014, Article 5(6) specifies:

- 20% of the funds should support actions under Article 3(2)(a), focusing on enhanced police cooperation and combating serious crime.
- 10% should be allocated to actions under Article 3(2)(b), which emphasize crime prevention and crisis management.

This means that:

- SO5 should receive 20% of the budget, and

- SO6 should receive 10%.

These requirements ensure that Member States are investing in the critical areas of border security and police cooperation, aligning national efforts with EU-wide security priorities. This structured allocation also enhances transparency and promotes a coordinated approach to addressing shared security challenges across the Union. Table below depict evaluation of allocations as described.

Table 4. Evaluation of allocations as per Regulations 515/2014 and 513/2014

Allocations as per Regulations		Specification of allocations as per Programme structure	Target allocations (%)	Factual allocations (EUR), only EU allocations	Factual allocations (%), only EU allocations
Regulation 515/2014, 6(2)	Article	SO2NO1 (SO2 "Borders", NO1 "EUROSUR")	10%	14229710,78	32%
		SO1NO1 (SO1 "Support a common visa policy", NO1 "National capacity") + SO2NO6 (SO2 "Borders", NO6 "National capacity") + SO3 (SO3 "Operational support")	25%	1671772,35 + 22854032,97 + 378307,71 = 24904113,03	56%
		SO1NO3 (SO1 "Support a common visa policy", NO3 "Consular cooperation mechanism") + SO2NO2 (SO2 "Borders", NO2 "Information exchange") + SO2NO3 (SO2 "Borders", NO3 "Common Union standards")	5%	0 + 0 + 1587267,12 = 1587267,12	4%
Regulation 513/2014, 5(6)	Article	SO5 (SO5 "Preventing and combating crime")	20%	16251844,18	89%
		SO6 (SO6 "Risks and crisis")	10%	2077815,98	11%

Source: Prepared by Evaluator, based on action plan (version 2024-09-02)

It should be concluded that only one requirement was unmet – achieving 4% instead of the required 5%. This shortfall can be explained by the increase in the total share of EU funds allocated to the program, specifically additional amounts dedicated to targeted actions (Action 1 under ISF-Visa and Actions 4 under ISF-Borders). These allocations were influenced by the 2019 decision to allocate additional amounts to the ISF-Borders & Visa National Programme for the development of EES, ETIAS, and IT systems. Furthermore, it could have been influenced by procurement procedures, as fewer projects were chosen to fund, which may have limited the effective allocation of funds to reach the required 5% utilization.

ACTIONS. The Programme Action Plan accounts for the detailed list of regular and specific actions for each SO as well as prefatory list of projects to be implemented with the foreseen maximum funding and preliminary implementation periods. Notably, a few final beneficiaries were chosen as applicants for most actions, those are as follows: PD, SBGS, ITDC, and MFA.

Table 5. ISF funds are allocated to each measure and applicants

SO	Action	Action name	Allocated EU funding (rounded up in thousands of Euros)	Percentage share of total funds (only EU contribution)	Applicants
SO1 – Support a common visa policy	1.1.1	Implementation of the National Visa Information System (VIS)	748	0,35%	ITCD
	1.1.2	Upgrading of hardware and communication equipment for visa workstations	923,7	0,53%	MFA
	1.2.1	Training for visa staff	173,0	0,08%	MFA
	1.3.1	Expansion of consular representation at the Consulate General of the Republic of Lithuania in Almaty	808,9	0,37%	MFA
SO2 – Borders	2.1.1	Strengthen the exchange of information between all authorities responsible for monitoring external borders	573,2	0,26%	SBGS
	2.1.2	Developing a national border surveillance system	13 656,5	6,20%	SBGS
	2.2.1	Implementation of the Biometric Verification System (Phase II)	229,9	0,10%	IDPC
	2.2.2	Radio compatibility with Poland and Latvia	403,7	0,18%	ITCD
	2.2.3	Upgrading of the main and back-up data centres of the information system (VRIS) insofar as it is required for border control	953,6	0,43%	ITCD
	2.3.1	Specialised and advanced training for border guards	456,2	0,21%	SBGS
	2.3.2	Implementation of the recommendations in the light of the results of the Schengen evaluation and monitoring mechanism	26,0	0,01%	SBGS
	2.4.1	Implementation of the national Schengen Information System (SIS)	793,7	0,59%	ITCD

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SO	Action	Action name	Allocated EU funding (rounded up in thousands of Euros)	Percentage share of total funds (only EU contribution)	Applicants
	2.4.2	Updating software and hardware	698,8	0,32%	SBGS
	2.4.3	Acquisition of technical border control equipment	6 375,9	2,90%	SBGS
	2.4.4	Developing a secure IT-based platform for handling sensitive information on external borders	707,4	0,32%	SBGS
	2.4.5	Developing and implementing the EU's entry-exit system	6 412,6	2,91%	SBGS, ITCD
	2.4.6	Establishment and implementation of the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS)	3 216,7	1,46%	SBGS
	2.4.7	Support for the rapid and efficient upgrade of the national SIS components of the Schengen Information System (SIS) as required by Regulation (EU) 2018/1861 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 November 2018	1 227,0	0,56%	ITCD
	2.4.8	Establishment of the technical infrastructure needed to implement the arrival-departure system	2 889,4	0,96%	SBGS
	2.4.9	Improving the infrastructure of the Druskininkai Border Post	532,6	0,25%	SBGS
	2.5.1	Purchase of a vehicle equipped with thermal imaging equipment	301,2	0,14%	SBGS
	2.5.2	Purchase of a coastal patrol boat	746,1	0,34%	SBGS
	2.5.3	Purchase of a coastal patrol vessel	3 600,0	1,64%	SBGS
	2.5.4	Purchase of a rapid response coastal patrol boat	1 069,0	0,49%	SBGS
SO3 – Operational support	3.1.1	Operational management of the national VIS	185,6	0,10%	ITCD

SO	Action	Action name	Allocated EU funding (rounded up in thousands of Euros)	Percentage share of total funds (only EU contribution)	Applicants
	3.2.1	Operational management of the National SIS	192,7	0,09%	ITCD
SO4 – Operational support for the execution of a special transit scheme	4.1.1	Upgrading the hardware and software of the STGD IT system	640,1	0,35%	MFA
	4.1.2	Upgrading of STGD IT communication equipment	132,5	0,06%	MFA
	4.1.3	Upgrading of desktop and laptop computers, MRZ scanners, printers, office equipment	302,0	0,19%	MFA
	4.1.4	Refurbishment of administrative, living and recreational facilities for staff operating the STD/STGD system	581,4	0,27%	MFA
	4.1.5	Upgrading of vehicles for the diplomatic missions of the Republic of Lithuania in Moscow, St Petersburg and Kaliningrad	97,5	0,04%	MFA
	4.1.6	Upgrading mobile communication equipment	37,3	0,02%	MFA
	4.2.2	Upgrading the equipment used for document verification on board trains	239,4	0,11%	SBGS
	4.2.3	Upgrading of hardware and software for border guards	111,1	0,05%	SBGS
	4.2.4	Upgrade of the SBGS information system VSATIS STD / STGD subsystems	226,3	0,10%	SBGS
	4.2.5	Installation of Wi-Fi connectivity at Kybartai railway border inspection post	136,5	0,06%	SBGS
	4.2.6	Replacement of STS domain controller and other software	150,8	0,07%	SBGS
	4.2.8	Upgrading the Mobile Digital Radio Network (SMRRT)	176,6	0,10%	ITCD
	4.3.1	Replacement of equipment mounted	38,0	0,02%	SBGS

SO	Action	Action name	Allocated EU funding (rounded up in thousands of Euros)	Percentage share of total funds (only EU contribution)	Applicants
		on the roof of a steam locomotive			
	4.3.2	Replacement of hardware and software for monitoring transit trains	322,0	0,15%	SBGS
	4.3.3	Upgrading of video surveillance systems at Kybartai and Kena border inspection posts	4 107,9	1,89%	SBGS, LR
	4.3.4	Improvement of the video surveillance system on the railway section Kena-Kybartai	716,3	0,33%	PD
	4.4.1	Vehicle renewal	3 671,1	1,67%	SBGS, PSS, PD
	4.4.2	Helicopter outfitting upgrade	1 546,9	0,70%	SBGS
	4.4.3	Technical equipment for border surveillance and detention of illegal immigrants	428,9	0,19%	SBGS
	4.4.4	Service dogs and activities related to their maintenance	312,6	0,14%	SBGS, PD, PSS
	4.4.5	Purchase of vehicle registration plate recognition equipment	1 336,9	0,61%	PD
	4.4.7	Acquisition of signal reception and processing systems	530,2	0,24%	PD
	4.4.8	Reconstruction of PSS buildings and renovation of garages	506,7	0,24%	PSS
	4.5.1	Training of Special Transit Scheme (STS) staff	1 227,2	0,23%	MFA, SBGS, PD
	4.6.1	Additional operating costs, including salaries of staff specifically involved in the operation of the special transit scheme	87,0	0,57%	MFA, ITCD, LR, PSS, IDPC, SBGS, PD
SO5 – Preventing and combating crime	5.1.1	Strengthening police capacity to prevent and combat cross-border, serious and organised crime through participation in the JTF and EMPACT, the acquisition of	3 957,8	2,90%	PD

SO	Action	Action name	Allocated EU funding (rounded up in thousands of Euros)	Percentage share of total funds (only EU contribution)	Applicants
		information technology, special tools and technical equipment in the field of criminal intelligence and pre-trial investigations, as well as technical tools and software in the fight against cybercrime			
	5.1.2	Strengthening police capacity through the development of investigative and research methods, special investigative and IT equipment, laboratory equipment, training in the use of this equipment and the introduction of new investigative methods	3 075,3	1,76%	PD, FSCL,
	5.1.3	Strengthening the capacity of customs units in criminal intelligence and pre-trial investigation	395,1	1,40%	CD
	5.1.4	Strengthening capacity to effectively investigate financial crime and fight corruption	1 643,7	0,18%	FCIS, SIS
	5.2.1	Enhancing cross-border information exchange and joint action capabilities at borders, in line with the recommendations of the European Information Exchange Model (EIEM)	99,1	0,75%	PD
	5.2.2	Upgrading of the Habitat Data Register (HDR) and creation of workstations for the collection of HDR data	1 300,0	0,05%	ITCD, PD
	5.2.3	Development of analytical tools for the National Crime Register (NCR)	668,2	0,59%	ITCD
	5.2.4	Establishment of a system for reporting	1 057,0	0,30%	SSD

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SO	Action	Action name	Allocated EU funding (rounded up in thousands of Euros)	Percentage share of total funds (only EU contribution)	Applicants
		and storing data on electronic communications incidents on public communications networks			
	5.2.5	Develop a national Passenger Information Unit (PIU) to implement the Passenger Name Record (PNR) IT system	1 540,0	0,48%	PD
	5.2.6	Developing IT solutions for the exchange of information with other Member States and the interoperability of IT systems and databases between the Union and other Member States	533,0	0,73%	PD, SSD
	5.2.7	Development of a universal data search engine (browser) for law enforcement authorities	218,0	0,24%	ITCD
	5.3.1	Specialised training for law enforcement officials on EU policy issues	802,1	0,08%	PD, SIS, FSCL, SFMS
	5.4.1	Protection and support for witnesses and victims of crime	964,3	0,38%	PD
SO6 – Risks and crisis	6.1.1	Strengthening preventive capacities against individual terrorism and violent attacks at national and EU level	1 878,5	0,44%	PD
	6.2.1	Establishment of a network/platform for the exchange of information between frontline officials	54,0	0,85%	PD
	6.2.2	Preparation for automated data exchange through the Interpol Ballistic Information Network (IBIN)	99,7	0,02%	PD
	6.3.1	Specialised training for police officers	46,1	0,02%	PD

Source: Prepared by Evaluator, based on IS VORAS data

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INDICATORS. The Programme foresees common indicators for each SO to be fulfilled by implementing the projects (without identifying which implementation measures, actions, or projects would specifically contribute to the fulfilment of the indicators). One target value is set to identify the implementation. EC has established that the baseline value equals 0.

Table 6. Common Indicators in the Programme

Special objective	ID	Common indicator	Measured in number	
			Target value	Cumulated value
SO1 – Support a common visa policy	C1	Number of consular cooperation activities developed with the help of the Fund (number)	1,00	1,00
	C2.1	Number of staff trained in common visa policy-related aspects with the help of the Fund (number)	400,00	549,00
	C2.2	Number of training courses (hours completed) (number)	80000,00	10738,20
	C3	Number of specialized posts in third countries supported by the Fund (number)	0,00	16,00
	C4.1	Number of consulates developed or upgraded with the help of the Fund out of the total number of consulates (number)	40,00	51,00
	C4.2	Percentage of consulates developed or upgraded with the help of the Fund out of the total number of consulates (percentage)	80,00	100,00
SO2 – Borders	C.1.1	Number of staff trained in borders management related aspects with the help of the Fund	1960,00	1084,00
	C.1.2	Number of training courses in borders management-related aspects with the help of the Fund (hours completed)	98000,00	93293,22
	C2	Number of border control (checks and surveillance) infrastructure and means developed or upgraded with the help of the Fund (number)	358,00	1768,00
	C3.1	Number of border crossings of the external borders through ABC gates supported by the Fund (number)	0,00	0,00
	C3.2	Total number of border crossings (number)	11000000,00	86824367,00
	C4	Number of national border surveillance infrastructure established/further developed in the framework of EUROSUR (number)	14,00	14,00
	C5	Number of incidents reported by the Member State to the European Situational Picture (number)	4000,00	41813,00
SO5 – Preventing and combating crime	C1	Number of JITs and EMPACT operational projects supported by the Fund, including the participating Member States and authorities (number)	2,00	4,00
	C2.1	Number of law enforcement officials trained on cross-border-related topics with the help of the Fund (number)	480,00	1893,00
	C2.2	Duration of the training (carried out) on cross-border related topics with the help of the fund (person days)	1440,00	17733,00
	C3.1	Number of projects in the area of crime prevention (number)	47,00	56,00
	C3.2	Financial value of projects in the area of crime prevention (EUR)	16260975,92	16251844,18
	C4	Number of projects supported by the Fund, aiming to improve law enforcement	8,00	6,00

Special objective	ID	Common indicator	Measured in number	
			Target value	Cumulated value
		information exchanges that are related to Europol data systems, repositories or communication tools (e.g. data loaders, extending access to SIENA, projects aiming to improve input to analysis work files, etc.) (number)		
SO6 – Risks and crisis	C1	Number of tools put in place or upgraded with the help of the Fund to facilitate the protection of critical infrastructure by Member States in all sectors of the economy (number)	3,00	24,00
	C2	Number of projects relating to the assessment and management of risks in the field of internal security supported by the Fund (number)	0,00	18,00
	C3	Number of expert meetings, workshops, seminars, conferences, publications, websites, and (online) consultations organized with the help of the Fund (number)	15,00	15,00

Source: prepared by Evaluator, based on IS VORAS data

PROJECTS. The list of projects to be financed was confirmed by the Order of Minister of Interior No. 1V-547 of 4 September 2024 (wording of Order No. 1V-356 of 30 May 2024).

A total of 124 projects were planned under all six SOs. The total funds of the Programme were EUR 171,2 million. Table 7 provides detailed information on projects under SO1, SO2, and SO3 regarding allocation of funds as well as implementers, PD was responsible for most projects. In total, EUR 47 million were allocated for projects under SO1, SO2, and SO3.

Table 7. Distribution of allocated funding based on projects per SO1, SO2, SO3

SO	Action	Project	Allocated EU funding (total, rounded up in thousands, Euro)	Percentage share of total EU funds	Implementer
SO1 – Support a common visa policy	1.1.1	Adaptation of the national VIS to changes in the Visa Code	309,9	0,43%	ITCD
		Development of the national VIS	438,1	0,63%	ITCD
	1.1.2	Upgrading of technical and communication equipment of visa services workplaces, phase I	427,8	0,59%	MFA
		Upgrading of technical and communication equipment of visa services workplaces, phase II	361,4	0,83%	MFA
		Acquisition of a dedicated line service	134,6	0,19%	MFA
	1.2.1	Training of visa service staff, stage I	94,8	0,13%	MFA
		Training of visa service staff, stage II	78,3	0,11%	MFA
	1.3.1	Expansion of consular representation in the Consulate General of the Republic of Lithuania in Almaty, stage I	304,1	0,42%	MFA
		Expansion of consular representation in the Consulate General of the Republic of Lithuania in Almaty, stage II	504,8	0,70%	MFA
SO2 – Borders	2.1.1	Acquire and modernize technical means for continuous exchange of information	573,2	0,79%	SBGS
	2.1.2	Installation of wall monitoring systems	6 830,1	9,47%	SBGS
		Renovation of the wall monitoring systems of the Bardinai, Viesviles, and Lavoriskiai defences	1569,5	2,18%	SBGS
		Seawall Monitoring System Update, stage I	1073,9	1,49%	SBGS
		Seawall Monitoring System Upgrade, stage II	2 131,8	2,95%	SBGS

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SO	Action	Project	Allocated EU funding (total, rounded up in thousands, Euro)	Percentage share of total EU funds	Implementer
		Updating of the monitoring system of the Plaskes firewall wall	422,3	0,59%	SBGS
		Renovation of the monitoring system of the Vileikiai fortress wall	383,8	0,53%	SBGS
		Upgrading the monitoring system of the Padvarioniai firewall wall	494,1	0,68%	SBGS
		Lavoriskes Wall Monitoring System Update, stage II	751,0	1,04%	SBGS
	2.2.1	Implementation of the biometric data verification system (stage II)	229,9	0,32%	IDPC
	2.2.2	Modernization of SMRRT, installation of connections with Latvian and Polish communication networks	403,7	0,56%	IDPC
	2.2.3	Upgrade of VRIS main and backup data centre components, stage I	695,9	0,96%	IDPC
		Upgrade of VRIS main and backup data centre components, stage II	257,7	0,36%	IDPC
	2.3.1	Specialized and higher-level training of border guards, stage I	147,7	0,20%	SBGS
		Specialized and higher-level training of border guards, stage II	308,4	0,43%	SBGS
	2.3.2	Implementation of the recommendations, considering the results of the application of the Schengen evaluation and monitoring mechanism	26,0	0,04%	SBGS
	2.4.1	Development of the national SIS	506,9	0,70%	IDPC
		Development of the national SIS by implementing additional security measures	286,8	1,10%	IDPC
	2.4.2	Software and hardware updates	698,8	0,97%	SBGS
	2.4.3	Purchase of portable thermal imagers and other tools necessary for border control	1 431,1	1,98%	SBGS
		Acquisition of vehicles	1 598,6	2,22%	SBGS
		Cynology Capacity Building, stage I	55,8	0,08%	SBGS
		Cynology Capacity Building, stage II	27,3	0,04%	SBGS
		Cynology Capacity Building, stage III	33,7	0,05%	SBGS
		Acquisition of transportable monitoring system equipment	249,6	0,35%	SBGS
		Acquisition of vehicles, stage II	2 979,8	4,13%	SBGS
	2.4.4	Creation of an information technology platform	707,4	0,98%	SBGS
	2.4.5	Implementation of the arrival-departure system	1 612,8	5,54%	SBGS
		Operating costs of the arrival-departure system	1 728,4	3,34%	ITCD
	2.4.6	Development and implementation of the European Travel Information and Authorization System (ETIAS)	3 216,7	4,46%	SBGS
	2.4.7	Updating the national SIS components of the Schengen Information System (SIS)	1 178,9	1,70%	ITCD
	2.4.8	Creation of the technical infrastructure necessary for the implementation of the Arrival-departure system	2 457,3	2,92%	SBGS
	2.4.9	Improving the infrastructure of the Druskininkai border checkpoint	532,5	0,77%	SBGS
	2.5.1	Purchase of a vehicle equipped with thermal imaging equipment	301,2	0,42%	SBGS
	2.5.2	Purchase of coastal patrol boat	746,1	1,03%	SBGS

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SO	Action	Project	Allocated EU funding (total, rounded up in thousands, Euro)	Percentage share of total EU funds	Implementer
	2.5.3	Purchase of Coastal Patrol Vessel	3 600,0	4,99%	SBGS
	2.5.4	Procurement of a rapid response coastal patrol boat	1 069,0	1,50%	SBGS
SO3 – Operational support	3.1.1	Operating support for VISA	185,5	0,08%	ITCD
	3.2.1	Operating support for borders	192,7	0,09%	ITCD

Source: prepared by Evaluator, based on IS VORAS data

Table 8 provides detailed information on projects under SO4, STS regarding allocation of funds as well as implementers. In total, EUR 154 million were allocated for project implementation under SO4, STS.

Table 8. Distribution of allocated funding based on projects per SO4, STS

SO	Action	Project	Allocated EU funding (total, rounded up in thousands, Euro)	Percentage share of total EU funds	Implementer
SO4 – OPERATING SUPPORT FOR THE SPECIAL TRANSIT SCHEME (LITHUANIA)	4.1	Modernization of issuing and delivery systems of simplified transit documents (STD) and simplified rail transit documents (STGD)	1790,8	0,81%	MFA
	4.2	Screening of passengers traveling on the basis of STD / STGD, determination and identification of violators of simplified transit rules	1040,7	0,47%	SBGS and ITCD
	4.3	Development of electronic control systems for transit trains going from the Russian Federation to the Kaliningrad region and back through the territory of the Republic of Lithuania	5184,2	2,35%	MFA, PD and LR
	4.4	Strengthening response capacity to ensure smooth transit of Russian citizens	8333,3	3,78%	PD, SBGS and PSS
	4.5	Training of personnel implementing the special transit scheme	1227,2	0,56%	MFA, SBGS and PD
	4.6	Additional operational costs	86995,4	39,49%	MFA, SBGS, PD, ITCD, LR, PSS and IDPC

Source: prepared by Evaluator, based on IS VORAS data

Table 9 provides detailed information on projects under SO5 and SO6 regarding allocation of funds as well as implementers. PD was responsible for most projects. In total, EUR 18 million were allocated for project implementation under SO5 and SO6.

Table 9. Distribution of allocated funding based on projects per SO5 and SO6

SO	Action	Project	Allocated EU funding (total, rounded up in thousands, Euro)	Percentage share of total EU funds	Implementer
SO5 – Preventing and combating crime	5.1.1	Acquisition of laboratory equipment for the investigation of narcotic substances and their precursors, stage I	327,3	0,45%	PD
		Acquisition of laboratory equipment for the investigation of narcotic substances and their precursors, stage II	337,4	0,47%	PD
		Acquisition of forensic hardware and software for cybercrime investigations, stage I	386,8	0,54%	PD
		Acquisition of forensic hardware and software for cybercrime investigations, stage II	389,8	0,54%	PD

SO	Action	Project	Allocated EU funding (total, rounded up in thousands, Euro)	Percentage share of total EU funds	Implementer
		Strengthening the Control of Illicit International Drug Trafficking, stage I	243,9	0,34%	PD
		Strengthening the Control of Illicit International Drug Trafficking, stage II	328,1	0,47%	PD
		Capacity Building in the Prevention, Detection, and Investigation of Cybercrime, stage I	940,2	1,30%	PD
		Capacity Building in the Prevention, Detection, and Investigation of Cybercrime, stage II	864,9	1,07%	PD
		Purchase of special vans	139,3	0,19%	PD
	5.1.2	Acquisition of laboratory equipment for ballistic, dactyloscopy, DNA, and other tests, stage I	447,7	0,62%	PD
		Legalization and support of expert research technology AdLab	248,2	0,34%	FSCL
		Implementation of advanced technologies for personal identification	234,8	0,33%	FSCL
		Creation of an information system for the administration of items seized by the police	324,7	0,46%	PD
		Acquisition of laboratory equipment for ballistic, dactyloscopy, DNA, and other tests, stage II	453,3	0,63%	PD
		Implementation of advanced preventive measures and models	0,0	0,00%	PD
		Implementation of new technologies, stage I	559,7	0,78%	PD
		Implementation of new technologies, stage II	224,3	0,31%	PD
		Improving data collection capabilities and the quality of collected information, stage I	161,1	0,22%	PD
		Improving data collection capabilities and the quality of collected information, stage II	270,1	0,37%	PD
		Installation and management of mobile monitoring systems	111,7	0,15%	PD
		Improvement of the information system of the International Relations Board of the Lithuanian Criminal Police Bureau	39,7	0,06%	PD
	5.1.3	Strengthening the capacities of the customs units performing criminal intelligence	163,8	0,23%	CD
		Acquisition of IT equipment for customs data analysis and processing	231,3	0,32%	CD
	5.1.4	Updating the intelligence technical base of FCIS and creating an integrated data management platform	1005,9	1,39%	FCIS
		Development of the criminal intelligence management system of the Special Investigation Service	599,2	0,83%	FCIS
		Measures for anti-corruption education, stage I	19,9	0,03%	FCIS
		Measures for anti-corruption education, stage II	18,7	0,03%	SIS
	5.2.1	Implementation of the European Information Exchange Model (ECIM) recommendations	99,1	0,14%	PD
	5.2.2	Modernization of HDR, using advanced technologies of facial recognition and identification tags	701,7	0,97%	ITCD
		Creation of workstations for HDR data collection	597,9	0,83%	PD

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SO	Action	Project	Allocated EU funding (total, rounded up in thousands, Euro)	Percentage share of total EU funds	Implementer
	5.2.3	The development of analytical tools for NVŽR to collect and compare spatial crime data	668,2	0,93%	ITCD
	5.2.4	Creation of a system for providing data on electronic communication events	1056,5	1,46%	SSD
	5.2.5	Development of the passenger data records (PNR) management system, stage I	1096,4	1,52%	PD
		Development of the passenger data records (PNR) management system, stage II	443,2	0,71%	PD
	5.2.6	Creation of a network for the exchange of classified intelligence information	409,1	0,57%	PD
		Provision of information on the location of terminal electronic communication devices to the competent authorities	123,9	0,17%	SSD
	5.2.7	Creation of a universal data search system (browser) for law enforcement institutions	217,5	0,25%	ITCD
	5.3.1	Improving the qualifications of police system employees, internships in EU member states, stage I	127,6	0,18%	PD
		Specialized training of police officers in the field of forensic investigations, stage I	33,3	0,05%	PD
		Specialized training of police officers in the field of forensic investigations, stage II	26,3	0,05%	PD
		Specialized training of SIS officers on topics related to EU policy, stage I	37,2	0,05%	SIS
		Specialized training of SIS officers on topics related to EU policy, stage II	33,7	0,05%	SIS
		Deepening of expert competencies through specialized training	52,4	0,07%	FSCL
		Advanced technology training in personal identification	51,4	0,07%	SFMS
		Improving the qualifications of police system employees, internships in EU member states, stage II	145,1	0,24%	PD
		Foreign language training for employees of the police system, stage I	43,0	0,06%	PD
		Foreign language training for employees of the police system, stage II	47,7	0,07%	PD
		Improving the skills of police officers responsible for international cooperation	9,8	0,01%	PD
		Training on advanced preventive measures and models, stage I	22,5	0,03%	PD
		Training on advanced preventive measures and models, stage II	28,9	0,04%	PD
		Bilateral and multilateral police cooperation training, stage I	53,2	0,07%	PD
		Bilateral and multilateral police cooperation training, stage I	90,0	0,12%	PD
	5.4.1	Modernization and repair of security centre infrastructure, stage I	141,8	0,20%	PD
		Modernization and repair of security centre infrastructure, stage II	208,6	0,29%	PD
		Increasing the efficiency of protection measures against criminal influence, stage I	45,0	0,06%	PD
		Increasing the efficiency of protection measures against criminal influence, stage II	381,7	0,53%	PD

SO	Action	Project	Allocated EU funding (total, rounded up in thousands, Euro)	Percentage share of total EU funds	Implementer
		Acquisition and modernization of polygraphic publishing and press engineering equipment	187,1	0,26%	PD
SO6 – Risks and crisis	6.1.1	LPAOR Aras Capability Enhancement for Special, Anti-Terrorist, and Hostage Rescue Operations, stage I	83,0	0,12%	PD
		Acquisition of forensic equipment for investigations of cybercrimes and attacks against information systems, stage I	44,3	0,06%	PD
		Acquisition of forensic equipment for investigations of cybercrimes and attacks against information systems, stage II	50,8	0,07%	PD
		Implementation of new technologies for the management of security risks and emergencies	91,8	0,13%	PD
		Strengthening the detection of cyber-attacks and other cybercrimes, stage I	32,3	0,04%	PD
		Strengthening the detection of cyber-attacks and other cybercrimes, stage II	76,1	0,11%	PD
		Enhancing remote data collection	59,8	0,08%	PD
		LPAOR Aras Capability Enhancement for Special, Anti-Terrorist, and Hostage Rescue Operations, stage III	483,2	0,67%	PD
		LPAOR Aras Capability Enhancement for Special, Anti-Terrorist, and Hostage Rescue Operations, stage II	248,8	0,34%	PD
		Enhancement of LPAOR Aras Sniper Capability in Anti-Terrorism and Hostage Rescue Operations, stage I	73,2	0,10%	PD
		Enhancement of LPAOR Aras Sniper Capability in Anti-Terrorism and Hostage Rescue Operations, stage II	41,3	0,06%	PD
		Enhancing the capacity of LPAOR Ara's minesweepers to conduct explosive search and neutralization, stage I	104,6	0,14%	PD
		Acquisition of special protective equipment for special, anti-terrorist, and hostage rescue operations	205,8	0,29%	PD
		Strengthening the capacity of LPAOR Aras officers to carry out operations to apprehend dangerous and armed criminals	126,8	0,18%	PD
		Acquisition of laboratory equipment for testing explosives, firearms, ammunition, and improvised devices, stage I	89,3	0,12%	PD
		Acquisition of laboratory equipment for testing explosives, firearms, ammunition, and improvised devices, stage II	67,4	0,09%	PD
	6.2.1	Creation of a network/platform for information exchange between front-line officers	53,6	0,07%	PD
	6.2.2	Preparation for automated data exchange through the Interpol Ballistic Information Network (IBIN)	99,7	0,14%	PD
	6.3.1	Raising the qualifications of officers of specialized criminal police units, stage I	9,1	0,01%	PD
		Raising the qualifications of officers of specialized criminal police units, stage II	2,4	0,00%	PD
		Improving the qualifications of employees of criminal investigation units investigating crimes in cases of terrorism and violent extremism	34,6	0,05%	PD

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Figure 3 illustrates how funds are distributed among the project implementors – more than half of the funds, i.e., EUR 38 thousand (58% to be precise) go to the projects managed by the SBGS, with the PD projects receiving the second biggest share of the funds totalling EUR 12,9 thousand (or 20%). The rest of the funding is shared among the rest of the project implementors.

Figure 3. The distribution of the ISF funds allocated to each project implementor for SOs 1, 2, 5 & 6, thousands of Euros
Source: prepared by Evaluator, based on IS VORAS data

Generally, the list of projects was created based on the needs expressed by the beneficiaries during the Programme planning stage[4]. All institutions delivered their needs in written form. The final list was prepared based on the allocation of funds in the Programme, considering the expressed needs and suggestions for potential projects.

After conducting a Reconstruction of the Intervention Logic, the following conclusions can be drawn:
1. The reconstructed intervention logic validates the alignment of the Programme with the EU regulations governing the ISF.
2. The identified Specific Objectives, implementation actions, and chosen intervention fields cohesively address Lithuania's contemporary challenges and overarching policy objectives.
3. The established common indicators demonstrate clear concordance with the defined objectives, and the ensuing projects arising from them distinctly achieve the envisaged policy outcomes.

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[4] As per interview with managing authorities and final beneficiaries' data.

3. State of Play

This chapter aims to highlight the progress and key developments of the ISF. The timeline covered in the report is 2014–2023. The project implementation is still outgoing. The Programme implementation started on 1st January 2014.

The total budget of the Programme planned was EUR 248 978 274,62, of which EUR 220 275 935,59 are EU funds, while EUR 28 702 339,03 are national funding. If calculated in percentages, EU funding makes up 88,5%, and national funding comprises 11,5%. Allocations for each SO is presented below.

Figure 4. Allocations for SOs as per Programme, total ISF fund
Source: Programme

The allocation comparison excludes SO4 due to its unique financial structure under the STS, which differs from other objectives in the Programme. Unlike other objectives that rely on standard funding, STS is not funded in the traditional sense; instead, it operates on a reimbursement model, providing support to compensate for foregone fees from visas issued for the purpose of transit and additional costs incurred in implementing STS. This is to offset expenses related to the transit of Russian citizens between the Kaliningrad Region and the rest of Russia, which is an arrangement established by Protocol No. 5 of the EU Accession Treaty and governed by Council Regulations (EC) No 693/2003 and 694/2003. The STS provides financial assistance to cover costs associated with the Facilitated Transit Document (FTD) and Facilitated Rail Transit Document (FRTD) schemes. These schemes involve investments in infrastructure, including systems for document issuance, control of transit train passengers, electronic monitoring equipment, and operational costs such as staff salaries and training for personnel involved in STS implementation. Additionally, expenses for maintaining information systems, communication networks, and border facilities are calculated annually based on methodologies tailored for the program. Since STS funding compensates for specific operational and transit-related expenses unique to Lithuania's geographical context and international obligations, it is considered distinct from other ISF objectives, making it unsuitable for direct comparison in general ISF allocation analyses.

The implementation measures cover several intervention fields for each SO that overarching regular and specific actions as well as projects. For SO1 „Support a common visa policy" EUR 2,6 MILLION of EU ISF funds were allocated (EUR 1 050,9 those allocations were unused); for SO2 „Borders" EUR 44,9 MILLION (EUR 3,648 million of these allocations were unused); for SO3 „Operational support" EUR 378,3 THOUSAND (used 100%). For SO4 „Operational support for the execution of a special transit scheme" EUR 154 MILLION (used 100% of the allocations); for SO5 „Preventing and combating crime" EUR 16,3 MILLION; for SO6 „Risks and crisis" EUR 2,1 MILLION respectively. For SO5 and SO6 only EUR 31 thousand were left unused. Notably, due to the strict eligibility requirements for EES expenditure, action 2.4.5 (SO2) left EUR 3,071 MILLION UNUSED.

Regarding the utilization of funds, it should be noted that while 100% of the planned funds were allocated to projects, 98.33% of the projected EU allocations were utilized. A detailed breakdown of each SO usage of the

planned ISF funds (only EU allocations) is provided below. It is important to emphasize that all planned projects were fully funded.

Figure 5. Usage of planned ISF funds, EU contribution only
Source: Programme

CALLS. From December 2013 to December 2022, 64 calls for projects were organised, all following planned schedule.

STATE OF PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION. A total of 198 projects have been implemented, and all projects planned are completed. 4 projects have been terminated (LT/2015/VSF/4.4.4.7; LT/2016/VSF/2.2.2.1; LT/2016/VSF/4.2.7.1; LT/2017/VSF/4.4.4.8), this is due to changing needs of institutions that were responsible for implementation of those projects, i. e., funds were reallocated to more priority projects at the time. A total of 299 on-site inspections were performed, and 3 are scheduled. In 100 cases discrepancies were not detected, 1 in-site inspection discrepancy was found and has not been fixed as of preparation of this evaluation. This is regarding the implementation of communication guidelines (i.e., ISF's logo appliance, as in accordance with Article 2 of Regulation No. 1048/2014, final beneficiary is responsible for informing the public about financial support). 3 discrepancies have been fixed after given a deadline for implementing actions needed, discrepancies were related to accounting errors, as well as following communication guidelines.

At present, the focus is on finalizing these pending payments and inspections, ensuring all funds are properly allocated, and addressing any outstanding administrative tasks. While the majority of the Programme's objectives have been met, the last steps involve ensuring complete financial and regulatory compliance to close out the Programme.

4. Evaluation results

As described in the Methodology chapter, the Evaluation results are presented according to evaluation questions (see Annex 1 for the Evaluation Matrix).

4.1.   ISF evaluation according to effectiveness criteria

According to the EC Revised Background Note, under this criterion, the independent evaluators will gauge the extent to which the programmes have progressed towards their objectives and whether their design is likely to be conducive to their achievement by the end of the programming period. Factors affecting the implementation and any unexpected or unintended outcomes should be assessed in this regard. This criterion looks not only into the progress towards the SO of the funds but also into any horizontal objective or principle established on a legal basis, including the effectiveness of the communication strategy and the monitoring system, as well as any SO of the Programme, beyond those set at EU level.

EFFECTIVENESS OF THE COMMUNICATION STRATEGY. The communication strategy under the ISF contributed significantly to maintaining alignment between national security goals and broader EU strategies. The strategy facilitated coordination and cooperation between different agencies and stakeholders at both national and EU levels, ensuring that all relevant parties were informed and involved in the decision-making process. The Monitoring Committee played a vital role in this strategy by reviewing project proposals and providing input from various institutions, enabling an efficient flow of information. This inclusive approach was crucial in ensuring that evolving needs, such as migration crises or geopolitical changes, were swiftly addressed through timely adjustments in project allocations.

MoI, as the Managing Authority, played a central role in coordinating communication internally among all relevant stakeholders, including the institutions responsible for implementing projects under the ISF. It provided guidance and ensured that communication channels were open for discussing project progress, changes in security needs, and emerging challenges. The MoI facilitated inter-agency cooperation, promoting the exchange of knowledge and practices across law enforcement and security bodies to strengthen coordination. CPMA acted as the Intermediate Body and had a critical role in communicating with the final beneficiaries regarding project evaluations, contract management, and the procedural requirements for reporting. Its communication ensured that institutions implementing ISF-funded projects adhered to agreed-upon timelines and objectives, while also addressing issues that arose during project implementation through continuous dialogue.

Additionally, public communication guidelines were outlined in the ISF, requiring final beneficiaries to inform the public about the financial support received through EU funds. This was achieved through press releases, ensuring that the public was aware of the contributions of EU funds towards enhancing national security. The CPMA also had a specific function in ensuring that communication and publicity rules were followed, including making sure that ISF's logo and the EU's financial support were visibly acknowledged in all public-facing materials.

EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MONITORING SYSTEM. The ISF's monitoring system was integral in tracking project progress and ensuring that the general and specific objectives outlined in Regulation (EU) No 515/2014 were met. The Monitoring Committee regularly assessed project implementation, allowing for rapid reallocation of funds when necessary to respond to emerging challenges like increased migration or border security concerns. This flexibility demonstrated the effectiveness of the monitoring system in adapting to changing conditions without deviating from the long-term objectives of the Fund.

The introduction of the IS VORAS system was another key component of the monitoring strategy. Once operational, it greatly enhanced the efficiency of project management by providing centralized data storage and real-time reporting. The system allowed for comprehensive tracking of milestones, thus reducing administrative burdens while improving the overall transparency of fund usage. This innovation underscored the importance of IT solutions in enhancing the effectiveness of monitoring and ensuring that projects stayed on track towards their intended outcomes.

EFFECTIVENESS OF ACHIEVING PLANNED RESULTS. Results and impact of ISF is evaluated based on their contribution to following objectives:

- general objective defined in Regulation (EU) No 515/2014;
- general objective defined in Regulation (EU) No 513/2014.

List of indicators has been provided by European Commission. These indicators allow for detailed analysis of results and impacts. Indicators, corresponding to SO1 and SO2 describe contribution to general objective defined in Regulation (EU) No 515/2014, while SO5 and SO6 describe contribution to general objective defined in Regulation (EU) No 513/2014. Results of SO3 (Operational support) and SO4 (Operational support for the execution of a special transit scheme) shall be evaluated separately due to specificity of these SOs.

It should be noted that not all data is available for the Evaluation. Some indicators needed for such evaluation are not collected by the responsible institutions. Lack of indicators is represented in the list below:

- SO1: out of 20 indicators (including sub-indicators) 16 indicators were collected, 4 were not (20% N/A);
- SO2: out of 21 indicators (including sub-indicators) all are available;
- SO5: out of 79 indicators (including sub-indicators) 64 indicators were collected, 15 were not (19% N/A);
- SO6: out of 5 indicators (including sub-indicators) all are available.

In total, out of 125 indicators (including sub-indicators) 19 is not available (15%).

Figure 6. Indicator so1r2v1, Number of consular cooperation activities developed with the help of the Fund
Source: Programme data

Target value for indicator so1r2v1 – 1 has been fulfilled in 2017, 1 consular activity of "representation" type has been carried out.

Figure 7. Indicator so1r3v1, Number of staff trained in aspects related to the common visa policy with the help of the Fund
Source: Programme data

In the field of staff training Programme managed to overperform. Target for indicator so1r3v1 has been set to 400, achieved result by 2023 – 549 (overperformance by 37%).

Number of training courses in aspects related to the common visa policy with the help of the Fund (hours completed)

Figure 8. Indicator so1r3v2, Number of training courses in aspects related to the common visa policy with the help of the Fund (hours completed)
Source: Programme data

In terms of training hours completed Programme has underperformed (indicator so1r3v2). Target value for this indicator has been set to 80 000, while total value achieved by 2024 was 10 738. It should, however, be noted that such indicators might disguised the actual added value of training Programmes, as number of hours completed does not directly translates into the quality of training provided. As indicated in interviews with final beneficiaries, training programmes were universally evaluated as valuable. Considering that training programmes were universally accepted as beneficial and the number of staff members, who participated in the training, is more numerous than expected, it should be concluded that Programme managed to achieve its goals of contributing to support of common visa policy, in this case, by providing effective training.

Consulates developed or upgraded with the help of the Fund

Figure 9. Number and percentage of consulates developed with the help of the Fund
Source: Programme data

Fund has also contributed to the development or upgrade of consulates (indicator so1r4v1 (total number) and so1r4v2 (percentage of total number)). As according to both indicators ISF has overperformed – instead of planned 80 percent of consulates (40 units) developed or upgraded, 100 percent has been developed or upgraded (51 unit).

Considering indicators of so1r5v1 type (number of Schengen Evaluation recommendation issued and addressed with the help of the fund) – 36 Schengen Evaluation recommendation issues in 2019. Only recommendations that had financial implications were binding. None of such recommendations were issued, thus none were addressed.

Similar situation is with indicators of so1r6v1, so1i1v1 type (number of persons with fraudulent travel documents) – no data has been collected by MoI, thus no evaluation according to these indicators could be carried out.

The only indicator in this field that has been collected – total number of persons applying for Schengen visas (see below).

Total number of persons applying for a Schengen visa

Figure 10. Indicator so1r6v1b, Total number of persons applying for a Schengen visa
Source: https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/schengen-borders-and-visa/visa-policy/short-stay-visas-issued-schengen-countries_en

As can be seen from data provided above, number of applicants has sharply dropped in 2020. This should be attributed to COVID-19 pandemic. The mild increase of applicants should be attributed to the tensions with Belarus and Russia, following the introductions of sanctions to these countries following multiple crises.

Last indicator - Number of specialised posts in third countries supported by the Fund (so1a1v1) has been targeted to be 0, however, funds were used to maintain specialists in third countries. 2 specialists in third countries maintained their position due to Programme starting from 2016 until now.

To conclude SO1 according to effectiveness criteria, SO1 has contributed to the achievement of the general objective defined in Regulation (EU) No 515/2014 by:

- **overperforming in the field of training** – a total of 549 staff members has been trained (10.7 thousand training hours in total). Interview data indicates that training has been evaluated as valuable.
- **overperforming in the field of development or upgrade of consulates** – 100 percent of consulates has been developed or upgraded (51 units);
- **achieved its target in the field of development of consular cooperation activities** – 1 such activities have been performed in 2017;
- **maintained 2 specialists in third countries** – starting from 2016 until now.

It can be concluded that the improved expertise and staff members as well as upgraded consulates allowed Lithuanian Republic to improve the quality of both consulates and staff members as well as by carrying out consular cooperation activities.

As in case with SO1, Evaluators were provided with a number of indicators to evaluate effectiveness of SO2.

Number of staff trained in borders management related aspects with the help of the Fund

Figure 11. Indicator so2r1v1. Number of staff trained in borders management related aspects with the help of the Fund
Source: Programme data

Target set for the staff training has been set to 1 960, while achieved results by 2023 has been 1 084 (55%). Thus, Programme underperformed in the field of number of staff trained. On the other hand, number of hours these staff members got is relatively high (see next).

Number of training hours border management related aspects with the help of the Fund

Figure 12. Indicator so2r1v2. Number of training hours border management related aspects with the help of the Fund
Source: Programme data

In contrast to the number of staff trained, the total number of hours of training provided almost achieved planned goals (93 293 hours of training provided instead of 98 000, or 98%). The conclusion must be drawn that the Programme was effective in providing staff training in the field of border management, even though the training provided has been relatively more intensive for smaller number of staff.

Indicator so2r2v1 is not analysed, as its target value has been set to 0.

Figure 13. Indicator so2r1v2. Number of training hours border management related aspects with the help of the Fund
Source: Programme data

The number of border crossing has been higher than expected by the Programme (86.8 million instead of 11 million). The same drop in 2020 could be seen, as in case of number of visa applicants, fluctuation should be attributed to the same reasons. Number of crossings has been rising – this is different as compared to number of visa applicants. This should be attributed to the increasing number of number of foreigners (especially from Belarus and Ukraine) living in Lithuania on long-term basis.

In case of number of Schengen Evaluation recommendations in the area of borders addressed with the support of the Fund, as compared to the total number of recommendations issued (indicator so2r4v1ab), 1 recommendation was addressed with the help of the fund as compared to 40 recommendations issued (2019 data provided by MoI). However, it must be noted that only recommendations which bear financial implication were binding – only 1 such recommendation (out of 40) was issued. Thus, this indicator should be treated as fully fulfilled.

Figure 14. Indicator so2i1v1. Number of national border surveillance infrastructure established/further developed in the framework of EUROSUR (data available until 2023)
Source: Programme data

Programme managed to achieve its goals of developing/establishing border surveillance infrastructure. A total of 14 units of infrastructure has been established/developed, of which 1 – national coordination centre, 13 - local coordination centres. The target has been achieved.

Figure 15. Number of incidents reported by the Member State to the European Situational Picture
Source: Programme data

Since the start of Programme, the number of cross-border crime has been stable – a total of 41 813 cases has been reported to European Situational Picture, however, this number has been increasing since 2021. Due to the Belarus border crisis, number of illegal immigrations has been increasing. It should be highlighted that the infrastructure and training provided by the Programme in the wake of this crisis has been instrumental in managing the crisis. The number of infrastructure and means developed are summarised in the figure below.

Figure 16. Number of border control (checks and surveillance) infrastructure and means developed or upgraded with the help of the Fund (data up until 2023)
Source: Programme data

The target of 280 units of infrastructure and equipment has been overachieved – final number by 2023 has reached 1 768 (indicators of so2a1v1 type). The success of Programme in this field allows for more successful management of border incidents.

To conclude SO2 according to effectiveness criteria, SO2 has contributed to the achievement of the general objective defined in Regulation (EU) No 515/2014 by:

- **performed in the field of training** – a total of 1 084 staff members have been trained (93.3 thousand training hours in total). Interview data indicates that training has been evaluated as valuable.
- **overperforming in the field of development of upgrade of border control infrastructure and equipment** – 1 768 units of infrastructure and equipment has been developed;
- **reached its targets in the field of national border surveillance infrastructure established/further developed in the framework of EUROSUR** – 1 national and 13 local coordination centres were established/developed.

- **supported the management of the migration crisis on the Belarus border** – as indicated by data, illegal migration has been on the historic high level. Investments made by the Programme assisted in managing the crisis.

It can be concluded that the improved expertise and staff members as well as upgraded infrastructure and equipment allowed Lithuanian Republic to improve the quality of border management. This has been well-timed, as the migration crisis on the border of Lithuania has developed the illegal migration flows of historic high.

As in case with other SOs, Evaluators were provided with a number of indicators to evaluate effectiveness of SO5. The indicators of SO3 and SO4 should be treated separately due to their operational nature.

Figure 17. Number of projects and their financial value (indicators so5a1v1 and so5a1v2)
Source: Programme data

As can be seen from visualised data of indicators so5a1v1 and so5a1v2, most of projects (by their value) their related to combating organised crime. Especially in early years, most of financial resources there dedicated to this field. Another significant field – combating computer crime. As a result, impact of the Programme in these fields should be primarily expected. Notably, Programme overachieved its goals in the area of indicators so5a1v1 and so5a1v2, as 56 projects for 16 million euros were implemented, as compared to 47 projects (target).

Out of these projects, 6 were dedicated to projects aiming to improving input to analysis work files (indicator so5a2v1, Number of projects supported by the Fund, aiming to improve law enforcement information exchanges which are related to Europol data systems, repositories or communication tools). Unfortunately, this is 1 project short of target (targeted value – 7). This can be said to be compensated by improvement in another field – indicator so5r1v1 (number of joint investigation teams (JITs) and European Multidisciplinary Platform against Criminal Threats (EMPACT) operation projects supported by the Fund, including the participating Member States and authorities) has achieved value of 4, as compared to 2 targeted projects.

Number of law enforcement officials trained on cross-border related topics with the help of the Fund

Figure 18. Number of law enforcement officials trained on cross-border related topics with the help of the Fund (data up until 2023)
Source: Programme data

According to indicator so5r2v1 (Number of law enforcement officials trained on cross-border related topics with the help of the Fund), Programme overperformed – a total of 1 893 staff members were trained, as compared to 480 targeted. Most of personal were trained on operational cooperation (762) and information exchange (710).

Duration of the training (carried out) on cross-border related topics with the help of the fund

Figure 19. Duration of the training (carried out) on cross-border related topics with the help of the fund (data up until 2023)
Source: Programme data

When assessing the duration of training same conclusions can be drawn, however, it must be noted that total number of training hours has been larger for training on combating organised crime. Programme also overperformed according to this indicator – 17 733 training hours has been provided as compared to 1 440 training hours.

Indicators of type so5r3v1 concern the number of seized illegal materials. It is used to measure of effectiveness of activities, aimed at disruption of organised crime group. It should be noted that such indicators are prone to fluctuation by nature. In order to analyse their impact, they should be analysed carefully and based on long term trendline.

Results of the disruption of organised crime groups: cannabis seizure

Figure 20. Results of the disruption of organised crime groups: cannabis seizure
Source: ITCD

Trendline of cannabis seizure has been rising, primarily due to exceptionally high numbers in 2019 and 2023.

Results of the disruption of organised crime groups: heroin seizure

Figure 21. Results of the disruption of organised crime groups: heroin seizure
Source: ITCD

Trendline of heroin seizure has been decreasing, primarily due to higher numbers in 2015 and 2016.

Results of the disruption of organised crime groups: cocaine seizure

Figure 22. Results of the disruption of organised crime groups: cocaine seizure
Source: ITCD

Trendline of cocaine seizure has been rising, primarily due to exceptionally high numbers in 2019 and 2023.

Results of the disruption of organised crime groups: amphetamine-metamphetamine seizure

Figure 23. Results of the disruption of organised crime groups: amphetamine-metamphetamine seizure
Source: ITCD

Trendline of amphetamine-metamphetamine seizure has been rising, primarily due to exceptionally high numbers in 2022.

Results of the disruption of organised crime groups: ecstasy seizure

Figure 24. Results of the disruption of organised crime groups: ecstasy seizure
Source: ITCD

Trendline of ecstasy seizure has been rising, primarily due to exceptionally high numbers in 2021.

Results of the disruption of organised crime groups: LSD seizure

Figure 25. Results of the disruption of organised crime groups: LSD seizure
Source: ITCD

Trendline of LSD seizure has been rising, primarily due to exceptionally high numbers in 2020.

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Results of the disruption of organised crime groups: contraband goods seizure

Figure 26. Results of the disruption of organised crime groups: contraband goods seizure
Source: ITCD

Trendline of contraband goods seizure has been rising, primarily due to exceptionally high numbers in 2020, 2021 and 2023.

To sum up, trendline of 6 out of 7 types of seized goods has been on the rise. This indicates that Lithuanian law enforcement agencies has been able to expand and improve their activities in the field of disruption of organised crime. It should be noted that in all cases the increase is due to the exceptionally high numbers in the second half of Programme period, which allows to draw conclusion of Programme involvement in this kind of success.

Regarding indicators so5r3v5 and so5r3v6, both the number of victims identified, and persons arrested has been on the decline, however the number of victims identified has been reducing at more rapid pace.

Number of persons arrested and victims identified

Figure 27. Number of persons arrested and victims identified (indicators so5r3v5 and so5r3v6)
Source: State Data Agency of Lithuania

If we compare 3-year average (2014-2016 and 2021-2023) the decrease in persons arrested is 24% and the decrease in victims identified is 43%. Although these indicators should be analysed with caution, a conclusion can be drawn that during the period analysed, the number of victims of crime has reduced (less of violent crime) while the number of persons arrested has remained relatively unchanged (maintaining the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies).

Estimated value of property frozen and estimated value of property recovered

Figure 28. Estimated value of property frozen and estimated value of property recovered (indicators so5i1v3 and so5i1v4)
Source: FCIS

By analysing indicators so5i1v3 and so5i1v4 the situation in combating financial crimes can be assessed. In the period of implementation of ISF the number of property frozen and recovered had a trendline of growth. A trendline of higher growth can be seen in the field of estimated value of property frozen. Positive trendline of both indicators has been driven primarily by spikes in 2019 and 2021 (in case of frozen assets) and 2018 and 2022 in case of value of recovered property.

To conclude SO5 according to effectiveness criteria, SO5 has contributed to the achievement of the general objective defined in Regulation (EU) No 513/2014 by:

- **overperforming in the field of training** – a total of 1 893 staff members has been trained (17.7 thousand training hours in total). Interview data indicates that training has been evaluated as valuable.
- **contributed to improvements in capabilities of Lithuanian law enforcement** – especial attention has been put in place in case of combating organised crime.
- **contributed to the improvements in performance indicators of Lithuania's law enforcement** – all indicators analysed indicated that long-term trendline had a growth trajectory. Single exception is the amount of seized heroin, which could be attributed to external factors.
- **overall number of victims identified had been on the decline** – overall number of crime victims has been on the decline in Lithuania.

It can be concluded that the improved expertise and staff members as well as other projects contributed to the improvements in preventing and combating crime in Lithuania.

Finally, SO6 can be analysed, a total of 4 indicators should be analysed:

- **so6a1v1**: Number of projects relating to the assessment and management of risks in the field of internal security supported by the Fund;
- **so6r1v1**: Number of tools put in place or upgraded with the help of the Fund to facilitate the protection of critical infrastructure by Member States in all sectors of the economy;
- **so6r2v1**: Number of expert meetings, workshops, seminars, conferences, publications, websites and (online) consultations organised with the help of the Fund:
  - o **so6r2v1a**: of which, Relating to critical infrastructure protection;
  - o **so6r2v1b**: of which, Relating to crisis and risk management.

Effectiveness indicators of SO6

Figure 29. Effectiveness indicators of SO6 (data up until 2023)
Source: Programme data

ISF has successfully overperformed in the field of indicators of SO6.

- **so6a1v1**: 19 projects have been carried out (target set was 0);
- **so6r1v1**: 24 tools have been put in place (target set was 3);
- **so6r2v1**: 15 meetings, workshops, seminars, etc. have been organized (target set was 15). All of them related to crisis and risk management.

To conclude SO6 according to effectiveness criteria, SO6 has contributed to the achievement of the general objective defined in Regulation (EU) No 513/2014 by:

- **activities in the field of risk management have been performed** – these activities have successfully contributed to the capacity of Lithuania to assess and mitigate risks and crises.

4.2. ISF evaluation according to efficiency criteria

According to the EC Revised Background Note, efficiency assesses the relationship between the resources used by an intervention and the changes generated by it. In the context of this evaluation exercise, the focus will lie on the extent to which the design of the Programme is conducive to efficient use of resources and whether there is room for further economies or simplification.

EFFICIENCY OF RESULTS ACHIEVED. To assess the efficiency of goals achieved in terms of cost the number of costs spent on technical assistance as compared to total fund spent should be analysed. The percentage value should be 7 percent or less.

Figure 30. Comparison of technical support as compared to total amount of funds spent
Source: Calculated based on Programme data

The total amount of technical support as compared to total amount of funds is 3%. The conclusion must be drawn that the result of the Programme was achieved at reasonable costs.

PREVENTION OF FRAUD AND OTHER IRREGULARITIES. The control mechanism for monitoring the use of EU funds in Lithuania involves both the CPMA and the Audit authority, ensuring robust oversight across different stages of the project:

1. **CPMA inspections**: The CPMA conducts ad-hoc ex-post inspections on-site to physically verify the implementation of projects. These inspections are not limited to document reviews but involve visiting the project sites to ensure that reported activities align with actual outcomes. Additionally, CPMA carries out ex-post evaluations of reports, focusing on document checks to confirm the accuracy and completeness of the project's financial and operational reporting. CPMA also initiates targeted checks if any evidence or red flags suggest that something might be wrong with a project. These mechanisms serve as proactive and reactive tools to detect and prevent irregularities.

2. **Audit authority**: The Audit authority, on the other hand, is responsible for the financial audits of projects, ensuring that all expenditures and financial practices adhere to both national and EU regulations. This involves thorough scrutiny of financial documentation, verifying that EU funds are used properly and in compliance with regulatory frameworks. Any financial mismanagement or discrepancies are flagged, and corrective measures are implemented as needed.

This dual-layered system allows for both preventive oversight through random checks and reactive measures when irregularities are suspected, providing a comprehensive framework for fraud detection and prevention.

According to IS VORAS data, a total of 23 compliance assessments were conducted by CPMA. Of these, 13 were found to be fixable, while 5 cases revealed no violations. In 2 instances, the violations were identified and subsequently corrected. However, there were 3 cases where the violations were deemed uncorrectable.

Figure 31. Violations cases and their findings
Source: IS VORAS

In the table below the situation of violations that cannot be corrected is explained. 2 of those are related to equipment purchased not being used, in the case of SBGS's project it was detected that the system was not being used according to functionalities declared.

Table 10. Incorrectable violations

Project No	Final beneficiary	Explication
LT/2015/VSF/4.6.1.14	LR	The inspection of the remote surveillance system in Vilnius revealed that 41 out of 108 cameras were not operational across various locations. Additionally, a planned inspection in Kaunas couldn't be completed due to the absence of a monitoring workstation, despite claims from Lithuanian Railways about an alternative setup. This discrepancy contradicts the project agreement, which specified the establishment of a surveillance station at the Kaunas location. As a result, a violation of the agreement has been identified, with a recommendation to register non-compliance due to failure to meet key project objectives.
LT/2020/VSF/4.2.4.2	SBGS	An ex-post inspection revealed that while the VSATIS system's functionalities were operational, proof that only STD/STGD document holders were being checked was not provided. Despite requests, SBGS failed to submit the required evidence, prompting a suspicion of violation. The project was completed on 2021-11-26, and the suspected violation involves a total of EUR 24,798.26, including a EUR 23,649.50 procurement contract and EUR 1,198.26 in indirect costs.
LT/2016/VSF/4.2.8.1	ITCD	The project's implementation deadline was December 31, 2023, but an inspection revealed unaddressed discrepancies, with equipment neither installed nor operational. Despite efforts to modernize Lithuania's public safety radio network (SMRRT), key objectives were not met. The uninstalled equipment, valued at EUR 37,574.67, is stored in Vilnius, and its expenses are deemed ineligible for funding. As a result, a suspected violation of the contract and funding rules has been identified.

Source: IS VORAS

Analysis of violations in relation to projects and budget. Out of the 206 projects in the ISF Programme, 13 projects had fixable violations, 2 projects had violations that were corrected, and 3 projects had uncorrectable violations.

- A total of 13 projects had fixable violations. The total value of the fixable violations is EUR 25,579,206.56, which represents 10.3% of the total Programme budget. These violations were minor and successfully resolved, with no long-term effect on Programme implementation.
- There were two projects with corrected violations, totalling EUR 768,217.26. This accounts for 0.31% of the total Programme budget. Both violations were identified and corrected, showing that the compliance mechanisms worked effectively.

- There were three projects with uncorrectable violations, totalling EUR 508,976.24, which represents 0.20% of the total Programme budget. These violations had a minimal financial impact, and although they could not be corrected, they did not significantly affect the overall success of the Programme.

The presence of violations in terms of both the number of projects and their financial impact is minimal. Fixable violations account for 10.3% of the total Programme budget, but all of these issues were resolved. Corrected violations had a minor financial impact, accounting for only 0.31% of the total budget. Uncorrectable violations affected just 0.20% of the total budget, with limited financial and operational consequences.

The low incidence of violations, combined with the fact that most were either corrected or fixable, demonstrates a high level of compliance and effective project management within the ISF Programme. This underscores that the overall Programme has been implemented efficiently, with minimal disruption from violations. Based on an interview with the Audit authority[5], no major violations were detected during the Programme's implementation as per audits performed. Most identified issues were minor and promptly addressed by the responsible entities. This indicates a strong adherence to compliance measures and effective oversight mechanisms. The proactive response to fixing these issues reflects the Programme's commitment to maintaining transparency and integrity. The few discrepancies that did arise were swiftly corrected, ensuring that project objectives remained on track and funding was utilized appropriately without significant disruptions to operations.

After conducting this chapter's assessment, the following conclusions can be made:

1. The ISF Programme in Lithuania has established robust measures to prevent, detect, report, and follow up on fraud and irregularities through the collaboration of the CPMA and the Audit Authority. A total of 23 compliance assessments revealed that 13 violations were fixable, 2 were corrected, and 3 were uncorrectable, with the latter representing only 0.20% of the total Programme budget.
2. The overall incidence of violations is low, with fixable violations accounting for 10.3% of the budget, all successfully resolved. The effective oversight mechanisms ensured that minor issues were promptly addressed, demonstrating a high level of compliance and integrity within the Programme. This reflects the commitment to transparency and efficient resource use throughout the ISF implementation.
3. Ration of funds allocated, and technical support is at 3%, which highlights the efficiency at which the results of the Programme were achieved.

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[5] Interview with the Audit authority, 2024-09-13

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4.3. ISF evaluation according to relevance criteria

The evaluation of the relevance criteria focuses on whether the needs identified during the programming phase are still the most relevant and whether the programme can sufficiently adapt to newly emerging or evolving needs. This analysis involves analysing data extracted while reconstructing the intervention logic, reviewing the key issues identified and their drivers, and investigating the continued relevance of the objectives identified on a legal basis.

Institutions implementing the Programme are set in accordance with the Law on the Basics of National Security[6], where the institutions ensuring national security are established in Chapter 12. The institutions, their status in the Programme, and legally established functions are provided in the table below.

Table 11. Legally established functions of the stakeholders

Institution	Status	Legally established functions related to the Programme
Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Lithuania	Managing authority	As set in the Rules of Procedure of the MoI[7]: • Form the state policy in the field of public security, organize, coordinate, and control its implementation; • Formulating, organizing, coordinating, and monitoring public policy on migration.
Centralized Internal Audit Unit of the MoI	Audit Authority	Performing audit activities.
Central Project Management Agency (CPMA)	Intermediate body	The functions include: • Evaluation of projects; • Conclusion of contracts and supervision of their implementation; • Procurement supervision; • Conducting on-site inspections; • Eligibility assessment and declaration of expenditure; • Breach management; • Information and publicity (in the case of BMVI – on the projects' level).
State Border Guard Service of Lithuania (hereinafter – SBGS)	Final beneficiary	As set in the Rules of Procedures of the SBGS[8], the institution is responsible for implementing national border protection and control policy.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania (hereinafter – MFA)	Final beneficiary	As set in the Rules of Procedure of the MFA[9]: • Formulating foreign affairs and security policy (developing bilateral and multilateral relations to safeguard Lithuania's national security interests, international relations and membership of international organizations, economic security, foreign trade, development cooperation, communication to the international community and the Lithuanian public, and public and cultural diplomacy), and organizing, coordinating and controlling the implementation of that policy; • Formulating, organizing, coordinating, and controlling the implementation of the policy on the representation of the Republic of Lithuania abroad, diplomatic and consular relations, the diplomatic service, the Lithuanian state and diplomatic protocol, international contractual relations, and visas; • Coordinating Lithuania's representation in the EU and positions on EU policy issues.

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[6] The Law on the Basics of National Security of the Republic of Lithuania, approved on 19 December 1996 by Resolution No. VIII-49 (wording as of 1 January 2023).

[7] Rules of Procedure of the Ministry of Interior, approved by the Resolution No. 291 of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania of 14 March 2001 (wording of Order No. 21 of 3 January 2024).

[8] Rules of Procedure of the SBGS, approved by the Resolution No. 194 of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania on 22 February 2001 (wording of Order No. 893 of 15 November 2023).

[9] Rules of Procedure of the MFA, approved by the Resolution 1155 of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania on 25 September 1998 (wording of Order No. 77 of 29 January 2020).

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Institution	Status	Legally established functions related to the Programme
Police Department under the MoI (hereinafter – PD)	Final beneficiary	Besides other functions, it forms the general policy of subordinate police institutions, controls and coordinates the activities of subordinate police agencies, and provides them with recommendations and instructions in relevant fields, including criminal intelligence investigations, maintenance of public order, international cooperation of police agencies, develops international relations and cooperates with EU institutions, services, agencies, other international organizations, competent institutions and institutions of EU member states and associated Schengen states, coordinates international cooperation of police and other law enforcement institutions in the investigation and prevention of criminal acts or public in the areas of security, ensuring uninterrupted exchange of information (as set in Rules of Procedure of the Ministry of Interior[10]).
Information Technology and Communications Department under the MoI (hereinafter – ITCD)	Final beneficiary	International functions: participates in projects carried out by the EC on the development, operation and use of the second-generation Schengen Information System (SIS II); ensures data exchange with the central SIS; cooperates with the responsible institutions of the EU and NATO states; cooperates with the UNODC, the EU Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale Information Technology Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, the EU-LISA; exchanges data on criminal convictions through the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS) with other authorized institutions of the EU Member States; participates in projects carried out by the EC and MS related to the simplification and improvement of mechanisms for the exchange of criminal record information, etc. National functions: Manages and develops the Internal Affairs Information System, the Lithuanian National Schengen Information System, the Lithuanian National Visa Information System, and other internal administration systems and ensures their security; administers information resources in the field of internal affairs, coordinates their use, provides IT services to institutions in the field of internal affairs, etc.[11]
Public Security Service under the MoI (hereinafter – PSS)	Final beneficiary	As set in the Rules of Procedure of the PSS[12], it is responsible for strengthening the forces of the Lithuanian Police, the SBGS under the Ministry of the Interior, the Fire and Rescue Department under the Ministry of the Interior, the Command Security Department under the Ministry of the Interior, and the Financial Crime Investigation Service under the Ministry of the Interior, and assist them in the implementation of the functions assigned to them.
Identity Documents Personalisation Centre (hereinafter – IDPC)	Final beneficiary	As set in the Rules of Procedure of the IDPC[13], it is responsible for ensuring the design, production, and issuance of personal documents that comply with the requirements of legal acts and international standards, ensuring the implementation of the national policy on the issuance of personal documents, including the issuance of secure personal documents.
State Security Department (hereinafter – SSD)	Final beneficiary	As set in the Law on Intelligence of the Republic of Lithuania,[14] the institution is responsible for conducting intelligence and counterintelligence.
Special Investigation Service (hereinafter – SIS)	Final beneficiary	As set in the Law on Criminal Intelligence Investigation of the Republic of Lithuania[15], the institution is responsible for coordinating and conducting criminal intelligence investigations.

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[10] Rules of Procedure of the Ministry of Interior, approved by the Resolution No. 291 of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania of 14 March 2001 (wording of Order No. 21 of 3 January 2024).

[11] Priority activities of the ITCD. https://www.ird.lt/lt/veiklos-sritys/prioritetines-veiklos-kryptys

[12] Rules of Procedure of the PSS, approved by the Resolution No. 278 of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania on 14 March 2007 (wording of Order No. 672 of 29 June 2016).

[13] Rules of Procedure of the IDPC under the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Lithuania, approved by the Resolution No. 681 of the Minister of Interior (wording of Order No. 1V-760 of 6 November 2017).

[14] The Law on Intelligence of the Republic of Lithuania, approved on 17 July 2000 by Resolution No. VIII-1861 (wording as of 1 July 2023).

[15] The Law on Criminal Intelligence Investigation of the Republic of Lithuania, approved on 2 October 2012 by Resolution No. XI-2234 (wording as of 1 June 2023).

Institution	Status	Legally established functions related to the Programme
Financial Crime Investigation Service (hereinafter – FCIS)	Final beneficiary	As set in the Law on Criminal Intelligence Investigation of the Republic of Lithuania [16], it is one of the institutions responsible for coordinating and conducting criminal intelligence investigations. It also protects the state financial system from criminal influence, ensures the disclosure and investigation of criminal acts and other legal violations related to the receipt and use of financial support funds from the EU and foreign countries, carries out criminal investigation, pre-trial investigation, investigation of economic and financial activities in accordance with the procedure established by law, and coordinates the cooperation of state institutions and other institutions with the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) (as per the Law on the Financial Crimes Investigation Service of the Republic of Lithuania[17]).
Customs Department (hereinafter – CD)	Final beneficiary	As set in the Law on Criminal Intelligence Investigation of the Republic of Lithuania[18], it is responsible for coordinating and conducting criminal intelligence investigations. It carries out international cooperation, prepares, participates in the preparation, and concludes agreements assigned to the competence of the CD with the institutions of the EU, international z, and institutions of other countries and implements them; coordinates the implementation of EU and other international programs and projects related to customs activities in the Republic of Lithuania; plans organizes, coordinates and controls the activities of customs offices, carried out in the performance of the functions assigned to them; organizes and controls the accounting and collection of customs administration, other taxes and state fees; organizes the application of import, export and transit prohibitions and restrictions assigned to customs activities and the application of customs supervision measures (set in Rules of Procedure of the CD[19]).
Lithuanian Railways (hereinafter – LR)	Final beneficiary	Lithuanian Railways is a state-owned, largest group of cargo, passenger transport, and infrastructure management companies in the Baltic States.
Forensic Science Centre of Lithuania (hereinafter – FSCL)	Final beneficiary	The main area of activity of FSCL is conducting expert research. The main objective of the Lithuanian Forensic Expertise Center is to objectively and qualitatively investigate the evidence of a criminal act. All of FSCL 's scientific activities are aimed at improving expert work: expanding research opportunities, conducting research in a shorter time, and having new technological opportunities to study rapidly developing crime methods.
The Directorate of Border Crossing Infrastructure (hereinafter – DBCI)	Final beneficiary	The purpose of the activity is to develop and modernize border checkpoints and parking lots for vehicles waiting to cross the state border, to ensure efficient management and proper maintenance of entrusted assets, and to organize smooth access to border checkpoints.
State Forensic Medicine Service (hereinafter – SFMS)	Final beneficiary	SFMS is a budgetary institution for personal health care of the Lithuanian national health system, which provides forensic medicine services in the field of personal health care management. The purpose of SFMS is to provide high-quality forensic medical services, performing forensic medical examinations and investigations in accordance with the orders of officials of courts, prosecutor's office or pre-trial investigation institutions, and requests of other natural and legal persons. The main objectives of SFMS activities: • provide forensic medicine services;

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[16] The Law on Criminal Intelligence Investigation of the Republic of Lithuania, approved on 2 October 2012 by Resolution No. XI-2234 (wording as of 1 June 2023).

[17] The Law on the Financial Crimes Investigation Service of the Republic of Lithuania, approved on 28 March 2002 by Resolution No. IX-816 (wording as of 28 March 2023).

[18] The Law on Criminal Intelligence Investigation of the Republic of Lithuania, approved on 2 October 2012 by Resolution No. XI-2234 (wording as of 1 June 2023).

[19] Rules of Procedure of the Ministry of interior, approved by the Resolution No. 291 of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania of 14 March 2001 (replaced by Resolution No. 993 of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania of 5 October 2022).

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Institution	Status	Legally established functions related to the Programme
		• ensure the training and improvement of the qualifications of forensic experts in their field, organize the provision of their qualifications, and participate in the training of forensic doctors; • ensure cooperation with research and study institutions.

Source: prepared by Evaluator

Based on the analysis of the functions of the final beneficiaries of the Programme, it should be set that the programme stakeholders are correctly identified in line with the objectives established legally. Institutions that implemented projects under the Programme are legally bound to fulfil functions related to ISF objectives.

MONITORING COMMITTEE. The stakeholders that were involved in the Inter-Institutional Working Group and later in the Monitoring Committee were selected and invited by the Managing Authority according to relevant procedures. All of these institutions are now responsible for the management of the Programme or the implementation of the projects. The members of the Monitoring Committee for the period of 2014-2020 were:

- State Border Guard Service under the Ministry of Interior;
- Police Department under the Ministry of Interior;
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
- Ministry of Social Security and Labour;
- State Security Department of the Republic of Lithuania;
- Special Investigation Service;
- Customs of the Republic of Lithuania;
- Public Security Service under the Ministry of Interior;
- Information Technology and Communications Department under the Ministry of Interior;
- Public Security Policy Workshop at the Ministry of Interior.

The Monitoring Committee was composed of the key stakeholders who were also the final beneficiaries of the Programme. These members actively participated in the decision-making process. Interviews with these final beneficiaries confirmed that they were actively involved in the workings of the Monitoring Committee, and decisions were made inclusively with their input.

Their role extended beyond passive participation; they were responsible for evaluating the progress of the Programme and ensuring compliance with both national and EU regulations. As final beneficiaries, they had direct insights into the operational needs of their respective institutions, which allowed for more informed and effective decisions within the Monitoring Committee.

The collaborative nature of the committee's work, with each member having a vote, ensured that the Programme was implemented transparently, addressing both local security concerns and broader EU security goals. This setup ensured that the Programme not only met its objectives but also aligned with the practical needs and insights of those managing its projects.

RELEVANCE TO THE CURRENT SITUATION. The needs analysis that led to the definition of the programme and related distribution of resources is in line with the relevant current and prospective needs of the relevant stakeholders. Below is an analysis of the needs provided for consideration in the preparation of the Programme.

Table 12. Needs expressed by stakeholders in the Programme planning stage in the documented form

Institution	Needs provided for consideration	Interview responses on the degree their needs are addressed in the Programme.
ITCD	**Need A:** Visa information system, Visa module of the Foreigners' Register. **Need B:** The needs of the Kaliningrad Special Transit (FRTD) system. **Need C:** New "Passenger Registration" system (according to the draft regulations of the Registered Traveler Program, the ITDC is a competent authority implementing the responsible institutions	Needs covered by the Programme.

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Institution	Needs provided for consideration	Interview responses on the degree their needs are addressed in the Programme.
	of the country, providing access to Lithuanian institutions to the Central registered passenger databases). **Need D:** Habitoscopic data register (HDR). **Need E:** Official Register of Criminal Acts (NVZR). **Need F:** IT infrastructure, building, and system renewal needs.	
FCIS	**Need A:** Updating and strengthening the technical bases of the financial crime investigation service and its strengthening in the fight against cross-border, serious, and organized crime, as well as close cooperation with other EU states' criminal and intelligence entities and Europol. **Need B:** Data analysis, including automated data collection, transfer, and exchange with interested state institutions and private companies, creation and implementation of an information system, and a FCIS specialist performing analytical work, application with computer-organizational technique. **Need C:** To strengthen the special abilities of FCIS employees in the field of information systems. **Need D:** The halls of the FCIS reconstruction, installation of a training centre, and renovation of elevators. **Need E:** Strengthen the general and special capabilities of FCIS employees by implementing training related to the employee's performance of functions. **Need F:** Implementation of crime prevention, involving society and the elimination of the main causes for the occurrence of crime.	The Programme addresses a range of needs—excluding training and reconstruction efforts—by prioritizing the requirements of law enforcement institutions that focus on the most critical areas relevant to Programme objectives.
MFA	**Need A:** Secondment of technical and consular officers to work with visa applications. **Need B:** Training for consular officers and Regional training for visa service employees. **Need C:** Renovation of representative office premises, infrastructure, workplaces. **Need D:** Updating of hardware, purchase of communication service. **Need E:** Establishment of two full-time KODs in the Schengen area. **Need F:** Staffing and secondment costs of consular officers to perform the functions of the Schengen Local Cooperation/Migration/Border Liaison Officer. **Need G:** Support, maintenance, and updating of STGD issuing and STD issuing system. **Need H:** Maintenance, updating, and improvement of the system for delivery of natural gas in trains. **Need I:** Training of STS implementing personnel.	Needs covered by the Programme.
SBGS	**Need A:** Strengthening of national capacities in the field of border control: • To purchase "Eurodec" equipment sets; • To purchase wearables, thermal imagers, and other equipment; • To purchase optoelectronic monitoring systems (in the base of the vehicle); • To update computer equipment; • To purchase service dogs and their care equipment; • To purchase vehicles. **Need B:** Implementation of an integrated wall monitoring system: • Expand the border surveillance system at the border with the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus;	Needs covered by the Programme.

Institution	Needs provided for consideration	Interview responses on the degree their needs are addressed in the Programme.
	• Implementation and ensuring the operation of the European border surveillance system (EUROSUR); • to modernize the equipment of video surveillance systems (sea and land borders). **Need C:** Implementation of the recommendations found in the Schengen evaluation and monitoring report. • Training of border officers. **Need D:** Develop a VSAT criminal intelligence system: • Create and implement a secure network for storing, processing, and transmitting classified information; • To acquire modern technical means for ensuring criminal intelligence.	
SFMS, FSCL (provided by MFA)	Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Lithuania demanded a measure that should be called as follows: „Improvement of the activities of state forensic examination institutions and the qualification of forensic experts working in them". The goals of such measure should be: • Purchasing, updating, maintaining, and supervising special research equipment; • implementation and testing of modern expert research methods, and accreditation; • improving the qualifications of forensic experts.	Needs covered by the Programme.
The Dignitary Protection Service	The institution was not included in the Programme as a final beneficiary. • Beads of canine activity (need for investments into dogs' training); • Strengthening criminal intelligence (development of the IT system, development of data sharing web, relevant equipment); • Trainings; • Special equipment update, such as Electric shock devices TASER, explosives detection protective suits, acquisition of explosives detection and identification chemical test complexes, etc.	Not applicable, as this institution was not involved in the Programme
Ministry of Communications of the Republic of Lithuania	**Need A:** Installation of protective railway strips from the border control point of the Stasyla railway to the state border with Belarus. **Need B:** Reconstruction of Kybarty International Road border checkpoint. **Need C:** Design and construction of the infrastructure of Rambyna International Road border checkpoint.	Need A was implemented by LR. Other needs were considered as not as priority compared to the needs of other institutions, thus not implemented under the Programme.
PD	**Need A:** needs for special transit scheme (infrastructure and trainings); **Need B:** borders and visas (e.g., human resources, trainings, equipment modernization, and update).	Need A was implemented by LR. Other needs were considered as not as priority compared to the needs of other institutions, thus not implemented under the Programme.

Source: prepared by Evaluator, based on information provided by MoI

The table below presents a summary of the scope of needs addressed by the Programme.

Table 13. Summary table of needs covered by the Programme

	Final beneficiaries	Explication
Needs were fully covered	ITCD, MFA, SBGS, SFMS	–

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	Final beneficiaries	Explication
Needs were partially covered	FCIS, Ministry of Communications of the Republic of Lithuania, PD	Not covered needs were considered as not as priority compared to the needs of other law enforcement institutions, thus not implemented under the Programme.

Source: prepared by Evaluator, based on information provided by MoI

ADAPTABILITY TO CHANGING NEEDS. The adaptability of the Programme to changing needs was evaluated as high, although it is important to note that the fundamental needs covered during the Programme's development phase remained largely stable throughout its implementation[20]. These initial needs were focused on core areas such as border security, crime prevention, and internal security, which did not undergo drastic changes over the course of the Programme. The well-structured development phase had anticipated many of the security challenges Lithuania faced, making the Programme robust and relevant from the outset.

However, there were some adjustments, particularly in response to external events like the increase in immigration flows in 2021, which required a more targeted approach. One of the most significant changes involved shifting resources to address heightened pressures along Lithuania's border with Belarus, in response to the surge in migrants attempting to cross the border – funds were reallocated to Lithuanian border with Belarus, as well as border with Kaliningrad region (Russia). This shift demonstrated the Programme's capacity to respond to specific, emerging needs while still operating within the framework of its original objectives.

It should be highlighted that the Monitoring Committee played a key role in facilitating these adjustments[21]. When the need for funds reallocations or new priorities arose, the committee acted swiftly, working closely with the MoI or CPMA and final beneficiaries to implement changes. This close communication allowed the Programme to remain flexible and responsive to real-time developments without losing sight of its broader goals. Thus, while the overarching needs did not change drastically, the Programme's adaptability allowed it to fine-tune its focus as necessary, particularly in light of new challenges related to immigration and border security.

After conducting this chapter's assessment, the following conclusions can be made:

1. Consistency with initial objectives: The program's relevance has been confirmed as it effectively addressed the most critical security needs of Lithuania while being adaptable to new challenges such as migration crises and geopolitical tensions.
2. Flexibility and responsiveness: The ISF's ability to respond to newly emerging needs without deviating from its original goals highlights its well-structured planning and robust adaptability mechanisms. This was particularly important during the migration crisis at the Belarusian border.
3. Key success factors: The continuous involvement of the Monitoring Committee in reviewing needs and reallocating resources was vital in maintaining the program's relevance. This facilitated swift responses to changes while keeping long-term strategic goals in focus.

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[20] Interview data.
[21] Interview data.

4.4.   ISF evaluation according to coherence criteria

According to EC Revised Background Note, when evaluating coherence criteria, the evaluators will assess how well is the Programme coherent with both initiatives supported under the same policy domains across different management modes (internal coherence), as well as other EU funds and even EU's external action (external coherence). At this stage of the programming period, the evaluation will focus on the existence and initial effective use of procedure and arrangements for the cooperation of the relevant actors entrusted with the policy design and implementation, including the complementarities with the work of the relevant agencies, the content of different programmes, initiatives, and funds to assess the level of potential overlap on objective grounds, and the evidence of inter-agency cooperation.

PROGRAMME'S CONNECTIVITY WITH OTHER INITIATIVES.

European Union strategic priorities. During the formulation of the ISF for 2014-2020, the European Union's strategic priorities were guided by several key documents. The Internal Security Strategy for the European Union (2010)[22] provided a comprehensive framework for coordinated action across member states, focusing on combating terrorism, organized crime, and other security threats (directly connected to SO5). The Stockholm Programme (2009)[23] set priorities for the EU's area of freedom, security, and justice, emphasizing enhanced border management and crime prevention (connected to SO1, SO2 and SO5). The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2005)[24] aimed at preventing terrorism and addressing radicalization (connected to SO5 and SO6). The European Agenda on Security (2015)[25], though published later, continued these strategic directions by focusing on terrorism, organized crime, and cybercrime (connected to SO5, SO6). Additionally, the EU Drugs Strategy (2013-2020)[26] targeted drug demand and supply reduction, while the EU Cybersecurity Strategy (2013)[27] provided a framework for defending against cyber threats. These strategic documents shaped the ISF's objectives, ensuring it supported initiatives enhancing internal security across the EU.

Other European Union initiatives and funds supporting strategic security priorities. Several EU initiatives and funds were designed to implement the strategic priorities outlined in the key documents related to internal security. Here are some of the prominent ones, along with their connections to the ISF:

1. Horizon 2020:
    - Purpose: Horizon 2020 is the EU's research and innovation funding program, which includes projects aimed at enhancing security technologies and capabilities.[28]
    - Complementary connection to ISF: Both Horizon 2020 and the ISF support projects aimed at improving security and resilience against various threats, such as terrorism and cybercrime. Horizon 2020's focus on innovation complements the ISF's operational funding by developing advanced security solutions.
2. European Social Fund (ESF) 2014-2020:

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[22] European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe, Brussels, 22.11.2010, COM(2010) 673 final

[23] European Council, Notices from European Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, The Stockholm Programme – an Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens, 2010/C 115/01

[24] Council of the European Union, The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, Brussels, 30 November 2005

[25] European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, The European Agenda on Security, Strasbourg, 28.4.2015, COM(2015) 185 final

[26] The Council of the European Union, EU Drugs Strategy (2013-20), 2012/c 402/01

[27] European Commission, Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace, Brussels, 7.2.2013, JOIN(2013) 1 final

[28] Information about Horizon 2020 provided in European Commission website, access via: https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-open-calls/horizon-2020_en

- Purpose: The ESF funds initiatives aimed at improving employment opportunities, education, and social inclusion across the EU, which indirectly supports security by addressing social issues that can lead to radicalization and crime.29
- Complementary connection to ISF: The ESF's focus on social inclusion and combating poverty aligns with the ISF's prevention measures against radicalization and recruitment into terrorism, addressing root causes of insecurity.

3. Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) 2014-2020:
    - Purpose: AMIF supports efficient management of migration flows, asylum procedures, and integration of third-country nationals.30
    - Complementary connection to ISF: The ISF and AMIF both contribute to border security and management, with AMIF focusing more on the humanitarian and integration aspects, while ISF targets crime prevention and law enforcement.

4. European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) 2014-2020:
    - Purpose: The ERDF aims to strengthen economic and social cohesion by correcting imbalances between regions, including funding for security infrastructure and resilience projects.31
    - Complementary connection to ISF: The ERDF can fund infrastructure projects that improve security, such as enhancing border controls and urban security systems, which aligns with the ISF's goals of protecting citizens and reducing crime.

5. EU Civil Protection Mechanism:
    - Purpose: This mechanism aims to improve the EU's response to natural and man-made disasters, including coordinating disaster response and supporting preparedness measures.32
    - Complementary connection to ISF: While the ISF focuses on internal security threats like crime and terrorism, the Civil Protection Mechanism enhances overall resilience and preparedness, contributing to a comprehensive security strategy.

6. Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA):
    - Purpose: IPA supports candidate countries in their preparation for EU membership, including strengthening their judicial and security sectors.33
    - Complementary connection to ISF: By improving security capabilities in candidate countries, the IPA indirectly contributes to current and future EU internal security, creating a more secure neighbourhood and complementing the ISF's objectives.

These initiatives and funds collectively support the EU's strategic security priorities by addressing various aspects of security and resilience. They complement the ISF by covering different dimensions of security, from innovation and social inclusion to migration management and disaster response, thereby creating a comprehensive and integrated approach to internal security within the EU. All the initiatives mentioned, while collectively enhancing internal security, operate under separate management and control systems. No overlap was detected in the implementation of the programs.

Potential overlaps when evaluating potential overlaps within the Programme, it's important to consider that multiple initiatives may target similar groups or sectors but often address distinct needs or employ different types of measures. For instance, Horizon 2020, as the EU's flagship research and innovation funding programme, focuses extensively on advancing security technologies through pioneering research and development. It aims to

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29 Information about European Social Fund 2014-2020 provided in European Commission website, access via: https://wayback.archive-it.org/12090/20220818123152/https://ec.europa.eu/esf/main.jsp?catId=35&langId=en

30 Information about Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund 2014-2020 provided in European Commission website, access via: https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/funding/asylum-migration-and-integration-funds/asylum-migration-and-integration-fund-2014-2020_en

31 Information about European Regional Development Fund 2014-2020 provided in European Commission website, access via: https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/funding/erdf/2014-2020_en

32 Information about EU Civil Protection Mechanism provided in European Commission website, access via: https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/eu-civil-protection-mechanism_en

33 Information about The Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) provided in European Commission website, access via: https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/funding-country_en

push the boundaries of technological innovation to enhance security capabilities across Europe. In contrast, the ISF is specifically tailored to address operational security measures, such as funding for law enforcement agencies, enhancing border controls, and implementing crime prevention strategies. While both Horizon 2020 and the ISF contribute to overall security objectives, they do so through different means and objectives. The differentiation between these programmes ensures that they complement rather than duplicate efforts. Horizon 2020 emphasis on research and innovation feeds directly into the development of security technologies and methodologies. These innovations are then integrated into practical applications supported by the ISF, enhancing the operational capabilities of law enforcement and security agencies on the ground. Moreover, the distinct focus areas of each programme allow for a comprehensive approach to security. Horizon 2020 fosters continuous advancements in security technologies, adapting to emerging threats and challenges. Meanwhile, the ISF ensures that these advancements are effectively applied in real-world security operations, thereby maximizing the impact of EU funding across different stages of security enhancement–from research and development to practical implementation. In essence, while there may be overlaps in terms of target groups or broad security objectives, the specific focuses and methodologies of Horizon 2020 and the ISF are strategically aligned to avoid duplication and instead leverage synergies. This approach not only optimizes the use of EU resources but also enhances the overall effectiveness of EU security initiatives in safeguarding European citizens and institutions.

Considering AMIF, AMIF, and ISF complement each other: 1) effective migration management supported by AMIF contributes to overall stability and societal resilience, indirectly supporting ISF objectives by addressing root causes of insecurity; 2) ISF-funded security measures contribute to creating a safe environment that facilitates effective integration and social inclusion efforts supported by AMIF. As CPM, CPM, and ISF complement each other as well: 1) effective disaster preparedness and response supported by the CPM contribute to overall societal resilience and stability, indirectly supporting ISF objectives by ensuring robust crisis management capabilities; 2) ISF-funded security measures contribute to creating a secure environment that facilitates effective disaster response and recovery efforts supported by the CPM.

National initiatives. During the 2014–2020 period, Lithuania launched several national initiatives that supported the ISF Programme, aligning with its goals of enhancing internal security, managing migration, and preventing crime. One significant national initiative was the National Action Plan for Migration Management[34], which was developed to handle the rising number of immigrants and asylum seekers. The plan improved processes for managing migration and asylum cases and supported the integration of migrants into society, aligning with ISF's goals of improving migration management systems. Additionally, the implementation of a national cybersecurity strategy[35] was crucial in protecting Lithuania's critical infrastructure from evolving cyber threats, complementing ISF's focus on preventing crime, particularly in the digital space, thus no overlap was detected in the implementation of the initiatives and the Programme.

MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL SYSTEM, PRACTICAL COORDINATION WITH OTHER INITIATIVE.

By Order No. 1V-60[36] of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Lithuania, the authorities were designated to participate in managing the ISF programme:

- Managing Authority – Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Lithuania;
- Intermediate Body – CPMA;
- Audit authority – Centralised Internal Audit Division of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Lithuania.

The separation and distribution of functions between authorities are established, as per Regulation No 515/2014. The interviewees indicated that there is an effective and regular application of coordination mechanisms. Additionally, it should be mentioned that the work of the Monitoring Committee, as all stakeholders of the ISF

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[34] https://socmin.lrv.lt/en/activities/social-integration/integration-of-foreigners/

[35] Ministry of National Defence of Republic of Lithuania, National Cyber Security Strategy, access via: https://kam.lt/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/2019-EN-KibernetineSaugumoStrategija-el.pdf

[36] Order No. 1V-60 of 27 January 2015 of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Lithuania "Approval of the Description of Procedures for the Distribution of Responsibilities and Functions Among Institutions in the Implementation of the National Internal Security Fund Programme for 2014-2020"

programme is involved in the process, is also an example of effective coordination, ensuring the programme is covering evolving changes and needs.

COORDINATION MECHANISMS.

Coordination mechanisms between the ISF and other interventions with similar objectives were established during the implementation period to ensure complementarity and prevent overlaps. The primary coordination tool was the Monitoring Committee, which included representatives from all final beneficiaries, law enforcement agencies, and relevant national institutions.

SPECIAL TRANSIT SCHEME. The inclusion of Operating Support for the Special Transit Scheme (STS) under the ISF aligns seamlessly with the objectives of Regulation (EU) No 515/2014 and Lithuania's ISF National Programme. Article 11 of the regulation explicitly provides for such support, reflecting the EU's acknowledgment of Lithuania's unique position as a transit country facilitating the movement of Russian citizens to Kaliningrad. This role is inherently linked to Lithuania's obligations under EU border management policies, making the STS a key component of external border security.

The integration of the STS into the ISF Programme complements Lithuania's broader efforts to modernize its border infrastructure and enhance system interoperability. Investments in IT systems, document verification tools, and personnel training under the ISF not only support the effective operation of the STS but also reinforce national security priorities in managing external borders. These measures ensure that transit operations are conducted securely while maintaining compliance with EU standards, demonstrating a clear alignment between the objectives of the STS and those of the ISF Programme.

After conducting this chapter's assessment, the following conclusions can be made:

1. The Programme remained highly relevant to Lithuania's national security needs throughout the 2014-2020 period. Projects such as the development of border surveillance systems and crime prevention strategies aligned closely with Lithuania's priorities, particularly in response to the migration crisis at the Belarusian border and geopolitical tensions following Russia's invasion of Ukraine.2. The objectives of the Fund were well-aligned with broader EU security policies, including the Internal Security Strategy and the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy. These policies guided the selection of projects to ensure that they addressed both national and EU-wide security goals, particularly regarding border protection and crime prevention.3. Coordination mechanisms between the ISF and other interventions with similar objectives were established during the implementation period to ensure complementarity and prevent overlaps.

2. The inclusion of the Special Transit Scheme (STS) within the ISF Programme demonstrates strong alignment with both EU border management policies and Lithuania's national security objectives, integrating seamlessly into broader efforts to enhance external border security.

4.5.   ISF evaluation according to complementarity criteria

The Programme has been evaluated based on its complementarity with other initiatives and interventions, ensuring that the Programme not only contributes to internal security but also aligns with similar efforts across the European Union. The complementarity criteria assess the extent to which the ISF was designed and implemented in coordination with other relevant funds, initiatives, and policies to avoid duplication and maximize efficiency. This section evaluates the ISF according to three key areas: assessment of other interventions with complementary objectives, coordination mechanisms during implementation, and mechanisms to prevent the overlapping of financial instruments.

ASSESSMENT OF OTHER INTERVENTIONS WITH COMPLEMENTARY OBJECTIVES. During the programming stage, the ISF Programme was developed in full alignment with European Commission regulations, ensuring that complementary initiatives were considered. The ISF was shaped by several key European Union strategic documents that guided internal security, including the Internal Security Strategy (2010), and the EU Counter-terrorism Strategy (2005). These documents helped to align the ISF's objectives with overarching EU security priorities, such as combating terrorism, organized crime, border security, and crisis management.

The ISF also complements other EU programmes like Horizon 2020, the European Social Fund (ESF), the Asylum, migration, and Integration Fund (AMIF), and the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). For instance, Horizon 2020 focused on innovation and research in security technologies, while the ISF provided operational funding to law enforcement agencies to apply these innovations. This complementarity ensured that research outcomes were effectively implemented, strengthening internal security.

Similarly, the AMIF and ISF were complementary in supporting migration management and crime prevention, with the AMIF addressing the humanitarian and integration aspects of migration while the ISF focused on crime prevention and law enforcement. This alignment helped to ensure a comprehensive approach to migration management and security across the EU.

COORDINATION MECHANISMS DURING IMPLEMENTATION. Effective coordination mechanisms were established to ensure that the ISF Programme operated in synergy with other relevant funds and initiatives throughout the implementation period. The Programme was managed by the Managing Authority MoI, with a clear separation of functions between the Intermediate body (CPMA), and the Audit authority. This structured management system facilitated close cooperation among key stakeholders and prevented overlaps in responsibilities.

One of the most important coordination mechanisms was the establishment of the Monitoring committee. This committee, comprising representatives from all final beneficiaries of the Programme, including national law enforcement and security agencies, played a critical role in ensuring that projects under the ISF were aligned with evolving security needs. The committee worked closely with relevant EU institutions to ensure that the Programme remained coherent with broader EU objectives. It also provided a platform for inter-agency cooperation, ensuring that all beneficiaries had a voice in decision-making processes and that the Programme addressed the operational needs of all institutions involved. As the interviewers, i.e., final beneficiaries stated, the Monitoring committee was functional, all the processes were clear and done efficiently.

The Committee's role extended beyond internal programme management to include discussions on how the ISF Programme aligned with other EU and national funding streams. For example, the Monitoring Committee actively reviewed projects and adjusted allocations to ensure compatibility with other initiatives such as the Asylum, Migration, and Integration Fund (AMIF), which focuses on managing migration flows and integration, and Horizon 2020, which supports security technology research. This ensured that the ISF focused on operational measures (e.g., border control and crime prevention) while Horizon 2020 contributed to research and innovation in security technologies, thus avoiding any duplication of efforts. Furthermore, national programmes, such as the National Action Plan for Migration Management, were integrated into the ISF framework, ensuring that the national and EU funds were aligned towards shared security goals. The Monitoring Committee facilitated the smooth exchange of information between the ISF and other funding mechanisms, allowing for real-time adjustments and resource reallocations to prevent overlaps. As a result, the ISF Programme coherently worked alongside other interventions, contributing to a holistic and coordinated approach to internal security.

MECHANISMS TO PREVENT OVERLAPPING OF FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS. To avoid the risk of overlapping funding, mechanisms were put in place to ensure that financial instruments supporting security-related projects remained distinct and complementary. The Monitoring committee played a key role in this area as well, reviewing project proposals to ensure that they did not duplicate funding streams from other EU financial instruments, such as the ERDF and AMIF.

Potential overlaps were mitigated by clearly delineating the objectives of each fund. For example, while the ERDF focused on infrastructure and resilience projects, the ISF primarily targeted operational security enhancements. This differentiation allowed the programmes to complement one another without duplicating efforts. Additionally, tools such as audits, financial reviews, and cross-institutional coordination meetings were regularly applied to ensure that each project was funded appropriately and aligned with the respective objectives of the ISF and other EU funds.

The Programme was designed and implemented in a way that ensured it complemented other EU interventions in the field of internal security, migration management, and crisis response. Comprehensive assessments of other interventions were carried out during the programming stage to align the ISF's objectives with those of other EU

initiatives[37]. Coordination mechanisms, particularly through the work of the Monitoring Committee, ensured that the Programme remained responsive to the evolving needs of beneficiaries while preventing any overlap in financial instruments. These efforts contributed to the Programme's overall effectiveness in enhancing national security and supporting EU-wide security goals.

SPECIAL TRANSIT SCHEME. The Operating Support for the Special Transit Scheme (STS) under the ISF reflects a targeted approach to addressing a specific operational challenge that aligns with both national and EU priorities. The STS fulfils Lithuania's obligations under EU acquis by ensuring secure and efficient transit to Kaliningrad while adhering to Schengen standards. Its inclusion within the ISF Programme avoids redundancy, as its objectives are distinct from other EU-funded mechanisms, such as AMIF, which address broader migration and integration issues. By incorporating the STS into the ISF, Lithuania leverages resources to enhance critical operational areas such as infrastructure, IT capabilities, and personnel readiness, which also serve broader border management goals. The STS integrates seamlessly into the overarching framework of Lithuania's ISF national Programme, complementing other actions aimed at strengthening border security and interoperability. The Monitoring Committee played an essential role in coordinating efforts, ensuring that STS funding worked in harmony with other initiatives, thereby maximizing the Programme's overall impact. In this context, the STS represents an efficient use of ISF support, addressing a niche but essential operational need that supports Lithuania's strategic objectives while contributing to the broader goals of the EU's security framework.

After conducting this chapter's assessment, the following conclusions can be made:

1. During the programming stage, the ISF Programme was assessed in relation to other EU initiatives such as Horizon 2020, AMIF, and the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). This assessment ensured that the ISF complemented these funds, especially in areas of border management and crime prevention.
2. The Monitoring Committee functioned as a key coordination mechanism, ensuring that ISF projects aligned with other national and EU-funded initiatives. The committee reviewed and approved changes, ensuring that ISF projects complemented national initiatives like the National Action Plan for Migration Management.
3. Mechanisms to prevent overlap with other funding sources were in place, with the Monitoring Committee playing a critical role in preventing overlap. Beneficiaries confirmed that any potential overlaps were avoided through careful project planning, and financial audits ensured clear delineation between ISF and other EU funds.
4. The Special Transit Scheme (STS) complements the ISF Programme by addressing a distinct operational need while enhancing Lithuania's border management capabilities and aligning effectively with broader EU security strategies.

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[37] This action was performed following Regulation (EU) No 515/2014, Article 3

4.6.   ISF evaluation according to EU added value criteria

The analysis presented in the 'Reconstruction and Description of the Intervention Logic' chapter underscores that the Programme primarily relies on EU funding for its implementation. Specifically, EU support accounts for 88.3% of the total funding required for project execution, with national contributions making up the remaining 11.6%. This highlights the substantial added value of EU involvement, as it enables the realization of planned activities that might otherwise not be feasible. Without EU support, many initiatives would either not be realized at all or would face prolonged implementation timelines, given the limitations of national finances allocated to these specific national security objectives. Given that national security ranks among Lithuania's top ten strategic long-term goals (as outlined in the 2021–2030 National Progress Programme of Lithuania), the potential for increased funding toward these critical objectives through EU support should be viewed as a highly probable outcome.

The ISF programme strategically focuses on areas, interventions, and target groups where EU-level results can significantly exceed what individual Member States could achieve independently. The ISF targets critical areas such as common visa policy support, border security, operational support, crime prevention, and crisis management. These areas benefit substantially from EU-level coordination due to the transnational nature of the challenges involved. For instance, managing border security and preventing cross-border crime requires a unified approach that transcends national boundaries, ensuring cohesive and comprehensive security measures across the EU. The ISF funds various interventions, including IT systems, equipment procurement, training programs, human resource development, and infrastructure enhancements. These interventions leverage EU-wide resources and expertise, facilitating the sharing of best practices and advanced technologies that might be beyond the reach of individual Member States. For example, the development and deployment of advanced IT systems for border management and crime prevention benefit from collective EU investments and innovation, leading to more robust and efficient solutions.

The primary beneficiaries of the ISF include various national law enforcement agencies and related institutions, such as the Police Department, State Security Department, and State Border Guard Service (full list provided in chapter 'Reconstruction and Description of the Intervention Logic'). These agencies, while operating within their national jurisdictions, face security threats that often have cross-border implications. The ISF enables these agencies to collaborate and coordinate effectively at the EU level, ensuring a unified response to security threats and enhancing overall European security. The ISF's focus on transnational security challenges underscores the added value of EU involvement. Individual Member States may lack the resources or motivation to invest heavily in security measures that primarily benefit the broader EU community. By pooling resources and fostering collaboration through the ISF, the EU can achieve a higher level of security and resilience. This collective approach addresses shared threats more effectively than isolated national efforts, ensuring a safer environment for all EU citizens. Member States often face resource constraints and may not prioritize investments in areas that predominantly serve EU-wide interests. The ISF addresses this by providing substantial EU funding (88.3% of total project costs) to support critical security initiatives. This funding structure ensures that essential security measures are implemented promptly and efficiently, overcoming the financial and logistical limitations that individual Member States, including Lithuania, might encounter.

In conclusion, the ISF programme exemplifies how EU-level coordination and funding can lead to superior outcomes in areas of shared security interest. By focusing on strategic areas, providing comprehensive interventions, and supporting key target groups, the ISF achieves results that go beyond the capabilities of individual Member States, thereby enhancing the overall security framework of the European Union.

Table 14. Evaluation of EU added value criteria.

Criteria	SO1	SO2	SO3	SO4	SO5	SO6
Evidence of volume effects	The large EU funding (allocation totals EUR 2.6 million) allows for a significant increase in the number of visa applications that can be processed. The infrastructure improvements, such as upgrading technical equipment and expanding consular representation, increase the overall capacity of visa services, allowing more efficient processing of visa requests across multiple consulates.	Allocated EU funding of EUR 44.9 million allows for a substantial increase in the capacity to monitor borders, deploy new surveillance technologies, and manage a greater volume of border crossings. This funding enables the procurement of modern equipment such as biometric systems and vehicles, significantly boosting border control volume.	The allocations of EUR 378,3 thousand in ISF funds enabled the handling of larger operational volumes, such as document verification, transit monitoring, and maintaining communication infrastructure. This increases the capacity to support border and visa operations under heavy demand conditions.	EU allocations of EUR 154 million substantially increases the volume of activities related to the STS, including the monitoring and management of special transit routes. This allows for larger transit flows and more efficient control over transit operations, ensuring smooth functioning even under high traffic volumes.	The EUR 16.2 million in ISF funding increased the volume of cross-border crime prevention efforts, enabling law enforcement to conduct more operations, investigations, and collaborative efforts across Member States. This includes scaling up surveillance and data-sharing activities.	With EUR 2 million in ISF funding, the scale of risk and crisis management activities were expanded. This includes more crisis simulations, emergency preparedness exercises, and greater response capacities, allowing for better management of large-scale emergencies.
Evidence of scope effects	The projects expand the reach of the national visa system by ensuring interoperability with other EU Member States and increasing representation in additional locations like Almaty. The system's scope is broadened to support both visa services and the national implementation of the EU Visa Code.	Projects under SO2 expand the scope of border management by introducing advanced monitoring systems, biometric verification, and upgrading border infrastructure. The development of national SIS and the biometric data system ensures that the scope covers all key areas of border security and aligns with EU requirements.	Operational support extends across the entire visa and border management framework. Improving IT systems and infrastructure ensures that operations can scale and adapt to cover broader responsibilities under the EU framework.	The scope of operations is enhanced by the implementation of IT systems, vehicle procurement, and infrastructure improvements, extending coverage across key transit points and integrating with broader EU transit operations.	The scope is broadened by enhancing investigative and intelligence capabilities across borders. The projects strengthen law enforcement agencies, enabling them to tackle a wide range of criminal activities, from financial crimes to organized crime, in cooperation with EU partners.	Projects under SO6 broaden the scope of national and EU crisis response systems by improving coordination and preparedness for a wide array of risks, from natural disasters to security threats. The projects ensure that responses are aligned with EU-wide risk management standards.
Evidence of function effects	The modernization of visa systems, from upgrading the national VIS to	Enhancements to the function of border control are made	The function of operational support is strengthened by	The STS's functionality is greatly improved through IT system	The function of crime prevention efforts is significantly improved	The function of risk management is enhanced through

Criteria	SO1	SO2	SO3	SO4	SO5	SO6
	enhancing IT infrastructure, results in more robust, secure, and streamlined functions. These improvements help ensure that the visa services are standardized across consulates and meet EU regulations.	possible by modernizing equipment, such as thermal imagers and coastal patrol boats. This ensures that border control functions efficiently and with greater precision, improving security and the ability to detect illegal activities.	upgrading IT and communication systems, ensuring that border guards and visa services can operate effectively. This includes maintaining and updating systems essential for monitoring and documentation verification.	updates and staff training. These advancements ensure that the scheme operates seamlessly and is better equipped to handle the complexities of special transit arrangements.	through investments in advanced technologies and specialized training. These investments allow for more efficient crime detection and prevention, enhancing national and EU security.	better coordination platforms, emergency response protocols, and specialized training. These improvements ensure that national responses are more efficient and integrated with EU systems, allowing for quicker and more effective crisis interventions.
Evidence of process effects	Improvements in processes include implementing a dedicated communication line, training staff, and updating IT systems, which streamline visa issuance and improve response times. This makes visa processing faster, more accurate, and compliant with EU standards.	The introduction of more sophisticated IT systems, enhanced biometric data checks, and comprehensive monitoring systems optimize border management processes, making border checks quicker and more reliable while integrating with EU-wide systems.	Streamlining processes through system upgrades and staff training ensures that operational tasks, such as data management and real-time communication, are performed more efficiently, with fewer delays and errors.	Modernized processes, such as better IT support for transit monitoring and the upgrade of communication networks, improve the speed and accuracy of STS operations. This leads to more coordinated actions across borders and better management of transit flow.	Improved processes include the creation of centralized information systems, better data analytics, and more coordinated actions across law enforcement agencies. These improvements lead to faster decision-making and more effective crime prevention measures.	The process of crisis management is streamlined by implementing better data-sharing platforms, improving coordination between first responders, and optimizing the flow of information during crises. This results in faster response times and improved crisis outcomes.

Criteria	SO1	SO2	SO3	SO4	SO5	SO6
Dependency criteria (there should be no systematic lack of national funds)	While a significant part of the budget for projects consists of EU funding, however, funds from the national budget are allocated as well. The national budget allocated for this SO consists of EUR 704,9 thousand (21% of total SO budget) and it does contribute to projects. While it would be enough to support some of the more strategically important projects, however, EU support has additional value in ensuring more crucial projects are implemented.	While a significant part of the budget for projects consists of EU funding, however, funds from the national budget are allocated as well. The national budget allocated for this SO consists of EUR 21,7 million (32,6% of total SO budget) and it does contribute to projects. While it would be enough to support some of the more strategically important projects, however, EU support has additional value in ensuring more crucial projects are implemented.	While a significant part of the budget for projects consists of EU funding, however, funds from the national budget are allocated as well. The national budget allocated for this SO consists of EUR 126,1 thousand (25% of total SO budget) and it does contribute to projects.	While a significant part of the budget for projects consists of EU funding, however, funds from the national budget are allocated as well. The national budget allocated for this SO consists of EUR 328 thousand (0,2% of total SO budget) and it does contribute to projects. While it would be enough to support some of the more strategically important projects, however, EU support has additional value in ensuring more crucial projects are implemented.	While a significant part of the budget for projects consists of EU funding, however, funds from the national budget are allocated as well. The national budget allocated for this SO consists of EUR 5,4 million (25% of total SO budget) and it does contribute to projects. While it would be enough to support some of the more strategically important projects, however, EU support has additional value in ensuring more crucial projects are implemented.	While a significant part of the budget for projects consists of EU funding, however, funds from the national budget are allocated as well. The national budget allocated for this SO consists of EUR 692,6 thousand (25% of total SO budget) and it does contribute to projects. While it would be enough to support some of the more strategically important projects, however, EU support has additional value in ensuring more crucial projects are implemented.

Source: composed by the Evaluator

The analysis of the six specific objectives based on the EU added value criteria demonstrates that the ISF Programme significantly enhances the volume, scope, functionality and processes of national functions regarding internal security activities. Despite the substantial financial support from the EU, there is no evidence of dependency due to a systematic lack of national investment. National budgets contribute to these projects, indicating a cooperative financial effort where EU funds complement national resources. This balanced approach ensures that Lithuania can achieve results that go beyond what could be accomplished independently, contributing to a more integrated, secure, and efficient EU.

CONSEQUENCES OF AN INTERRUPTION OF ISF SUPPORT. Interviews with final beneficiaries highlighted that an interruption of ISF funding would have had severe consequences for the modernization of law enforcement institutions, particularly in areas such as IT systems and training. Law enforcement bodies like SBGS, which implemented 52 projects under the Programme, emphasized that without the ISF's financial support, critical projects would have been delayed, in some cases by up to 10 years. This would have led to outdated technology, slower response times, and decreased efficiency in border control and internal security operations.[38] Specific examples include:

- **IT system upgrades**: The national systems that facilitate the exchange of information for border security, like the national SIS (Schengen information system), EES, NVIS, ETIAS and biometric data systems, were significantly modernized using ISF funding. Without these funds, Lithuania's border security would have lagged behind, weakening the security at the EU's external borders.
- **Training**: The training of border guards, police, and other law enforcement personnel was another area where ISF funds played a pivotal role. Without these training programs, Lithuanian law enforcement agencies would have had reduced capacity to effectively combat modern security threats, such as organized crime, terrorism, and cyber threats.

Lithuania, as an EU member state that borders Russia and Belarus, holds a strategically important position in the Union's external security landscape. Delays in modernizing its border security would not only have weakened Lithuania's internal security but also compromised the EU's collective security framework, especially in light of current geopolitical tensions with neighbouring non-EU states.

BENEFIT TO THE UNION LEVEL. The actions supported by the ISF Programme have resulted in significant benefits at the Union level, particularly in terms of securing the EU's external borders. By ensuring that Lithuania's border with Russia and Belarus is well-guarded, modernized, and equipped with the latest technology, the entire EU benefits from reduced risks of illegal immigration, cross-border crime, and potential security breaches. Specific benefits include:

- **Enhanced border security**: Lithuania implemented advanced monitoring systems, including thermal imagers, patrol boats, and biometric verification systems. These projects helped to create an effective barrier against illegal cross-border activities, which could otherwise spread into other Schengen countries.
- **Information systems integration**: By developing systems like the national SIS, Lithuania has been able to integrate more effectively into the EU-wide security infrastructure. This enhances coordination between EU Member States, improves information sharing, and strengthens collective responses to security threats.
- **Cross-border crime prevention**: Projects aimed at preventing and combating crime, such as the establishment of centralized IT systems for data exchange between law enforcement agencies, have improved Lithuania's ability to cooperate with other EU states in tackling transnational organized crime and terrorism.

Lithuania's geographic location at the eastern border of the EU plays a crucial role in safeguarding the Union. The ISF-supported projects have ensured that Lithuania remains a strong defensive line, benefiting not just its citizens but the security of the broader EU community.

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[38] Interview with SBGS, 2024-09-17

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ADDED VALUE OF OPERATING SUPPORT. Operating support provided through the Programme had notable added value, particularly in terms of capacity building and enhancing administrative efficiency within the agencies responsible for managing the Programme. Some of the key examples of operating support include:

- **Capacity building and training**: Operating support was used to fund teaching sessions for final beneficiaries, organized by the CPMA. These sessions ensured that beneficiaries learned how to efficiently administer projects, manage control mechanisms, and ensure compliance with both national and EU regulations.
- **IS VORAS information system**: A critical use of operating support was the implementation of the IS VORAS system, an IT platform for monitoring and data collection regarding project progress. Although not mandatory in the 2014-2020 programming period, the MoI followed the European Commission's recommendation to establish the system. IS VORAS enabled better tracking of project milestones, centralized data storage, and real-time reporting, making project management more transparent and accountable. This platform also allowed for more efficient collaboration between all stakeholders involved in the ISF Programme, improving overall project oversight.

The Programme has delivered clear EU-added value by enhancing Lithuania's law enforcement capabilities and contributing to the overall security of the European Union. The consequences of interrupting the ISF's support would have led to significant delays in project implementation, particularly in IT systems and training, severely weakening Lithuania's ability to manage border security and combat crime. The actions supported by the Fund have directly benefited the EU, particularly given Lithuania's strategic location at the Union's eastern border. Finally, the operating support provided to agencies like the CPMA has added value by improving the efficiency and accountability of the project management process, laying the groundwork for continued success in future programming periods.

After conducting this chapter's assessment, the following conclusions can be made:

1. An interruption of ISF support would have severely hindered the progress of critical projects, especially regarding IT system upgrades and training for law enforcement agencies. Several beneficiaries stated that without ISF funding, some projects would have been postponed by up to 10 years, particularly those related to border surveillance and crime prevention.
2. ISF-funded actions, such as the modernization of border control technologies and the SIS, have contributed significantly to EU-level security. Lithuania's strengthened borders, particularly with Russia and Belarus, directly contribute to the security of the entire Schengen Area, preventing illegal immigration and cross-border crime.
3. Operating support provided significant added value to ensure sufficient Programme management. The operating support provided to administrative bodies like the CPMA and the introduction of the IS VORAS system allowed for more efficient project management and monitoring. While there were initial delays in the IS VORAS system, beneficiaries acknowledged its long-term value in reducing administrative burdens.

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4.7.   ISF evaluation according to sustainability criteria

This section evaluates the measures adopted to ensure the sustainability of project results, mechanisms for sustainability checks, expected continuation of outcomes, and measures to maintain the activities funded through operating support.

MEASURES TO ENSURE THE SUSTAINABILITY OF PROJECT RESULTS AT THE PROGRAMMING AND IMPLEMENTATION STAGE. At both the programming and implementation stages, several key measures were adopted by Lithuania to ensure the sustainability of the outcomes of the projects funded by the ISF. From the outset, the ISF Programme in Lithuania was designed to align with long-term national and EU security strategies, ensuring that the projects supported by the Fund addressed key national security priorities. The Internal Security Strategy for the European Union (2010), the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2005), and Lithuania's National Cybersecurity Strategy were guiding frameworks that helped align ISF-funded projects with broader security objectives. This strategic alignment ensures that the measures introduced are embedded into long-term national planning, fostering sustainability.

Many of the projects supported under the ISF involved the modernization of IT infrastructure and the delivery of essential training for law enforcement personnel. Final beneficiaries, including the SBGS, confirmed that ISF-funded IT upgrades (such as the national SIS and biometric systems) will have lasting effects, as these systems are now integrated into Lithuania's border control operations and are essential for ongoing cooperation with EU security frameworks. Similarly, the training provided to personnel ensures that the skills gained are retained and applied beyond the duration of the funding period.

According to information provided by all final beneficiaries, all equipment purchased under the ISF Fund is still in active use. Although some violations were detected during on-site inspections regarding the non-use of certain equipment, these issues have since been resolved.

This includes surveillance systems, biometric data tools, vehicles, and IT systems that have become critical components of law enforcement and border security operations. The continued use of this equipment underscores the lasting impact of the ISF-funded projects and ensures that the investment made during the funding period remains beneficial for the long term.

The programme placed a strong emphasis on capacity building for final beneficiaries. Capacity-building initiatives, such as training final beneficiaries on how to administer projects and manage control mechanisms, ensured that the institutions themselves were strengthened and can continue the work initiated by ISF-funded projects in future programming periods.

MECHANISMS TO ENSURE SUSTAINABILITY CHECK AT THE PROGRAMMING AND IMPLEMENTATION STAGES. During both the programming and implementation stages, specific mechanisms were established to ensure the long-term sustainability of ISF-funded projects. Requirements were set from the outset, mandating that all equipment purchased under the Programme be used beyond the funding period to maintain the benefits of the investments. To enforce these requirements, regular inspections and audits were conducted throughout the Programme's implementation. These checks ensured that all equipment was actively used and maintained as intended. Any discrepancies, such as instances where equipment was found not to be in use during inspections, were promptly addressed, and the violations were corrected to ensure continued compliance

Moreover, the Monitoring Committee played a vital role in ensuring sustainability by overseeing both project implementation and adherence to these requirements. Beneficiaries confirmed that the Committee monitored compliance through frequent evaluations, ensuring that all decisions regarding financial reallocations or project changes were made with the long-term sustainability of the projects in mind. The IS VORAS system, which tracks and monitors project outcomes, also supported sustainability efforts by allowing continuous oversight of project indicators. This system ensures that data on project performance and equipment usage is systematically reviewed, enabling authorities to verify the ongoing use and impact of ISF-funded equipment even after the Programme has ended.

Expected continuation of outcomes/benefits of ISF-supported actions. The outcomes of the ISF-funded actions are expected to continue well beyond the 2014-2020 programming period. There are several reasons for this optimistic outlook.

- Firstly, the law enforcement agencies that benefited from ISF-funded projects have fully integrated these projects into their regular operations[39].
- Secondly, projects such as the modernization of Lithuania's Schengen Information System (SIS), biometric verification systems, and surveillance technologies at border points will continue to provide security benefits for years to come. These systems are not only necessary for Lithuania's national security but are also integrated into EU-wide security protocols, meaning their ongoing operation is critical for both national and Union-level security.
- Thirdly, the training programs provided under the ISF, which enhanced the capacity of law enforcement agencies and border guards, have a long-term impact. The skills and knowledge gained through these programs will continue to benefit Lithuania's law enforcement agencies.
- Furthermore, the systems and processes developed for administering ISF projects, such as the IS VORAS system, ensure that project management capacity will remain high for future programming periods. Interim evaluations of 2021-2027 ISF programming period results suggests that IS VORAS system for new period was built on logic of IS VORAS 2014-2020 period.[40]
- Finally, since all equipment purchased under the ISF is still in use, this underscores the durability and long-term utility of the investments made. Whether it is surveillance equipment, vehicles, or IT systems, these assets continue to serve critical roles in Lithuania's security infrastructure and are expected to remain operational for years to come, ensuring that the Fund's impact is sustained.

MEASURES TO ENSURE CONTINUITY OF ACTIVITIES FUNDED THROUGH OPERATING SUPPORT. To ensure the continuity of activities funded through operating support, several measures were implemented. The operating support was used for staff at the CPMA and to train beneficiaries on how to effectively administer projects, monitor control mechanisms, and ensure that project outcomes were sustainable. This has left behind a legacy of improved institutional capacity that will continue to benefit future programmes[41]. As mentioned earlier, the IS VORAS system was a key outcome of the operating support. By creating a centralized platform to monitor the progress of projects and gather data, the IS VORAS system ensures that sustainability checks are built into the project management process. This system will continue to be used in future programming periods, ensuring that the outcomes of the ISF Programme are maintained and that projects are monitored for ongoing effectiveness. The Monitoring Committee and the mechanisms for inter-institutional collaboration that were established during the ISF Programme are expected to continue in the 2021-2027 programming period. This continuity ensures that the lessons learned, administrative capacities developed, and oversight mechanisms established during the implementation of the Programme will carry forward into future programmes, providing a stable foundation for ongoing internal security improvements.

To conclude, the sustainability of the Programme's results has been ensured through a combination of strategic alignment, robust institutional capacity building, and the implementation of key monitoring and oversight mechanisms. The integration of ISF-supported projects into national law enforcement operations, such as the modernization of IT systems and border security infrastructure, guarantees that the benefits will continue beyond the initial funding period. The continued use of equipment purchased under the Fund reinforces the long-term impact of the Programme. Moreover, operating support provided through the ISF has enhanced the capacity of managing authorities and beneficiaries, ensuring that they are well-prepared to manage future security challenges. Overall, the Programme has created a sustainable framework for improving Lithuania's internal security and contributing to the broader security of the European Union.

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[39] Interview data.

[40] Mid-Term Evaluation of the Internal Security Fund 2021-2027 Programme and Mid-Term Evaluation of the 2021-2027 Programme of the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy Forming Part of the Integrated Border Management Funs, access via: https://www.vsfsvvp.lt/bendra-informacija/ataskaitos-ek/nepriklausomo-vertinimo-ataskaitos/180

[41] Mid-Term Evaluation of the Internal Security Fund 2021-2027 Programme and Mid-Term Evaluation of the 2021-2027 Programme of the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy Forming Part of the Integrated Border Management Funs, access via: https://www.vsfsvvp.lt/bendra-informacija/ataskaitos-ek/nepriklausomo-vertinimo-ataskaitos/180

After conducting this chapter's assessment, the following conclusions can be made:

1. Several measures were adopted to ensure the sustainability of project results, including the integration of IT systems and surveillance infrastructure into national operations. The continuous use of equipment purchased under the ISF, such as surveillance cameras and biometric systems, ensures that the Programme's benefits will last beyond the funding period.
2. Sustainability checks were embedded in the Monitoring Committee's oversight functions. The Committee regularly reviewed project outcomes to ensure their alignment with long-term national security goals, and adjustments were made as needed.
3. Most of the outcomes, such as the modernized border systems and law enforcement training, are expected to have a long-term impact beyond the funding period. The IS VORAS system, despite its delayed implementation, will continue to be used for project management in the next programming period.

4.8. ISF evaluation according to simplification and reduction of administrative burden criteria

In the 2014-2020 programming period, the ISF implemented several innovative procedures aimed at reducing the administrative burden and simplifying processes for beneficiaries. This evaluation explores how the Fund's features, such as multiannual programming, national programmes' flexibility, operating support, and the Special Transit Scheme (STS), contributed to simplification for final beneficiaries.

SIMPLIFIED COST OPTIONS (SCOS). While SCOs, such as lump sums or flat-rate financing, were not used in Lithuania's ISF during the 2014-2020 period, their implementation is in place for the 2021-2027 period. In the 2014-2020 period, traditional cost structures were used, which required more detailed financial reporting and audits. The absence of SCOs in this period meant that beneficiaries had to engage in more complex and time-consuming financial management, but there were still other innovations that simplified certain aspects of the Programme.

MULTIANNUAL PROGRAMMING. One of the most beneficial innovations during the 2014-2020 period was the introduction of multiannual programming. This allowed for a more flexible approach to funding allocation. The Programme's funds were allocated through decisions made by the Programming Committee, which was composed of the MoI and all relevant law enforcement institutions (final beneficiaries). The multiannual approach allowed final beneficiaries to prioritize projects based on national security needs and shifting priorities, ensuring that funding was directed toward the most urgent objectives. Final beneficiaries confirmed that this flexibility significantly reduced the administrative burden. By allowing decisions on multi-year projects, they were able to avoid the yearly reprogramming or reapplication processes that might otherwise have added layers of complexity.

NATIONAL ELIGIBILITY RULES. For the ISF 2014-2020, there were no national eligibility rules that differed from EU regulations, which contributed to the smooth administration of the Programme. The alignment of national and EU regulations eliminated any confusion or discrepancies that could have arisen from differing eligibility standards. This simplification prevented additional administrative burdens on final beneficiaries who otherwise would have had to navigate two sets of rules.

FLEXIBILITY IN NATIONAL PROGRAMMES. The flexibility built into the national programme design was another key factor in simplifying the project management process. According to feedback from final beneficiaries, project content changes, budget reallocations, and adjustments to performance indicators were easily accommodated through the Monitoring Committee. Beneficiaries emphasized that this process was smooth and efficient, with a unified understanding among all stakeholders regarding the Programme's objectives and priorities. The fact that changes were agreed upon democratically and decisions were made quickly ensured that no delays were encountered when modifications were necessary. This level of flexibility provided significant relief to the beneficiaries, as it allowed them to adapt projects to evolving security needs without being hindered by bureaucratic obstacles.

IMPACT OF OPERATING SUPPORT AND IS VORAS SYSTEM. Operating support provided through the ISF further contributed to the reduction of administrative burdens. A notable example is the introduction of the IS VORAS system, which was designed to facilitate project management and monitoring for final beneficiaries. Although IS VORAS was not available at the beginning of the programme due to public procurement delays determined by public procurement laws in Lithuania, its eventual implementation was regarded as a major improvement. The system allowed beneficiaries to track the progress of their projects, store data, and streamline administrative tasks related to reporting and project management. Beneficiaries who were able to use the system found it indispensable in easing their workload, improving transparency, and enhancing the overall efficiency of project administration. However, due to the delayed implementation, not all beneficiaries were able to use IS VORAS for the entirety of the programme period. It should also be noted that, in the initial stages, the system experienced errors that temporarily increased the administrative burden for final beneficiaries. However, these issues were quickly resolved. It is important to highlight that the creation of the information system during the 2014-2020 period allowed all beneficiaries to familiarize themselves with it, ensuring smoother operations in the future. As the system was already in place, the 2021-2027 period should be less challenging, especially since its use for a new financial perspective is now mandatory as per European Commission regulations.

Special Transit Scheme (STS). The STS was established as part of the 2002 EU-Russia agreements, also, following Lithuania's accession to the Schengen Area and the European Union. Changes to the STS were implemented smoothly and efficiently, especially as Lithuania faced new challenges due to evolving geopolitical tensions. For instance, as illegal migration became a pressing issue at the Belarusian-Lithuanian border in 2021, changes in the STS were swiftly approved to address these new priorities. Similarly, the Kaliningrad transit was also adjusted following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. These adjustments were managed with minimal administrative burden, as the flexibility of the Programme allowed for quick reallocations and adaptations based on the new security landscape.[42]

To conclude, the Programme introduced several key mechanisms that reduced the administrative burden and simplified project management for final beneficiaries. While Simplified cost options (SCOs) were not utilized in this period, multiannual programming provided flexibility in funding allocation, and the harmonization of national and EU eligibility rules ensured a streamlined process. Additionally, the IS VORAS system, although delayed and faced initial errors, played a crucial role in simplifying project monitoring once it was implemented, and the Special Transit Scheme (STS) benefitted from a flexible administrative approach that allowed it to adapt to evolving security challenges. Overall, these innovations contributed to a more efficient and manageable programme for Lithuania's law enforcement agencies, reducing the complexity and administrative burden.

After conducting this chapter's assessment, the following conclusions can be made:

1. Several procedures simplified the administrative workload for beneficiaries. Multiannual programming allowed projects to span multiple years, reducing the need for constant reapplications and reallocations. The IS VORAS system further simplified the management process once implemented, though some beneficiaries experienced short-term administrative burdens due to initial delays.
2. There were some challenges related to the simplification efforts. For instance, the delayed rollout of the IS VORAS system created temporary administrative challenges, increasing the workload for some beneficiaries. However, once operational, IS VORAS reduced reporting burdens and improved project tracking.

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[42] Interview data.

5. Conclusions

The Internal Security Fund (ISF) Programme for the 2014–2020 period was implemented in Lithuania to strengthen the country's internal security, focusing on key areas such as border management, crime prevention, and crisis response. This evaluation has reviewed the progress and outcomes of the Programme from 2014 to 2023, with a particular emphasis on its alignment with national and EU strategic priorities, resource utilization, and the overall impact on security institutions. The financial structure of the Programme was well-balanced, with EU funds covering 88.3% and national contributions accounting for 11.6% of the total budget. This financial support enabled the completion of 198 projects across six specific objectives (SOs). All budget allocated for SO4 (STS), SO5+SO6 used 99,8% of allocated funds, and SO1+SO2+SO3 used 92.4% of allocated funds. This is regarding actions 2.4.5 and 2.4.6, as those were not fully implemented as were planned. This was due to challenges surrounding the implementation of key systems, specifically the Entry/Exit System (EES) and the European Travel Information and Authorization System (ETIAS). Actions 2.4.5 and 2.4.6, which were directed toward these systems, faced delays largely stemming from postponed development at the EU level. This delay meant Lithuania could not progress with its national EES and ETIAS systems as initially scheduled. The knock-on effect of these EU-wide delays led to a misalignment between national and EU project timelines, making it difficult for Lithuania to allocate resources effectively to these actions within the original program period.

The evaluation also highlights the successful use of technical support, including the IS VORAS system, which enhanced project management and reduced administrative burdens for beneficiaries. While initial delays in system implementation caused short-term difficulties, the system later played a vital role in ensuring transparency and effective project monitoring. In light of these observations, the following conclusions and recommendations are presented, addressing the lessons learned, best practices, and areas for improvement moving forward.

Reconstruction of intervention logic. The intervention logic underpinning the ISF Programme confirms that it effectively aligned with the EU regulations and objectives governing the fund. The Specific Objectives and national targets were strategically selected to address Lithuania's security challenges, from border management to crime prevention. The common indicators established under the Programme clearly correlated with its objectives, ensuring that the outcomes achieved reflected the intended policy impacts.

Effectiveness. It is assessed that the Programme has been effective in achieving its objectives. The analysis of both Programme data and other data sources indicate that general security situation has either increased or has been worsened by external factors.

SO1 has contributed to the achievement of the general objective defined in Regulation (EU) No 515/2014 by:

- overperforming in the field of training – a total of 549 staff members has been trained (10.7 thousand training hours in total). Interview data indicates that training has been evaluated as valuable.
- overperforming in the field of development or upgrade of consulates – 100 percent of consulates has been developed or upgraded (51 units);
- achieved its target in the field of development of consular cooperation activities – 1 such activities have been performed in 2017;
- maintained 2 specialists in third countries – starting from 2016 until now. .

SO2 has contributed to the achievement of the general objective defined in Regulation (EU) No 515/2014 by:

- performed in the field of training – a total of 1 084 staff members have been trained (93.3 thousand training hours in total). Interview data indicates that training has been evaluated as valuable.
- overperforming in the field of development of upgrade of border control infrastructure and equipment – 1 768 units of infrastructure and equipment has been developed;
- reached its targets in the field of national border surveillance infrastructure established/further developed in the framework of EUROSUR – 1 national and 13 local coordination centres were established/developed.
- supported the management of the migration crisis on the Belarus border – as indicated by data, illegal migration has been on the historic high level. Investments made by the Programme assisted in managing the crisis.

The indicators of SO3 and SO4 should be treated separately due to their operational nature. Both SOs contributed to the ongoing international obligations of the Republic of Lithuania.

SO5 has contributed to the achievement of the general objective defined in Regulation (EU) No 513/2014 by:

- overperforming in the field of training – a total of 1 893 staff members has been trained (17.7 thousand training hours in total). Interview data indicates that training has been evaluated as valuable.
- contributed to improvements in capabilities of Lithuanian law enforcement – especial attention has been put in place in case of combating organised crime.
- contributed to the improvements in performance indicators of Lithuania's law enforcement – all indicators analysed indicated that long-term trendline had a growth trajectory. Single exception is the amount of seized heroin, which could be attributed to external factors.
- overall number of victims identified had been on the decline – overall number of crime victims has been on the decline in Lithuania.

SO6 has contributed to the achievement of the general objective defined in Regulation (EU) No 513/2014 by:

- activities in the field of risk management have been performed – these activities have successfully contributed to the capacity of Lithuania to assess and mitigate risks and crises.

Efficiency. The ISF Programme demonstrated high efficiency, particularly in its resource management and oversight mechanisms. The collaboration between the Central Project Management Agency (CPMA) and the Audit Authority was effective in identifying and resolving compliance issues. Out of 23 compliance assessments, the vast majority of violations were either fixable or corrected, with only a small fraction (0.20% of the Programme budget) deemed uncorrectable. This demonstrates that the Programme was managed with integrity and transparency, minimizing waste and ensuring proper use of funds. Ration of funds allocated, and technical support is at 3%, which highlights the efficiency at which the results of the Programme were achieved

Relevance. The Programme maintained its relevance throughout its implementation. Initially designed to address Lithuania's critical security needs, it proved adaptable to new challenges, such as the migration crisis. The Monitoring Committee played a pivotal role in regularly reviewing and adjusting priorities, ensuring that resources were reallocated swiftly when needed, without deviating from the long-term strategic goals.

Coherence. The ISF Programme was well-aligned with both Lithuania's national security priorities and broader EU security strategies, such as the Internal Security Strategy and the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Coordination mechanisms between the ISF and other interventions, such as Horizon 2020 and the Asylum, Migration, and Integration Fund (AMIF), ensured that efforts were complementary, and no significant overlaps occurred.

Complementarity. Assessments conducted during the programming stage ensured that the ISF complemented other EU initiatives. The Monitoring Committee played a key role in this coordination, regularly reviewing projects to ensure alignment with national initiatives such as the National Action Plan for Migration Management. Mechanisms to prevent overlap between different funding sources were also effectively implemented, with beneficiaries confirming the success of these planning efforts.

EU added value. The ISF provided significant EU added value, particularly in areas such as border surveillance and crime prevention, which would have faced delays of up to 10 years without this funding. The Programme's impact extended beyond Lithuania, contributing to the security of the entire Schengen Area, especially regarding illegal immigration and cross-border crime. Operating support, including the implementation of the IS VORAS system, further strengthened Programme management, improving efficiency and reducing administrative burdens.

Sustainability. Sustainability was a core focus throughout the Programme. The integration of IT systems, such as surveillance infrastructure and biometric systems, into national operations ensures that the results of the ISF-funded projects will continue to deliver benefits beyond the funding period. The Monitoring Committee regularly assessed project outcomes to ensure they aligned with long-term goals, and the continued use of the IS VORAS system in future programming periods further enhances the sustainability of the Programme's impact.

Simplification and reduction of administrative burden. The Programme introduced several measures to simplify administration for beneficiaries, such as multiannual programming and the use of the IS VORAS system for project

tracking. While the delayed implementation of IS VORAS created short-term administrative challenges, it ultimately reduced reporting burdens and improved the overall efficiency of project management.

5.1.   Lessons learned

This section delineates critical lessons learned regarding the significance of flexibility in programme management during times of crisis, underscores the effectiveness of an inclusive governance structure, as well as addresses the implementation of the IS VORAS system.

IMPORTANCE OF FLEXIBILITY IN PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT IN FACE OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT: The Programme's flexible approach to programming, including the ability to adjust financial allocations and project activities through the Monitoring Committee, has been instrumental in addressing evolving national security needs, particularly during unpredictable crises like illegal migration surges at the Belarusian-Lithuanian border. This demonstrated the importance of adaptable programming for national security frameworks.

INCLUSIVE MONITORING COMMITTEE AS EFFECTIVE COORDINATION MECHANISMS: The success of the Monitoring Committee in ensuring that all key stakeholders participated in the decision-making process highlighted the importance of a well-structured governance mechanism. The Committee facilitated changes to projects efficiently, provided a transparent platform for stakeholders, and enhanced inter-agency cooperation.

SUCCESS OF INTRODUCTION OF IT SOLUTIONS FOR PROGRAMME AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT: The introduction of the IS VORAS system, although delayed, was a key innovation that simplified project management for final beneficiaries. While not all stakeholders could utilize the system from the outset, its future potential for reducing administrative complexity is evident.

5.2.   Examples of good practice

This section emphasizes the importance of information system introduction, efficient adjustment implementation and inter-agency collaboration in programme management, as examples of good practice.

IS VORAS: The implementation of the IS VORAS system represents a significant advancement in programme and project management. Despite initial delays, this innovative IT solution has simplified project management processes for final beneficiaries. While not all stakeholders were able to utilize the system from the outset, the IS VORAS system demonstrates considerable potential for reducing administrative complexity in future applications, thereby enhancing overall efficiency and effectiveness.

EFFICIENT ADJUSTMENT IMPLEMENTATION: The Monitoring Committee's ability to quickly reallocate funds and adapt to emerging needs, in accordance with changing public procurement procedures, represents good practice in responsive governance, ensuring that resources are efficiently deployed where needed. All projects were planned according to the original programme/action plan, except for project 2491 - Druskininkai PU Infrastructure Improvement.

INTER-AGENCY COLLABORATION: Close cooperation among institutions, as evidenced by the collaborative work within the Monitoring Committee, ensured that the Programme was implemented cohesively and that security measures were adapted to changing needs. This collaboration is a strong model of inter-institutional synergy.

5.3.   Recommendations

This section outlines key recommendations aimed at enhancing programme management and addressing administrative challenges in future initiatives. By prioritizing the effective implementation of IT systems, promoting simplified cost options, strengthening training initiatives, improving border management capabilities, and reinforcing crisis preparedness, stakeholders can significantly reduce administrative burdens and enhance

overall efficiency. These strategic recommendations are designed to ensure that programmes are better equipped to respond to emerging needs and challenges in the 2021-2027 period.

Table 15. Recommendations

Title	Recommendation	Institution
Continue the success of IT system application for Programme management by ensuring its performance	Given the significant delays in the implementation of the IS VORAS and its importance in reducing administrative burden, future programmes should prioritize the early introduction of IT systems for project management. This will ensure that all beneficiaries can utilize these systems from the outset, avoiding bottlenecks in programme administration.	CPMA
Early use of simplified cost options	As simplified cost options (SCOs) were not used widely in the 2014-2020 period, their early implementation in the 2021-2027 period should be applied to further reduce the administrative burden on beneficiaries, especially regarding financial reporting.	MoI
Strengthen training initiatives	While operating support for CPMA staff and beneficiaries' training was effective, it is recommended that this practice is taken into consideration in the 2021-2027 period as well. Targeted training sessions should be organized early in the programming period to ensure that beneficiaries are fully equipped to manage both operational tasks and administrative procedures efficiently.	MoI, CPMA
Continuous improvement of border management systems	Given Lithuania's strategic importance as an external EU border, it is crucial that investments in border surveillance and monitoring systems continue. This should include regular upgrades to technological infrastructure and sustained training programs for border management personnel.	MoI
Reinforce crisis preparedness	The geopolitical landscape has shown the need for continuous crisis management capabilities. Future programmes should focus on reinforcing Lithuania's preparedness for a wide range of crises, including those resulting from political or military tensions, ensuring rapid response capacities are further developed.	MoI

Source: composed by evaluator

Annexes

Annex 1. Evaluation matrix

Table 16. Evaluation matrix

Evaluation question	Judgement Criteria	Indicator (Descriptor)[43]	Methods	Sources
1.a. **Effectiveness criteria** (*How did the Fund contribute to the achievement of the following specific objectives: a) Support a common visa policy to facilitate legitimate travel; b) Provide a high quality of service to visa applicants; c) Ensure equal treatment of third-country nationals and d) Tackle illegal migration?*)				
1.a.1. What progress was made towards promoting the development and implementation of the common visa policy to facilitate legitimate travel, and how did the Fund contribute to achieving this progress?	1.a.1-6.1. Intervention logic of successfully completed projects is in line with the impact goals; 1.a. 1-6.2. Values of respective common results and impact indicators allow us to conclude the impact of the Programme; 1.a. 1-6.3. Stakeholders recognize the impact, produced by the Programme.	1.a.1-6.1. Intervention logic of relevant measures; 1.a. 1-6.3. Normative judgements by relevant stakeholders;	a) Semi-structured interviews; b) Analysis of financial and physical progress; c) Theory based impact evaluation; d) Reconstruction of intervention logic.	a) Reports by involved institutions; b) Legal documents related to the Programme; c) Data from semi-structured interviews; d) Monitoring data.
1.a.2. What progress was made towards ensuring better consular coverage and harmonised practices on visa issuance between MS, and how did the Fund contribute to achieving this progress?		1.a.1-6.1. Intervention logic of relevant measures; 1.a. 1-6.2. Values of indicators SO1 R2, SO1 I1, SO1 I2; 1.a. 1-6.3. Normative judgements by relevant stakeholders;		
1.a.3. What progress was made towards ensuring the application of the Union's acquis on visas and how did the Fund contribute to achieving this progress?		1.a.1-6.1. Intervention logic of relevant measures; 1.a. 1-6.2. Values of indicators SO1 R3; 1.a. 1-6.3. Normative judgements by relevant stakeholders;		
1.a.4. What progress was made towards MS' contribution to strengthening the cooperation between MS operating in third countries as regards the flows of third-country national into the territory		1.a.1-6.1. Intervention logic of relevant measures; 1.a. 1-6.2. Values of indicators SO1 C3, SO1 R1, SO1 R6, SO1 R5;		

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[43] NA/SM – Needs assessment/stakeholder mapping; SI – Semi-structured interview; ILR – Reconstruction of the Intervention logic; AFPP – Analysis of financial and physical progress; PSSA – Primary and secondary source analysis.

Evaluation question	Judgement Criteria	Indicator (Descriptor)[43]	Methods	Sources
of MS, including prevention and tackling of illegal immigration, as well as the cooperation with third countries, and how did the Fund contribute to achieving this progress?		1.a. 1-6.3. Normative judgements by relevant stakeholders;		
1.a.5. What progress was made towards supporting the common visa policy by setting up and running IT systems, their communication infrastructure and equipment, and how did the Fund contribute to achieving this progress?		1.a.1-6.1. Intervention logic of relevant measures; 1.a. 1-6.2. Values of indicators SO1 R4; 1.a. 1-6.3. Normative judgements by relevant stakeholders;		
1.a.6. How did the operating support provided for in Article 10 of the Regulation (EU) No 515/2014 contribute to the achievement of the specific objective on common visa policy?		1.a.1-6.1. Intervention logic of relevant measures; 1.a. 1-6.3. Normative judgements by relevant stakeholders;		
1. b. **Effectiveness criteria** (How did the Fund contribute to the following specific objectives: a) Supporting integrated border management, including promoting further harmonisation of border management-related measures in accordance with common Union standards and through the sharing of information between MS and between MS and the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the MS of the EU? b) Ensuring, on one hand, a uniform and high level of control and protection of the external borders, including by the tackling of illegal immigration and, on the other hand, the smooth crossing of the external borders in conformity with the Schengen acquis, while guaranteeing access to international protection for those needing it, in accordance with the obligations contracted by the MS in the field of human rights, including the principle of non-refoulement??)				
1.b.1. What progress was made towards promoting the development, implementation and enforcement of policies with a view to ensure the absence of any controls on persons when crossing the internal borders, and how did the Fund contribute to achieving this progress?	1. b.1-8.1. Intervention logic of successfully completed projects is in line with the impact goals; 1. b. 1-8.2. Values of respective common results and impact indicators allow to draw conclusions on the impact of the Programme; 1. b. 1-8.3. Stakeholders recognize the impact, produced by the Programme.	1.b.1-8.1. Intervention logic of relevant measures; 1.b.1-8.3. Normative judgements by relevant stakeholders;	a) Semi-structured interviews; b) Analysis of financial and physical progress; c) Theory based impact evaluation; d) Reconstruction of intervention logic.	a) Reports by involved institutions; b) Legal documents related to the Programme; c) Data from semi-structured interviews; d) Monitoring data.
1.b.2. What progress was made towards carrying out checks on persons and monitoring efficiently the crossing of external borders, and how did the Fund contribute to achieving this progress?		1.b.1-8.1. Intervention logic of relevant measures; 1.b.1-8.2. Values of indicators SO2 C2, SO2 R2, SO2 I3, SO2 I5; 1.b.1-8.3. Normative judgements by relevant stakeholders;		
1.b.3. What progress was made towards establishing gradually an integrated management system for external		1.b.1-8.1. Intervention logic of relevant measures;		

Evaluation question	Judgement Criteria	Indicator (Descriptor)[43]	Methods	Sources
borders, based on solidarity and responsibility, and how did the Fund contribute to achieving this progress?		1.b.1-8.2. Values of indicators SO2 R5; 1.b.1-8.3. Normative judgements by relevant stakeholders;		
1.b.4. What progress was made towards ensuring the application of the Union's acquis on border management, and how did the Fund contribute to achieving this progress?		1.b.1-8.1. Intervention logic of relevant measures; 1.b.1-8.2. Values of indicators S02 R1, SO2 R3, SO2 R4; 1.b.1-8.3. Normative judgements by relevant stakeholders;		
1.b.5. What progress was made towards contributing to reinforcing situational awareness at the external borders and the reaction capabilities of MS, and how did the Fund contribute to achieving this progress?		1.b.1-8.1. Intervention logic of relevant measures; 1.b.1-8.3. Normative judgements by relevant stakeholders;		
1.b.6. What progress was made towards setting up and running IT systems, their communication infrastructure and equipment that support border checks and border surveillance at the external borders, and how did the Fund contribute to achieving this progress?		1.b.1-8.1. Intervention logic of relevant measures; 1.b.1-8.2. Values of indicators SO2 I1, SO2 I2, SO2 I4; 1.b.1-8.3. Normative judgements by relevant stakeholders;		
1.b.7. What progress was made towards supporting services to MS in duly substantiated emergencies requiring urgent action at the external borders, and how did the Emergency Assistance contribute to achieving this progress? What type of emergency actions were implemented? How did the emergency actions implemented under the Fund contribute to addressing the urgent needs of the Member State? What were the main results of the emergency actions?		1.b.1-8.1. Intervention logic of relevant measures; 1.b.1-8.3. Normative judgements by relevant stakeholders;		
1.b.8. How did the operating support provided for in Article 10 of the		1.b.1-8.1. Intervention logic of relevant measures;		

Evaluation question	Judgement Criteria	Indicator (Descriptor)[43]	Methods	Sources
Regulation (EU) No 515/2014 contribute to the achievement of the specific objective of border management?		1.b.1-8.3. Normative judgements by relevant stakeholders;		
1. c. **Effectiveness criteria** (How did the Fund contribute to the achievement of the following specific objectives: a) Prevention of cross-border, serious and organised crime, including terrorism?; b) Reinforcement of the coordination and cooperation between law enforcement authorities and other national authorities of Member States, including with Europol or other relevant Union bodies, and with relevant third countries and international organisations?)				
1.c.1. What progress was made towards the achievement of the expected results of strengthening Member States' capacity to combat cross-border, serious and organised crime, including terrorism and to reinforce their mutual cooperation in this field, and how did the Fund contribute to the achievement of this progress?	1.c.1-4.1. The intervention logic of successfully completed projects is in line with the impact goals; 1. c. 1-4.2. Values of respective common results and impact indicators allow to draw conclusions on the impact of the Programme; 1. c. 1-4.3. Stakeholders recognize the impact, produced by the Programme.	1.c.1-4.1. Intervention logic of relevant measures; 1.c.1-4.2. Values of indicators SO5 R1 SO5 I1 SO5 I2 SO5 I3 SO5 C3 SO5 R3; 1.c.1-4.3. Normative judgements by relevant stakeholders;	a) Semi-structured interviews; b) Analysis of financial and physical progress; c) Theory based impact evaluation; d) Reconstruction of intervention logic.	a) Reports by involved institutions; b) Legal documents related to the Programme; c) Data from semi-structured interviews; d) Monitoring data.
1.c.2. What progress was made towards developing administrative and operational coordination and cooperation among Member States' public authorities, Europol or other relevant Union bodies and, where appropriate, with third countries and international organisations, and how did the Fund contribute to the achievement of this progress?		1.c.1-4.1. Intervention logic of relevant measures; 1.c.1-4.2. Values of indicators SO5 R1 SO5 I5 SO5 I6 SO5 C4 SO5 I7; 1.c.1-4.3. Normative judgements by relevant stakeholders;		
1.c.3. What progress was made towards developing training schemes, such as those regarding technical and professional skills and knowledge of obligations on human rights and fundamental freedoms, in the implementation of EU training policies, including through specific Union law enforcement exchange programmes, and how did the Fund contribute to the achievement of this progress?		1.c.1-4.1. Intervention logic of relevant measures; 1.c.1-4.2. Values of indicators SO5 R2; 1.c.1-4.3. Normative judgements by relevant stakeholders;		
1.c.4. What progress was made towards putting in place measures, safeguard		1.c.1-4.1. Intervention logic of relevant measures;		

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Evaluation question	Judgement Criteria	Indicator (Descriptor)[43]	Methods	Sources
mechanisms and best practices for the identification and support of witnesses and victims of crime, including victims of terrorism, and how did the Fund contribute to the achievement of this progress?		1.c.1-4.2. Values of indicators S05 I4 S05 C3; 1.c.1-4.3. Normative judgements by relevant stakeholders;		
1.d. Effectiveness criteria (How did the Fund contribute to improving the capacity of Member States to manage effectively security-related risks and crises, and protecting people and critical infrastructure against terrorist attacks and other security-related incidents?)				
1.d.1. What progress was made towards reinforcing Member States' administrative and operational capability to protect critical infrastructure in all sectors of economic activity, including through public-private partnerships and improved coordination, cooperation, exchange and dissemination of know-how and experience within the Union and with relevant third Countries, and how did the Fund contribute to the achievement of this progress?	1.d.1-3.1. The intervention logic of successfully completed projects is in line with the impact goals; 1.d. 1-3.2. Values of respective common results and impact indicators allow to draw conclusions on the impact of the Programme; 1.d. 1-3.3. Stakeholders recognize the impact, produced by the Programme.	1.d.1-3.1. Intervention logic of relevant measures; 1.d.1-3.2. Values of indicators S06 R1 S06 R2 S06 I1; 1.d.1-3.3. Normative judgements by relevant stakeholders;	a) Semi-structured interviews; b) Analysis of financial and physical progress; c) Theory based impact evaluation; d) Reconstruction of intervention logic.	a) Reports by involved institutions; b) Legal documents related to the Programme; c) Data from semi-structured interviews; d) Monitoring data.
1.d.2. What progress was made towards establishing secure links and effective coordination between existing sector-specific early warning and crisis cooperation actors at Union and national level, and how did the Fund contribute to the achievement of this progress?		1.d.1-3.1. Intervention logic of relevant measures; 1.d.1-3.2. Values of indicators S06 R1 S06 R2 S06 I1; 1.d.1-3.3. Normative judgements by relevant stakeholders;		
1.d.3. What progress was made towards improving the administrative and operational capacity of the Member States and the Union to develop comprehensive threat and risk assessments, and how did the Fund contribute to the achievement of this progress?		1.d.1-3.1. Intervention logic of relevant measures; 1.d.1-3.2. Values of indicators S06 R2 S06 C2; 1.d.1-3.3. Normative judgements by relevant stakeholders;		

Evaluation question	Judgement Criteria	Indicator (Descriptor)[43]	Methods	Sources
2. **Efficiency criteria** (*Were the general objectives of the Fund achieved at a reasonable cost?*)				
2.1. To what extent were the expected results of the Fund achieved at a reasonable cost in terms of deployed financial and human resources?	2.1.1. The amount of financial resources used for administration (technical support) are on track or below the goals established; 2.1.2. There are proofs of either reactive or proactive actions by MA and/or IB, addressing issues related to efficiency.	2.1.1.a. Amount of financial recourses used are lower than a threshold (AFPP/PSSA); 2.1.2.a. Normative judgements from potential and actual partners (SI); 2.1.2.b. Proofs of actions taken (PSSA).	a) Semi-structured interviews; b) Analysis of financial and physical progress; c) Primary and secondary source analysis.	a) Reports by involved institutions; b) Legal documents related to the Programme; c) Data from semi-structured interviews; d) Monitoring data.
2.2. What measures were put in place to prevent, detect, report and follow up on cases of fraud and other irregularities, and how did they perform?	2.2.1. There are formal procedures in place to detect, prevent, report, and follow up on cases of fraud and other irregularities; 2.2.2. There is proof of these procedures being followed; 2.2.3. These procedures are efficient and effective.	2.2.1.a. Existence of formal procedures (PSSA); 2.2.2.a. Reports of measures being taken related to fraud and other irregularities (PSSA); 2.2.3.a. Normative judgements from potential and actual partners (SI).	a) Semi-structured interviews; b) Primary and secondary source analysis.	a) Reports by involved institutions; b) Legal documents related to the Programme; c) Reports by involved institutions; d) Monitoring data.
3. **Relevance criteria** (*Did the objectives of the interventions funded by the Fund correspond to the actual needs?*)				
3.1. Did the objectives set by the Member State in their National Programmes respond to the identified needs? Did the objectives set in the Annual Work Programme (Union actions) address the actual needs? Did the objectives set in the Annual Work Programme (Emergency assistance) address the actual needs?	3.1.1. The programme stakeholders are correctly identified in line with the objectives established legally; 3.1.2. The needs analysis that led to the definition of the programme and related distribution of resources is in line with relevant current and prospect needs of the relevant stakeholders; 3.1.3. The strategy developed to address identified needs, which is translated into concrete milestones and targets, aims to address the most relevant needs with proportionate resources; 3.1.4. The list of implementation measures included in the legal basis and planned within the programme is suitable to address the current and prospective needs of the target groups.	3.1.1.a. The list of stakeholders is comprehensive and involves all institutions and organisations that are relevant to the objectives of the Programme (NA/SM); 3.1.2.a. There is evidence that a needs assessment was performed, which reflected the needs of stakeholders (PSSA); 3.1.2.b. Normative judgements by programme authorities (SI). 3.1.3.a. Milestones and targets of the Programme reflects the identified needs (RIL);	a) Reconstruction of the intervention logic; b) Needs assessment/stakeholder mapping; c) Semi-structured interviews d) Primary and secondary source analysis.	a) Reports by involved institutions; b) Legal documents related to the Programme; c) Data from semi-structured interviews;

Evaluation question	Judgement Criteria	Indicator (Descriptor)[43]	Methods	Sources
		3.1.4.a. Measures of the Programme reflect the identified needs (RIL);		
3.2. Which measures did the Member State put in place to address changing needs?	3.2.1. There is evidence of changing needs being addressed by the MA/IB in response to changing needs of stakeholders.	3.2.1.a. There is formal evidence of timely input of the partnership / Monitoring Committee on evolving needs and relevant developments on the ground (PSSA); 3.2.1.b. Normative judgements by programme authorities from potential and actual partners (SI); 3.2.1.c. Examples of swift adjustments of the programme could be identified in reports of involved institutions (PSSA/SI).	a) Semi-structured interviews; b) Primary and secondary source analysis.	a) Reports by involved institutions; b) Legal documents related to the Programme; c) Data from semi-structured interviews;
4. **Coherence criteria** (*Were the objectives set in the national programme coherent with the ones set in other programmes funded by EU resources and applying to similar areas of work? Was the coherence ensured also during the implementation of the Fund?*)				
4.1. Was an assessment of other interventions with similar objectives carried out and taken into account during the programming stage?	4.1.1. Assessment of other similar interventions has been carried out before the start of the Programme and conclusions of such assessment has been taken into consideration.	4.1.1.a. Evidence of formal assessment (PSSA); 4.1.1.b. Normative judgements by programme authorities from potential and actual partners (SI).	a) Semi-structured interviews; b) Primary and secondary source analysis.	a) Reports by involved institutions; b) Legal documents related to the ISF; c) Data from semi-structured interviews.
4.2. Were coordination mechanisms between the Fund and other interventions with similar objectives established for the implementing period?	4.2.1. Structures, organisational arrangements, or coordination mechanisms are in place which ensure coordination, complementarities and, where relevant, synergies across the different management modes of the same programme; 4.2.2. Coordination mechanisms and arrangements are used regularly and to good effect;	4.2.1.a. Evidence of structures or other coordination mechanisms exists (PSSA); 4.2.2.a. Normative judgements by programme authorities from potential and actual partners (SI); 4.2.2.b. Formal examples of these coordination mechanisms being used (PSSA);	a) Semi-structured interviews; b) Primary and secondary source analysis.	a) Reports by involved institutions; b) Legal documents related to the ISF; c) Data from semi-structured interviews.

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Evaluation question	Judgement Criteria	Indicator (Descriptor)[43]	Methods	Sources
4.3. Were the actions implemented through the Fund coherent with and non-contradictory to other interventions with similar objectives?	4.3.1. Alleged overlaps are justified on objective grounds (e.g. same target group but a different type of measure/ different need addressed/ different readiness of the type of funding support chosen); 4.3.2. The programme is coherent with the current policy agendas at the EU and national level;	4.3.1. a. All alleged overlaps are justified (RIL); 4.3.2.a. Coherence with policy agenda at the EU and national level could be established (RIL/PSSA)	a) Reconstruction of the intervention logic; b) Primary and secondary source analysis.	a) Reports by involved institutions; b) Legal documents related to the ISF.
5. Complementarity criteria (*Were the objectives set in the national programme and the corresponding implemented actions complementary to those set in the framework of other policies — in particular those pursued by the Member State?*)				
5.1. Was an assessment of other interventions with complementary objectives carried out and taken into account during the programming stage?	5.1.1. An assessment of other interventions with complementary objectives was carried out and taken into account during the programming stage.	4.1.1.a. Evidence of formal assessment (PSSA); 4.1.1.b. Normative judgements by programme authorities from potential and actual partners (SI).	a) Semi-structured interviews; b) Primary and secondary source analysis	a) Reports by involved institutions; b) Legal documents related to the Programme; c) Data from semi-structured interviews.
5.2. Were coordination mechanisms between the Fund and other interventions with similar objectives established for the implementing period to ensure their complementarity for the implementing period? Were mechanisms aimed to prevent the overlapping of financial instruments put in place?	5.2.1. Coordination mechanisms, with the goal of ensuring complementarity, between the Programme and other interventions with similar objectives were established for the implementing period to ensure their complementarity for the implementing period. 5.2.2. Mechanisms aimed to prevent the overlapping of financial instruments were in place.	4.3.1.a. All alleged overlaps are justified (RIL); 4.3.2.a. Complementarity with policy agenda at the EU and national level could be established (RIL/PSSA).	a) Reconstruction of the intervention logic; b) Primary and secondary source analysis.	a) Reports by involved institutions; b) Legal documents related to the ISF.
6. EU added value criteria (*Was any added value brought about by the EU support?*)				
6.1. What are the main types of added value resulting from the support of the Fund (volume, scope, role, process)?	6.1.1. There is evidence of volume, scope, role and process effects (type of value added).	6.1.1.a. Intervention logic of relevant measures; 6.1.1.b. Normative judgements by relevant stakeholders.	a) Reconstruction of the intervention logic; b) Primary and secondary source analysis; c) Needs assessment/stakeholder mapping.	a) Reports by involved institutions; b) Legal documents related to the ISF; c) Data from semi-structured interviews; d) Monitoring data.

Evaluation question	Judgement Criteria	Indicator (Descriptor)[43]	Methods	Sources
6.2. Would the Member State have carried out the actions required to implement the EU policies in the areas supported by the Fund without its financial support? What would be the most likely consequences of an interruption of the support provided by the Fund?	6.2.1. The programme focuses on areas, interventions, and target groups where the results can go beyond what can be achieved by the Member States acting on their own.	6.2.1.a. Intervention logic of relevant measures; 6.2.1.b. Normative judgements by relevant stakeholders.	a) Reconstruction of the intervention logic; b) Primary and secondary source analysis; c) Needs assessment/stakeholder mapping; d) Semi-structured interviews.	a) Reports by involved institutions; b) Legal documents related to the ISF; c) Data from semi-structured interviews; d) Monitoring data.
6.3. To which extent have actions supported by the Fund resulted in a benefit at the Union level?	6.3.1. The impact of the Programme resulted in a benefit at the Union level.	6.3.1.a. Intervention logic of relevant measures; 6.3.1.b. Normative judgements by relevant stakeholders.	a) Reconstruction of the intervention logic; b) Primary and secondary source analysis; c) Needs assessment/stakeholder mapping; d) Semi-structured interviews.	a) Reports by involved institutions; b) Legal documents related to the ISF; c) Data from semi-structured interviews; d) Monitoring data.
6.4. What was the added value of the operating support?	6.4.1. There is evidence of value added as a result of operating support.	6.4.1.a. Normative judgements by relevant stakeholders.	a) Primary and secondary source analysis; b) Needs assessment/stakeholder mapping; c) Semi-structured interviews.	a) Data from semi-structured interviews; b) Monitoring data.
7. Sustainability criteria (*Are the positive effects of the projects supported by the Fund likely to last when its support will be over?*)				
7.1. What were the main measures adopted by the Member State to ensure the sustainability of the results of the projects implemented with the support of the Fund (both at the programming and implementation stage)? Were mechanisms put in place to ensure a sustainability check at the programming and implementation stage?	7.1.1. Mechanisms were in place to ensure a sustainability check at the programming and implementation stages.	7.1.1.a. Evidence of formal assessment (PSSA); 7.1.1.b. Normative judgements by relevant stakeholders.	a) Primary and secondary source analysis; b) Needs assessment/stakeholder mapping; c) Semi-structured interviews.	a) Legal documents related to the ISF; b) Data from semi-structured interviews.

Evaluation question	Judgement Criteria	Indicator (Descriptor)[43]	Methods	Sources
7.2. To what extent are the outcomes/benefits of the actions sustained by the Fund expected to continue thereafter? What measures were adopted to ensure the continuity of the activities carried out thanks to the operating support?	7.2.1. There is evidence that the investments made under the implementation of the Programme will be in use (equipment, infrastructure, IT systems) or will continue thereafter (other investments); 7.2.2. Operating support ensured the continuity of the activities carried out.	7.2.1.a. Normative judgements by relevant stakeholders; 7.2.1.b. Evidence of formal assessment (PSSA).	a) Primary and secondary source analysis; b) Semi-structured interviews; c) Analysis of financial and physical progress.	a) Data from semi-structured interviews; b) Reports by involved institutions; c) Monitoring data.
8. Simplification and reduction of administrative burden criteria (*Were the management procedures of the Fund simplified, and the administrative burden reduced for its beneficiaries?*)				
8.1. Did the innovative procedures introduced by the Fund (simplified cost option, multiannual programming, national eligibility rules, more comprehensive national programmes allowing for flexibility, operating support and Special Transit Scheme for Lithuania) lead to simplification for the beneficiaries of the Fund?	8.1.1. Procedures leading to simplification of costs for the beneficiaries of the Programme are in place and being benefited from. 8.1.2. Procedures leading to simplification of costs for the beneficiaries of the Programme impact reduction of administrative burden.	8.1.1.a.-8.1.1.a. Normative judgements by relevant stakeholders; 8.1.2.b.-8.1.2.b. Evidence of formal assessment (PSSA).	a) Primary and secondary source analysis; b) Semi-structured interviews.	a) Legal documents related to the ISF; b) Data from semi-structured interviews.

Source: composed by the Evaluator

Annex 2. List of indicators

Table 17. List of indicators by SO, type and data source

SO	Indicator	Source of data	Target value	Baseline value	Y2014	Y2015	Y2016	Y2017	Y2018	Y2019	Y2020	Y2021	Y2022	Y2023	Y2024	Total	Notes
SO1	Number of consular cooperation activities developed with the help of the Fund: (so1r2v1, source: AIR (indicator SO1 C1))	AIR (indicator SO1 C1)	1,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	1,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	1,00	Source: annual reports
	(a) co-locations, (so1r2v1a, source: AIR (indicator SO1 C1.a))	AIR (indicator SO1 C1.a)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	Source: annual reports
	(b) common application centres, (so1r2v1b, source: AIR (indicator SO1 C1.b))	AIR (indicator SO1 C1.b)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	Source: annual reports
	(c) representations, (so1r2v1c, source: AIR (indicator SO1 C1.c))	AIR (indicator SO1 C1.c)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	1,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	1,00	Source: annual reports
	(d) others. (so1r2v1d, source: AIR (indicator SO1 C1.d))	AIR (indicator SO1 C1.d)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	Source: annual reports
	Number of staff trained in aspects related to the common visa policy with the help of the Fund (so1r3v1, source: AIR (indicator SO1 C2.1))	AIR (indicator SO1 C2.1)	400,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	48,00	55,00	130,00	42,00	84,00	31,00	159,00	0,00	0,00	549,00	Source: annual reports
	Number of training courses in aspects related to the common visa policy with the help of the Fund (hours completed) (so1r3v2, source: AIR (indicator SO1 C2.2))	AIR (indicator SO1 C2.2)	80 000,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	1 758,00	2 144,00	1 785,00	729,30	1 344,00	806,00	2 171,90	0,00	0,00	10 738,20	Source: annual reports
	Number of consulates developed or upgraded with the help of the Fund out of the total number of consulates (so1r4v1, source: AIR (indicator SO1 C4.1))	AIR (indicator SO1 C4.1)	40,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	17,00	14,00	20,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	51,00	Source: annual reports
	Percentage of consulates developed or upgraded with the help of the Fund out of the total number of consulates (so1r4v2, source: AIR (indicator SO1 C4.2))	AIR (indicator SO1 C4.2)	80,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	33,33	27,45	39,22	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	100,00	Source: annual reports

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(a) Number of Schengen Evaluation recommendations in the area of visa addressed with the support of the Fund (so1r5v1a, source: Member States)	Member States	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	It was not financed as there were no needs.
Number of Schengen Evaluation recommendations in the area of visa addressed with the support of the Fund, as compared to the total number of recommendations issued (so1r5v1ab, source: Calculate based on other indicators)	Calculate based on other indicators	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	No recommendations were legaly binding; thus, none were implemented.
(b) Total number of Schengen Evaluation recommendations issued (so1r5v1b, source: Member States)	Member States	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	36,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	36,00	Source: MoI
Number of persons using fraudulent travel documents detected at consulates supported by the Fund: (so1r6v1, source: Member States)	Member States	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	According to the MFA, no such data is collected.
(a) Number of persons with fraudulent documents applying for a Schengen visa (so1r6v1a, source: Member States)	Member States	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	According to the MFA, no such data is collected.
(b) Total number of persons applying for a Schengen visa (so1r6v1b, source: Member States)	Member States	NA	NA	463 709,00	423 189,00	421 143,00	413 966,00	353 059,00	359 484,00	66 800,00	24 764,00	26 556,00	30 668,00	NA	2 583 338,00	Source: https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/schengen-borders-and-visa/visa-policy/short-stay-visas-issued-schengen-countries_en
(c) Percentage of persons with fraudulent documents applying for a Schengen visa (so1r6v1c, source: Calculate based on other indicators)	Calculate based on other indicators	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0,00	It is not possible to calculate it, as such data is not collected.
Number of visa applicants having to apply for a Schengen visa outside of their country of residence (so1i1v1, source: Member States)	Member States	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0,00	According to the MFA, no such data is collected.

	Indicator	Source														Total	Source note
	Number of specialised posts in third countries supported by the Fund (so1a1v1, source: AIR (indicator SO1 C3))	AIR (indicator SO1 C3)	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	2,00	2,00	2,00	2,00	2,00	2,00	2,00	2,00	0,00	16,00	Source: annual reports 2016-2023 m.
	Number of specialised posts in third countries supported by the Fund, of which ILOs (so1a1v1a, source: AIR (indicator SO1 C3.a))	AIR (indicator SO1 C3.a)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	Source: annual reports
	Number of specialised posts in third countries supported by the Fund, of which Others (so1a1v1b, source: AIR (indicator SO1 C3.b))	AIR (indicator SO1 C3.b)	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	2,00	2,00	2,00	2,00	2,00	2,00	2,00	2,00	0,00	16,00	Source: annual reports
	Number of staff trained in borders management related aspects with the help of the Fund (so2r1v1, source: AIR (indicator SO2 C1.1))	AIR (indicator SO2 C1.1)	1 960,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	263,00	169,00	187,00	258,00	192,00	15,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	1 084,00	Source: annual reports
	Number of training courses in border management related aspects with the help of the Fund (so2r1v2, source: AIR (indicator SO2 C1.2))	AIR (indicator SO2 C1.2)	98 000,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	20 639,00	5 856,00	22 682,22	34 744,00	9 008,00	364,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	93 293,22	Source: annual reports
	Number of border crossings of the external borders through ABC gates supported from the Fund (so2r2v1, source: AIR (indicator SO2 C3.1))	AIR (indicator SO2 C3.1)	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	Source: annual reports
SO2	Total number of border crossings (so2r2v2, source: AIR (indicator SO2 C3.2))	AIR (indicator SO2 C3.2)	11 000 000,00	0,00	10 852 706,00	9 119 473,00	9 837 428,00	10 221 501,00	11 665 131,00	11 724 210,00	3 892 394,00	3 056 920,00	6 357 324,00	7 302 909,00	2 794 371,00	86 824 367,00	Source: annual reports
	(a) Number of Schengen Evaluation recommendations in the area of borders addressed with the support of the Fund (so2r4v1a, source: Member States)	Member States	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	1,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	1,00	Source: MIA
	Number of Schengen Evaluation recommendations in the area of borders addressed with the support of the Fund, as compared to the total number of recommendations issued (so2r4v1ab, source: Calculate based on other indicators)	Calculate based on other indicators	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	2,50	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	2,50	Calculated from what data is available.

Indicator	Source														Total	Source
(b) Total number of Schengen Evaluation recommendations in the area of borders issued (so2r4v1b, source: Member States)	Member States	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	40,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	40,00	Source: MoI
Number of national border surveillance infrastructure established/further developed in the framework of EUROSUR: (so2i1v1, source: AIR (indicator SO2 C4))	AIR (indicator SO2 C4)	14,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	6,00	2,00	2,00	1,00	1,00	2,00	0,00	0,00	14,00	Source: annual reports
(a) National coordination centres (so2i1v1a, source: AIR (indicator SO2 C4.a))	AIR (indicator SO2 C4.a)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	1,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	1,00	Source: annual reports
(b) Regional coordination centres (so2i1v1b, source: AIR (indicator SO2 C4.b))	AIR (indicator SO2 C4.b)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	Source: annual reports
(c) Local coordination centres (so2i1v1c, source: AIR (indicator SO2 C4.c))	AIR (indicator SO2 C4.c)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	6,00	2,00	1,00	1,00	1,00	2,00	0,00	0,00	13,00	Source: annual reports
(d) Other types of coordination centres (so2i1v1d, source: AIR (indicator SO2 C4.d))	AIR (indicator SO2 C4.d)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	Source: annual reports
Number of incidents reported by the Member State to the European Situational Picture (so2i2v1, source: AIR (indicator SO2 C5))	AIR (indicator SO2 C5)	4 000,00	0,00	2 965,00	2 787,00	4 566,00	4 888,00	4 429,00	4 576,00	2 746,00	4 319,00	6 473,00	2 682,00	1 382,00	41 813,00	Source: annual reports
(a) Illegal immigration, including on incidents relating to a risk to the lives of migrants (so2i2v1a, source: AIR (indicator SO2 C5.a))	AIR (indicator SO2 C5.a)	NA	0,00	2 676,00	2 519,00	4 283,00	4 534,00	4 155,00	4 343,00	2 621,00	4 079,00	6 027,00	2 138,00	590,00	37 965,00	Source: annual reports
(b) Cross-border crime (so2i2v1b, source: AIR (indicator SO2 C5.b))	AIR (indicator SO2 C5.b)	NA	0,00	289,00	268,00	283,00	352,00	273,00	232,00	124,00	190,00	273,00	288,00	256,00	2 828,00	Source: annual reports
(c) Crisis situations (so2i2v1c, source: AIR (indicator SO2 C5.c))	AIR (indicator SO2 C5.c)	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	Source: annual reports
Number of border control (checks and surveillance) infrastructure and means developed or upgraded with the help of the	AIR (indicator SO2 C2)	358,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	2,00	300,00	529,00	502,00	1,00	11,00	423,00	0,00	1 768,00	Source: annual reports

	Indicator															Total	Source
Fund (so2a1v1, source: AIR (indicator SO2 C2))																	
of which, Infrastructure (so2a1v1a, source: AIR (indicator SO2 C2.a))	AIR (indicator SO2 C2.a)	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	1,00	1,00	0,00	1,00	0,00	3,00	Source: annual reports
of which, Fleet (air, land, sea borders) (so2a1v1b, source: AIR (indicator SO2 C2.b))	AIR (indicator SO2 C2.b)	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	2,00	94,00	3,00	119,00	0,00	11,00	2,00	0,00	231,00	Source: annual reports
of which, Equipment (so2a1v1c, source: AIR (indicator SO2 C2.c))	AIR (indicator SO2 C2.c)	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	206,00	490,00	382,00	0,00	0,00	419,00	0,00	1 497,00	Source: annual reports
of which, Others (so2a1v1d, source: AIR (indicator SO2 C2.d))	AIR (indicator SO2 C2.d)	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	36,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	1,00	0,00	37,00	Source: annual reports
SO5 — Number of projects in the area of crime prevention (so5a1v1, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C3.1))	AIR (indicator SO5 C3.1)	47,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	18,00	9,00	7,00	13,00	8,00	1,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	56,00	Source: annual reports
of which, on Terrorism (so5a1v1a, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C3.1a))	AIR (indicator SO5 C3.1a)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	1,00	0,00	2,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	3,00	Source: annual reports
of which, on Trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation of women and children (so5a1v1b, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C3.1b))	AIR (indicator SO5 C3.1b)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	Source: annual reports
of which, On Illicit drug trafficking (so5a1v1c, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C3.1c))	AIR (indicator SO5 C3.1c)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	1,00	1,00	1,00	1,00	1,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	5,00	Source: annual reports
of which, On Illicit arms trafficking (so5a1v1d, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C3.1d))	AIR (indicator SO5 C3.1d)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	1,00	0,00	0,00	1,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	2,00	Source: annual reports
of which, on Money laundering (so5a1v1e, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C3.1e))	AIR (indicator SO5 C3.1e)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	Source: annual reports
of which, on Corruption (so5a1v1f, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C3.1f))	AIR (indicator SO5 C3.1f)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	2,00	0,00	3,00	1,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	6,00	Source: annual reports
of which, on Counterfeiting of means of payment (so5a1v1g, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C3.1g))	AIR (indicator SO5 C3.1g)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	Source: annual reports
of which, on Computer crime (so5a1v1h, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C3.1h))	AIR (indicator SO5 C3.1h)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	1,00	1,00	0,00	1,00	1,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	4,00	Source: annual reports

Indicator	Source															Total	
of which, on Organised crime (so5a1v1i, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C3.1i))	AIR (indicator SO5 C3.1i)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	15,00	5,00	5,00	7,00	3,00	1,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	36,00	Source: annual reports
Financial value of projects in the area of crime prevention (so5a1v2, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C3.2))	AIR (indicator SO5 C3.2)	16 260 975,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	4 057 687,33	3 255 608,94	3 401 557,47	3 023 362,61	2 188 929,31	324 698,52	0,00	0,00	0,00	16 251 844,18	Source: annual reports
of which, on Terrorism (so5a1v2a, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C3.2a))	AIR (indicator SO5 C3.2a)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	139 337,55	0,00	660 709,40	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	800 046,95	Source: annual reports
of which, on Trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation of women and children (so5a1v2b, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C3.2b))	AIR (indicator SO5 C3.2b)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	Source: annual reports
of which, on Illicit drug trafficking (so5a1v2c, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C3.2c))	AIR (indicator SO5 C3.2c)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	327 292,63	243 942,87	163 792,86	337 358,77	328 053,66	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	1 400 440,79	Source: annual reports
of which, on Illicit arms trafficking (so5a1v2d, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C3.2d))	AIR (indicator SO5 C3.2d)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	447 727,93	0,00	0,00	453 263,90	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	900 991,83	Source: annual reports
of which, on Money laundering (so5a1v2e, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C3.2e))	AIR (indicator SO5 C3.2e)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	Source: annual reports
of which, on Corruption (so5a1v2f, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C3.2f))	AIR (indicator SO5 C3.2f)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	57 058,52	0,00	651 727,40	145 122,78	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	853 908,70	Source: annual reports
of which, on Counterfeiting of means of payment (so5a1v2g, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C3.2g))	AIR (indicator SO5 C3.2g)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	Source: annual reports
of which, on Computer crime (so5a1v2h, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C3.2h))	AIR (indicator SO5 C3.2h)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	386 835,32	940 170,00	0,00	389 796,55	864 975,45	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	2 581 777,32	Source: annual reports
of which, on Organised crime (so5a1v2i, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C3.2i))	AIR (indicator SO5 C3.2i)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	2 895 831,45	2 014 437,55	3 098 427,06	1 191 215,99	190 068,02	324 698,52	0,00	0,00	0,00	9 714 678,59	Source: annual reports
Number of projects supported by the Fund, aiming to improve law enforcement information exchanges which are related to Europol data systems, repositories or communication tools (e.g. data loaders, extending access to SIENA, projects aiming to	AIR (indicator SO5 C4)	8,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	2,00	2,00	2,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	6,00	Source: annual reports

Indicator	AIR code														Total	Source
improving input to analysis work files etc.) (so5a2v1, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C4))																
of which, on Data loaders (so5a2v1a, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C4a))	AIR (indicator SO5 C4a)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	Source: annual reports
of which, on Extending access to SIENA (so5a2v1b, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C4b))	AIR (indicator SO5 C4b)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	Source: annual reports
of which, on Projects aiming to improving input to analysis work files etc. (so5a2v1c, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C4c))	AIR (indicator SO5 C4c)	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	2,00	2,00	2,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	6,00	Source: annual reports
Number of joint investigation teams (JITs) and European Multidisciplinary Platform against Criminal Threats (EMPACT) operation projects supported by the Fund, including the participating Member States and authorities (so5r1v1, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C1))	AIR (indicator SO5 C1)	2,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	1,00	2,00	0,00	1,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	4,00	Source: annual reports
Leader (Member State) (so5r1v1a, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C1.a))	AIR (indicator SO5 C1.a)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	Source: annual reports
Partners (Member States) (so5r1v1b, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C1.b))	AIR (indicator SO5 C1.b)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	Source: annual reports
Participating authorities (so5r1v1c, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C1.c))	AIR (indicator SO5 C1.c)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	1,00	2,00	0,00	1,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	4,00	Source: annual reports
Participating EU Agency (Eurojust, Europol), if applicable (so5r1v1d, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C1.d))	AIR (indicator SO5 C1.d)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	Source: annual reports
Number of law enforcement officials trained on cross-border related topics with the help of the Fund (so5r2v1, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C2.1))	AIR (indicator SO5 C2.1)	480,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	100,00	294,00	155,00	111,00	18,00	240,00	932,00	43,00	0,00	1 893,00	Source: annual reports
of which, on Terrorism (so5r2v1a, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C2.1a))	AIR (indicator SO5 C2.1a)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	Source: annual reports

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Indicator	AIR														Total	Source
of which, on Trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation of women and children (so5r2v1b, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C2.1b))	AIR (indicator SO5 C2.1b)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	Source: annual reports
of which, on Illicit drug trafficking (so5r2v1c, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C2.1c))	AIR (indicator SO5 C2.1c)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	1,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	1,00	Source: annual reports
of which, on Illicit arms trafficking (so5r2v1d, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C2.1d))	AIR (indicator SO5 C2.1d)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	Source: annual reports
of which, on Money laundering (so5r2v1e, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C2.1e))	AIR (indicator SO5 C2.1e)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	Source: annual reports
of which, on Corruption (so5r2v1f, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C2.1f))	AIR (indicator SO5 C2.1f)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	53,00	0,00	25,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	78,00	Source: annual reports
of which, on Counterfeiting of means of payment (so5r2v1g, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C2.1g))	AIR (indicator SO5 C2.1g)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	Source: annual reports
of which, on Computer crime (so5r2v1h, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C2.1h))	AIR (indicator SO5 C2.1h)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	6,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	6,00	Source: annual reports
of which, on Organised crime (so5r2v1i, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C2.1i))	AIR (indicator SO5 C2.1i)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	336,00	0,00	0,00	336,00	Source: annual reports
of which, on the Area of law enforcement: information exchange (so5r2v1j, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C2.1j))	AIR (indicator SO5 C2.1j)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	8,00	6,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	100,00	596,00	0,00	0,00	710,00	Source: annual reports
of which, on the Area of law enforcement: operational cooperation (so5r2v1k, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C2.1k))	AIR (indicator SO5 C2.1k)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	91,00	235,00	155,00	86,00	18,00	134,00	0,00	43,00	0,00	762,00	Source: annual reports
Duration of the training (carried out) on cross-border related topics with the help of the fund (so5r2v2, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C2.2))	AIR (indicator SO5 C2.2)	1 440,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	321,00	2 324,00	1 917,00	625,00	90,00	1 660,00	10 621,00	175,00	0,00	17 733,00	Source: annual reports
of which, on Terrorism (so5r2v2a, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C2.2a))	AIR (indicator SO5 C2.2a)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	Source: annual reports
of which, on Trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation of	AIR (indicator SO5 C2.2b)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	Source: annual reports

women and children (so5r2v2b, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C2.2b))

Description	Source														Total	Note
of which, on Illicit drug trafficking (so5r2v2c, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C2.2c))	AIR (indicator SO5 C2.2c)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	5,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	5,00	Source: annual reports
of which, on Illicit arms trafficking (so5r2v2d, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C2.2d))	AIR (indicator SO5 C2.2d)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	Source: annual reports
of which, on Money laundering (so5r2v2e, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C2.2e))	AIR (indicator SO5 C2.2e)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	Source: annual reports
of which, on Corruption (so5r2v2f, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C2.2f))	AIR (indicator SO5 C2.2f)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	177,00	0,00	132,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	309,00	Source: annual reports
of which, on Counterfeiting of means of payment (so5r2v2g, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C2.2g))	AIR (indicator SO5 C2.2g)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	Source: annual reports
of which, on Computer crime (so5r2v2h, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C2.2h))	AIR (indicator SO5 C2.2h)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	30,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	30,00	Source: annual reports
of which, on Organised crime (so5r2v2i, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C2.2i))	AIR (indicator SO5 C2.2i)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	7,00	254,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	7 904,00	0,00	0,00	8 165,00	Source: annual reports
of which, on the Area of law enforcement: information exchange (so5r2v2j, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C2.2j))	AIR (indicator SO5 C2.2j)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	16,00	12,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	1 196,00	0,00	2 717,00	175,00	4 116,00	Source: annual reports
of which, on the Area of law enforcement: operational cooperation (so5r2v2k, source: AIR (indicator SO5 C2.2k))	AIR (indicator SO5 C2.2k)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	293,00	1 881,00	1 917,00	493,00	90,00	434,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	5 108,00	Source: annual reports
Results of actions supported by the Fund leading to the disruption of organised crime groups: 1. seizures of criminal commodities: a. Counterfeited goods (so5r3v1a, source: Member States)	Member States	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	Data is not collected.
seizures of criminal commodities: b. Contraband goods (so5r3v1b, source: Member States)	Member States	NA	NA	15 149 288,00	30 599 341,00	34 933 678,00	22 399 406,00	25 530 102,00	33 974 376,00	67 944 013,00	86 763 303,00	43 789 945,00	63 606 787,00	NA	424 690 239,00	Source: customs department

Indicator	Source															Notes
seizures of criminal commodities: c. Stolen goods (so5r3v1c, source: Member States)	Member States	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	Non-public data, not provided by PD.
seizures of criminal commodities: d. Firearms (so5r3v1d, source: Member States)	Member States	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	Non-public data, not provided by PD.
seizures of criminal commodities: e. Environmental crimes (so5r3v1e, source: Member States)	Member States	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	Non-public data, not provided by PD.
Cannabis (so5r3v1a1, source: Member States)	Member States	NA	NA	173,00	1 380,00	156,00	1 276,00	809,00	3 041,00	1 357,00	1 081,00	883,00	2 551,00	NA	12 707,00	Source: ITCD
Heroin (so5r3v1a2, source: Member States)	Member States	NA	NA	3,00	11,00	10,00	1,00	0,00	26,00	1,00	3,00	2,00	1,00	NA	58,00	Source: ITCD
Cocaine (so5r3v1a3, source: Member States)	Member States	NA	NA	239,00	10,00	60,00	5,00	317,00	488,00	56,00	6,00	88,00	848,00	NA	2 117,00	Source: ITCD
Amphetamine - methamphetamine (so5r3v1a4, source: Member States)	Member States	NA	NA	34,00	115,00	87,00	67,00	14,00	112,00	5,00	18,00	353,00	75,00	NA	880,00	Source: ITCD
Ecstasy (so5r3v1a5, source: Member States)	Member States	NA	NA	60,00	67,00	322,00	611,00	388,00	648,00	1 552,00	398 336,00	77,00	78,00	NA	402 139,00	Source: ITCD
New psychoactive substances (so5r3v1a6, source: Member States)	Member States	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	Data is not collected.
LSD (so5r3v1a7, source: Member States)	Member States	NA	NA	0,00	5,00	0,00	403,00	275,00	590,00	3 436,00	1 708,00	242,00	6,00	NA	6 665,00	Source: ITCD
2. seizures of cash (by value); (so5r3v2, source: Member States)	Member States	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	Non-public data, not provided by PD.
3. seizures of other assets (by estimated value); (so5r3v3, source: Member States)	Member States	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	Non-public data, not provided by PD.
4. takedowns of web domains (number); (so5r3v4, source: Member States)	Member States	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	Non-public data, not provided by PD.
5. victims identified (for certain crime types); (so5r3v5, source: Member States)	Member States	NA	NA	45 409,00	42 173,00	44 448,00	44 008,00	42 836,00	35 443,00	28 404,00	24 638,00	25 551,00	24 588,00	NA	357 498,00	Source: State Data Agency of Lithuania
6. persons arrested (so5r3v6, source: Member States)	Member States	NA	NA	868,00	712,00	602,00	611,00	606,00	726,00	581,00	574,00	555,00	538,00	NA	6 373,00	Source: State Data Agency of Lithuania
Number/value of frozen, seized and confiscated criminal assets as a result of actions within the	Member States	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	Data is not collected.

scope of Regulation (EU) 513/2014:
1. number of freezing orders executed; (so5i1v1, source: Member States)

Indicator	Source																Notes
2. number of confiscation orders executed; (so5i1v2, source: Member States)	Member States	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA			Data is not collected.
3. estimated value of property frozen, at least of property frozen with a view to possible subsequent confiscation at the time of freezing; (so5i1v3, source: Member States)	Member States	NA	NA	8 628 784,00	10 437 585,00	10 262 032,00	5 547 133,00	9 616 032,00	166 751 671,00	12 942 110,00	118 598 621,00	12 005 688,00	17 605 275,00	NA		372 394 931,00	Source: FCIS.
4. estimated value of property recovered at the time of confiscation (so5i1v4, source: Member States)	Member States	NA	NA	2 268 550,00	4 582 546,00	2 891 553,00	1 066 517,00	4 917 549,00	3 573 522,00	1 518 232,00	3 990 304,00	5 866 367,00	3 992 866,00	NA		34 668 006,00	Source: FCIS.
5. number of cases where the confiscation order issued on basis of the Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA has not been executed (so5i1v5, source: Member States)	Member States	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA			Data is not collected.
Number of protected or assisted crime victims: 1. Number of victims recorded by the law enforcement agencies (so5i4v1, source: Member States)	Member States	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA			Non-public data, not provided by PD.
2. Number of referrals by police to victim support services (so5i4v2, source: Member States)	Member States	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA			Non-public data, not provided by PD.
3. Number of victims that request and receive support (so5i4v3, source: Member States)	Member States	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA			Non-public data, not provided by PD.
4. Number of victims that request and do not receive support (so5i4v4, source: Member States)	Member States	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA			Non-public data, not provided by PD.
SO6 — Number of projects relating to the assessment and management of risks in the field of internal security supported by the Fund	AIR (indicator SO6 C2)	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	8,00	3,00	1,00	6,00	1,00	0,00	0,00	NA	NA		19,00	Source: annual reports

	Indicator	Source														Total	Source
	(so6a1v1, source: AIR (indicator SO6 C2))																
	Number of tools put in place or upgraded with the help of the Fund to facilitate the protection of critical infrastructure by Member States in all sectors of the economy (so6r1v1, source: AIR (indicator SO6 C1))	AIR (indicator SO6 C1)	3,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	2,00	0,00	0,00	2,00	6,00	0,00	14,00	NA	NA	24,00	Source: annual reports
	Number of expert meetings, workshops, seminars, conferences, publications, websites and (online) consultations organised with the help of the Fund (so6r2v1, source: AIR (indicator SO6 C3))	AIR (indicator SO6 C3)	15,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	7,00	7,00	0,00	1,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	NA	NA	15,00	Source: annual reports
	of which, Relating to critical infrastructure protection (so6r2v1a, source: AIR (indicator SO6 C3.a))	AIR (indicator SO6 C3.a)	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	NA	NA	0,00	Source: annual reports
	of which, Relating to crisis and risk management (so6r2v1b, source: AIR (indicator SO6 C3.b))	AIR (indicator SO6 C3.b)	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	7,00	7,00	0,00	1,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	NA	NA	15,00	Source: annual reports
General	Number of Full Time Equivalent in the Responsible Authority, the Delegated Authority and the Audit Authority working on the implementation of the Fund and paid by the technical assistance or national budgets as compared to: (H1, source: Member State)	Member State	NA	NA	0,00	4,70	27,27	31,27	32,88	29,53	28,27	26,15	25,74	18,48	0,00	224,29	Source: Programme institutions
	(a) the number of projects implemented (H1, source: Member State)	Member State	NA	NA	2,00	9,00	2,00	19,00	32,00	38,00	27,00	18,00	23,00	18,00	10,00	198,00	Source: IS VORAS
	(b) the amount of the funds claimed for the financial year (H1, source: Member State)	Member State	NA	NA	0,00	24 396 457,11	22 292 465,63	28 502 342,23	30 103 455,32	23 452 574,08	43 987 776,83	27 929 370,73	9 299 249,35	4 889 846,01	1 824 144,66	216 677 681,95	Source: annual reports
	(a) Technical assistance plus the administrative (indirect) cost (H2, source: Member State)	Member State	NA	NA	0,00	11 555,72	700 307,82	812 481,41	869 701,94	951 592,05	1 220 110,91	943 547,04	878 957,76	551 107,26	102 428,20	7 041 790,11	Source: Programme institutions
	(b) Amount of funds claimed for the financial year (H2, source: Member State)	Member State	NA	NA	0,00	24 396 457,11	22 292 465,63	28 502 342,23	30 103 455,32	23 452 574,08	43 987 776,83	27 929 370,73	9 299 249,35	4 889 846,01	1 824 144,66	216 677 681,95	Unused EUR 3649773,89 for ISF-b; EUR 31327,84 for ISF-p

Indicator	Source															Note
Technical assistance plus the administrative (indirect) cost of projects as compared to the amount of funds claimed for the financial year (H2, source: Calculate based on other indicators)	Calculate based on other indicators	NA	NA	0,0000	0,0005	0,0314	0,0285	0,0289	0,0406	0,0277	0,0338	0,0945	0,1127	0,0562	0,0325	Calculated on the basis of annual reports.
Amount of the annual accounts submitted by the Member State compared to the: (H3, source: SFC2014)	SFC2014	NA	NA	0,00	24 396 457,11	22 292 465,63	28 502 342,23	30 103 455,32	23 452 574,08	43 987 776,83	27 929 370,73	9 299 249,35	4 889 846,01	1 824 144,66	216 677 681,95	Source: annual reports
Total amount of funds allocated to the national programme. (H3, source: SFC2014)	SFC2014	NA	NA	45 625 489,00	42 375 611,00	38 310 807,00	35 162 472,33	34 435 110,68	24 449 293,67	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	220 358 783,68	Source: annual reports
Absorption rate of the Fund (H3, source: Calculate based on other indicators)	Calculate based on other indicators	NA	NA	0,0000	0,5757	0,5819	0,8106	0,8742	0,9592	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0,9833	Calculated on the basis of annual reports.
(a) Number of equipment in use 2 years after their acquisition (> than EUR 10.000) (H4, source: Member State)	Member State	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	5,00	129,00	230,00	175,00	51,00	73,00	24,00	70,00	757,00	Source: supplied by project promoters
(b) Number of equipment acquired under the Fund (> than EUR 10.000) (H4, source: Member State)	Member State	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	5,00	129,00	230,00	175,00	51,00	73,00	24,00	70,00	757,00	Source: supplied by project promoters
Number of equipment in use 2 years after their acquisition / number of equipment acquired under the Fund (> than EUR 10.000) (H4, source: Calculate based on other indicators)	Calculate based on other indicators	NA	NA	0,0000	0,0000	0,0000	1,0000	1,0000	1,0000	1,0000	1,0000	1,0000	1,0000	1,0000	1,0000	Calculated
(a) Maintenance cost of acquired equipment under the Fund (H5, source: Member State)	Member State	NA	NA	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	Source: supplied by project promoters
(b) Total EU contribution (H5, source: Member State)	Member State	NA	NA	0,00	24 396 457,11	22 292 465,63	28 502 342,23	30 103 455,32	23 452 574,08	43 987 776,83	27 929 370,73	9 299 249,35	4 889 846,01	1 824 144,66	216 677 681,95	Source: annual reports
Share of the maintenance cost of acquired equipment under the Fund in the total Union contribution to actions co-financed by the Fund (H5, source:	Calculate based on other indicators	NA	NA	0,0000	0,0000	0,0000	0,0000	0,0000	0,0000	0,0000	0,0000	0,0000	0,0000	0,0000	0,0000	Calculated

Calculate based on other indicators)	

Source: composed by the Evaluator